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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philoso-
phy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend 
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although 
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling 
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is 
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse 
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the 
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes 
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of 
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim: 
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects 
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such 
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the 
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the 
mnk order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This 
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is 
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarian-
ism is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor 
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being inde-
pendently of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be 
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support 
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the 
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than 
Prioritarianism. 
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Preface 
In recent moral philosophy, Egalitarianism, following Derek Parfit's vigor-
ous challenge, has become something of an unpopular position, although 
it has not been properly defined or understood. Many philosophers seem 
to have eschewed Egalitarianism for what has become known as Priori tar-
ianism. Nevertheless, Egalitarianism is still a widelyi"supported position in, 
economics. Economists go into the technical detail of 'Egalitarianism, but d~: 
not emphasize its normative scope fully. In this dissertation, drawing upon ,. 
insights from formal methods of economics, I shall defend a version of Egal-
itarianism, my aim being to revitalize its currency within moral philosophy. 
In writing this dissertation, I have benefited from the discussions with 
many people. My greatest gratitude goes to my ~o supervisors, Jo!;t.n 
Broome and John Skorupski. John Broome and JOhl\ Skorupski have been 
so helpful both academically and personally. Without their advise and en-
couragement, this dissertation could not have been completed. My thanks 
also go to Dave Archard, Garret Cullity, Roger Crisp, IvIarc Fleubaey, James 
Griffin, Katherine Hawley, Sune Holm, Kent Hurtig, I~arsten Klint Jensen, 
David IvIcCarthy, Andrew Mason, Dennis McKerlie, J?sh Parsons, Wlodek 
Rabinowicz, Joseph Raz, Stephen Read, Andrew Reisner, Simon Robertson, 
and Peter Vallentyne. I am very grateful for their comments and criticisms. 
I should note that some parts of chapter 7 appear in my "Saving the 
greater number without combining claims" (Analysis 61: 2001) and "Ag-
gregation and numbers" (Utilitas 16: 2004). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The present dissertation is about the distribution of well-being. 1',11 ore specif-
ically, it is about the betterness of distributions of well-being. vVe often judge 
that one distribution of well-being is better than another. This dissertation 
is concerned with principles underlying such judgements of relative good-
ness of distributions. There are many distributive principles. For the most 
of part, this dissertation concentrates on Egalitarianism and Derek Parfit's 
Prioritarianism. I shall put forward a version of Egalitarianism, and attempt 
to defend it. 
Egalitarianism, I believe, has not been properly understood in moral phi-
losophy. Until the 1970's, as Rawls (1971) famously pointed out, the domi-
nant doctrine in distributive justice was utilitarianism. Standard textbooks 
in political philosophy tell us that, as interpersonal aggregation of impar-
tial spectators allegedly violates the separateness of persons, non-utilitarian 
philosophers proposed a non-aggregative distributive principle, which gives 
absolute priority to the worst off person, or group, in some sense (John 
Ralws's Difference Principle, Thomas Nagel's pairwise comparison, Thomas 
Scanlon's contractualism, and so on). And these proposed principles are 
seen to reawaken Egalitarianism within contemporary political philosophy. 
True. Rawls's Difference Principle is motivated by an egalitarian concern, 
namely that inequality should be arranged so that it benefits the least advan-
taged group of the society. However, it is debat.able whether the Difference 
Principle really implies a version of Egalitarianism.] 
I Difference Principle may be seen as a version of deontic Egalitarianism. But it docs 
not claim that equality is a good or that inequality is a bad. 
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A radical claim on behalf of Egalitarianism has recently been made by 
Amartya Sen (1992). Sen claims that any sensible normative theory de-
mands equality of something. According to Sen, John Rawls demands both 
equal liberty and equality in the distribution of primary social goods; Ronald 
Dworkin demands treatment as equals and equality of resources; Thomas 
Nagel demands economic equality; utilitarianism demands equal weights on 
everyone's utility; and even Robert Nozick demands equality of libertarian 
rights. 2 Sen himself demands equality of capability to function. However, in 
Sen's claim, the definition of equality is too broad, and it does not help much 
to defend conventional claim of Egalitarianism, i.e. equality of well-being. 
Although Egalitarianism was not precisely defined or understood, it has 
faced a vigorous challenge from Derek Parfit and his followers, since Parfit 
proposed Prioritarianism in 1990's. In a relatively short period, Pm·fit's po-
sition, "Prioritarianism", developed in the 1990's, has become widely known, 
appearing in standard textbooks of ethics and political philosophy.3 
The main goal of this dissertation is to defend a version of Egalitarian-
ism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism., from the Prioritarian challenge. 
In order to achieve this goal, I shall clarify the exact difference between 
Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism, and the respect with regard 
to which Weighted Egalitarianism is more plausible than Prioritarianism. 
Another (subsidiary) goal is to elucidate the scope of Prioritarianism. 
Although I shall suggest a precise characterization of Prioritarianism, some 
Prioritarians may be ready to modify some of its basic claims in order to 
meet some of my criticisms. I shall therefore discuss two modified versions of 
Prioritarianism. One of these gives priority to those people below a certain 
absolute level of well-being over those others above that level (what I call 
the Threshold Principle in chapter 3). The other gives absolute priority to 
the worse off person (Leximin). I believe that this will help to understand 
the scope of Prioritarianism. 
Throughout this dissertation, I shall often use the formal methods of 
economics. The formal methods developed in economics are very useful for 
understanding the structure of ethical theories in general, as well as dis-
tributive principles. In economics, there is a large literature of distributive 
2Sen (1992, pp. 12-1:~). 
3See Arneson (199:~, pp. 502-5(5), Kagan (U)1)8, pp. 5:~-54), and Kymlicka (2002, p. 
()()). 
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principles, and many results in the literature can contribute to the better un-
derstanding of debate between Prioritarians and Egalitarians. For example, 
this dissertation has greatly benefited from Amartya Sen's seminal book On 
Economic Inequality, which illuminates many points I tried to make. After 
all, this dissertation might add nothing to the existing literature in eco-
nomics insofar as the discussion of the theoretical structure of distributive 
principles is concerned. However, I am not claiming that Sen's book explains 
everything about distributive principles: it is fair to say that the normative 
significance and scope of distributive principles are not fully examined in 
Sen's book. As I shall discuss in chapter 2, the recent philosophical debate 
on Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism contributes to the understanding of 
several issues untouched in economics. I believe that economics and philos-
ophy complement each other in understanding distributive principles. 
This dissertation is not a comprehensive study of distributive justice in 
general. It discusses Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. Therefore, this 
dissertation is limited in scope. I should point out at least five issues I do 
not discuss in this dissertation. Firstly, I shall consider only the betterness 
of distributions. It may be argued that some distributions include some sort 
of wrongdoing or unfairness, and that these distributions are not ranked in 
terms of betterness. I do not assume that every distribution is ranked in 
terms of betterness. I shall limit my discussion to the distributions that 
are ranked in terms of betterness. What do I mean by the betterness of 
distributions? The task of the next section is to answer this question in 
order to set out my analysis of distributive principles. 
Secondly, I shall not discuss the substantive concept of well-being. As 
I discuss in section 3, well-being is to be understood in its hroadest sense. 
If the notion of well-being is defined sufficiently broad so as to be neutral 
amongst the competing notions of well-being, my discussion of distributive 
principles will not be affected by particular theory of well-being. That is, 
the distributive principles that I discuss can operate on any notion of well-
being. This is an advantage of taking the notion of well-being as broadly as 
possible. Nonetheless, I am fully aware that the choice of concept is a very 
important issue in distributive justice in general. 
Thirdly, I shall ignore desert, or what each person deserves. Someone 
might claim that equality of well-being is not the central concern of distribu-
tive justice, and that desert should be the focus of the discussion. Suppose, 
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for example, that there are two persons, lazy Anna and hard-working Betty. 
Suppose that Anna is slightly worse off than Betty. If some benefit is avail-
able, some people would claim that we should give it to hard-working Betty 
rather than lazy Anna. But this in turn makes the distribution of well-being 
more unequal. They would claim that our distributive judgement should be 
based on what each person deserves, not the distribution of well-being pel' 
se. Although the literature of desert is rapidly growing in recent moral phi-
losophy, I shall not consider the desert in this dissertation. I shall assume 
either that people are equally deserving or that the notion of well-being is 
adjusted with desert. 
Fourthly, I shall not analyze the distributions of the variable population 
size. The size of population may change across time, and our distribu-
tive judgement may be affected by changes in population size. However, 
the problem of variable population size makes the discussion of distributive 
judgement extremely complicated. I shall simply assume that the size of 
population is fixed. 
Finally, I shall consider the distributive principles for outcomes, not 
prospects. Rabinowicz (2002, pp. 8-15) has recently argued that there is a 
substantial and important difference between Prioritarianism for outcomes 
and Prioritarianism for prospects. I agree with Rabinowicz. Many inter-
esting issues arise when we consider distributive principles for prospects. 
However, Rabinowicz's paper appeared too late for me to take it into ac-
count within my dissertation. This is why I do not discuss distributive 
principles for prospects here. 
1.1 Betterness of distributions 
This dissertation is about the distribution of well-being. It is concerned with 
how people's well-being should be distributed. More specifically, it examines 
theories of betterness of distributions. 
Some peoples' lives go well, others' badly. The unequal state of peo-
ple's lives has given rise to a serious concern of moral philosophers. Many 
people believe that how people's well-being is spread should be taken into 
consideration when we fare how well a society is going. One way to fare how 
people's well-beings should be spread is to consider the relative goodness, 
or betterness, of distributions. Call principles of betterness of distributions 
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distributive principles. 
\iVe often have to choose how to act, or which principle to adopt, where 
these choices significantly affect people's well-being. By adopting one action, 
some people's well-being may be increased, while other people's well-being 
might be decreased. By adopting a different alternative, different people's 
well-being may be increased. Amongst those who are affected by the choice 
of actions or policies, there is a conflict of interests. There are many ap-
proaches to solving such a conflict, and there are therefore many moral 
theories. One approach appeals to the notion of betterness. We often judge 
that an alternative is better than another alternative, and it is right to 
bring about the better alternative. A distributive principle determines the 
ordering of alternatives in terms of the relative goodness of each alternative. 
Needless to say, there are many distributive principles. I will be examining 
two types of distributive principles: Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. 
I shall now define the betterness ordering of distributions in a precise 
way. I shall consider a finite number of individuals. Let N = {I, 2, 3, ... , n} 
be a set of individuals who constitute society. A distribution is a list 
(more precisely, vector) of individuals' well-beings. Write the well-being 
of person i E N as Wi. Let a distribution be (W},W2,1U3, ... ,Wn). Let 
X = {(W},W2, ... ,wn)lwi,i = 1,2, ... ,n} be a set of distributions. A dis-
tributive principle imposes a betterness ordering on the distributions in a 
given set. That is, a distributive principle determines the betterness relation 
Oil distributions such that a distribution x is at least as good as y (x, y E X). 
For simplicity, I shall assume that the betterness relation of distributions is 
reflexive and transitive on X, and hence that it is a partial weak ordering. 
A betterness relation on X is reflexive, if and only if, for all x EX, x is 
at least as good as x. It is transitive, if and only if, for all x, y, z EX, if 
x is at least as good as y and y is at least as good as z, then :1: is at least 
as good as z. I do not require completeness here. 4 A distributive principle 
thus imposes a betterness ordering on the distributions in a given set. 
Throughout the dissertation, I sometimes represent the goodness of a 
distribution by the quantitative scale. From Debreu's (1960) theorem, there 
exists a real-valued function G( ), which is unique up to an increasing trans-
formation. That is, there exists a function such that G(x) ~ G(y) if and 
1 A betterncss ordering on X is complete if and only if, for all x, y EX, either x is at 
least as good as y or y is at least as good as x. 
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only if x is at least as good as y. Call this function the goodness function. A 
goodness function only preserves the ordering. That is, a goodness fUllction 
represents a betterness ordering. But it does not determine Olle single fUllc-
tion. If G( ) represents a betterness ordering, any increasing function of 
G( ) represents the same betterness ordering. The goodness function only 
assigns the higher value to the better distribution. The higher the value of 
the function, the better the distribution is considered to be. The goodness 
function can be linear, concave, or convex. If the goodness of a distribu-
tion x is 10 and the goodness of another distribution y is 5, it is meant 
that x is better than y. It is not claimed that x is twice as good as y. A 
goodness function G( ) represents the betterness ordering ordinally. In this 
dissertation I am concerned with the betterness ordering of distributions. I 
only want to judge whether a distribution is better than another. I am not 
concerned with how much a distribution is better than another. Therefore, 
a cardinal goodness function is not required here. 
Some people propose a moral theory that does not fall under the theory 
of betterness. They argue that some distributions ought not to be brought 
about: some distributions are not acceptable and it is wrong to bring about 
such distributions, full stop. They are not concerned with whether one 
unacceptable distribution is better than another unacceptable distribution. 
They are not concerned with the betterness of distributions. Robert Nozick's 
(1974) side-constraint theory is an example of a moral theory of this kind. 
Side-constraint theory maintains a set of rules by which we judge whether 
a certain act or policy is wrong, without comparing the goodness of the 
consequences of acts. It judges the wrongness and rightness of an act without 
referring the goodness of the outcome the act would bring about. If one act 
is wrong, one ought not to do it. It is not matter whether it is better than 
another. Side-constraint theory itself does not have the structure of the 
betterness ordering. Nozick writes: 
The exercise of these rights fixes some features of the world. 
Within the constraints of these fixed features, a choice may be 
made by a social choice mechanism based upon a social ordering; 
if there are any choices left to make! Rights do not determine 
a social ordering but instead set the constraints within which 
a social choice is to be made, by excluding certain alternatives, 
fixing others, and so on. Rights do not determine the position 
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of an alternative or the relative position of two alternatives in a 
social ordering; they operate upon a social ordering to constrain 
the choice it can yield.5 
Here, Nozick does not deny the possibility of a betterness ordering of 
alternatives. Rather, he claims, rights constrain the domain on which a 
betterness ordering (or social ordering) is defined. If there are alternatives 
left to be ordered, consideration of the betterness of distributions still comes 
into play. But it is not his primary concern. 
Some people, however, claim that wrongness can be reduced to badness. 
Amartya Sen may be one of them. Sen thinks that the violation of a right 
can be reduced to badness. Nozick argues that "[iJf I have a right to choose 
to live in New York or in Massachusetts, and I choose Massachusetts, then 
alternatives involving my living in New York are not appropriate objects to 
be entered in a social ordering". 6 Nozick believes that the right to choose 
whether he lives in New York or Massachusetts must be respected and that 
the alternatives involving the restriction on one's right should be eliminated 
from the domain of a betterness ordering. The violation of one's right is 
wrong and one's right should be respected. It is not a question of good or 
bad. Amartya Sen, however, thinks that wrongness can be accommodated 
within the domain of goodness or betterness. 
But one can also argue that, if I believe that it is a better society 
which - given other things -lets Nozick decide where he wishes 
to live, then I must assert that it is socially better that Nozick 
should be permitted to live in Massachusetts as desired by him. 
If Nozick is forced out of Massachusetts, then one would wish to 
say not only that Nozick's rights have been violated, but that 
society is worse off - given other things - by stopping Nozick 
from living where he wishes. 7 
Here, Sen contends that the violation of a person's right is not only wrong 
but also worse than non-violation of that right. That is to say, the wrongness 
of an act or policy can be reduced to the badness of an alternative. If this 
5Nozick (UJ74, p. 1(6). 
GNo;dck (HJ7G, p. (2). 
'Sen (HJ76b, pp. :lOG-:1(7). Page references are to his Choice, Welfare and Afeasure-
mcnt. 
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is plausible, the alternatives involving some kind of wrongness are ranked 
in terms of betterness, and the claim of side-constraint theorist can be ac-
commodated within the structure of the betterness (or worseness) ordering. 
But I shall not examine this strategy of Sen any further. 8 I will simply 
concentrate on the distribution of well-being, which is ranked in terms of 
betterness. 
Exactly speaking, some distributive principles are unconcerned with how 
individual well-beings are distributed in the society. For example, take clas-
sical utilitarianism, according to which a distribution x = (Wl' W2, ... , w n ) is 
better than another y = (wi, W~, ... , w~) if and only if the total well-being in 
x is greater than that in y. According to my definition, classical utilitarian-
ism is a distributive principle, because it determines a betterness ordering 
of distributions. However, it does not care about distribution of well-being 
really. All it cares about is the total well-being, and it is unconcerned with 
how people's well-being is distributed in the society. 
1.2 Well-being 
Although I discuss the distribution of well-being, I shall not discuss which 
notion of well-being is the most plausible. A person's well-being is under-
stood in the broadest sense. It should be so broad that it is neutral between 
competing notions of well-being. 
Nonetheless, I should explain why I do not assume a substantive notion 
of well-being. There are many competing notions of well-being in moral phi-
losophy: income, resources, primary social goods, opportunities for welfare, 
capability to function, happiness, net pleasure, preference-satisfaction, and 
so on. Each account has some advantages over others, but, at the same 
time, each account inevitably has some disadvantages. It is not easy to 
choose one over others, and the dispute over which account of well-being 
is most plausible seems to be endless. But this does not prevent us from 
discussing the distributive principles. It is not necessary to argue for a par-
ticular notion of well-being whenever we discuss distributive principles. In 
other words, the discussion of distributive principles are not affected by the 
choice of notion of well-being. It is possible to discuss distributive principles 
8However, I shall discuss a related issue in chapter 7, where I sugge~t that some notions 
of unfairneHs Hhould be reduced to a bad. 
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without specifying the notion of well-being, when our notion of well-being 
must be broad enough to cover many notions of well-being. Once I take 
the notion of well-being in the broadest sense, we can discuss distributive 
principle without being committed to a particular notion of well-being. 
I assume that a person's well-being is everything which is good for that 
person. If income is good for him, it is a part of his well-being. Similarly, 
if pleasure is good for him, pleasure is a part of his well-being. However, I 
am not assuming, for example, that a person actually experiences pleasure 
or pain. Suppose that the spouse of person A is cheating on person A, but 
person A is not aware of his spouse's affairs. As I am not assuming that 
the good must be experienced, I can certainly claim that the situation is 
worse for person A, and that his well-being is decreased. ·When I say that 
something is good for a person, I do not mean that that person has actually 
experienced it. 
I now define an individual betterness relation. An individual betterness 
relation is a betterness relation for a person, which is defined on distribu-
tions. For example, x is at least as good for a person as y. I assume that an 
individual betterness relation constitutes an individual betterness (partial 
weak) ordering on distributions, i.e. it is reflexive and transitive. 
Throughout this dissertation, I shall represent a person's well-heing by 
a quantity: for example, I say that the well-being of person 1 in distribution 
x is 10. I assume that the quantitative notions of a person's well-being can 
be co-cardinally measured. In what follows, I shall explain the quantitative 
notions of a person's well-being. 
An individual betterness ordering can be represented by a utility function 
u( ). A utility function Ui( ) assigns higher numerical values to each 
distribution, ranking the distributions in accordance with the individual 
betterness ordering. That is, it assigns a higher value to a hetter distribution 
for that person than a worse distribution. I call admissible transformation 
for all strictly increasing functions satisfying the following condition: namely 
t.hat., ;7: is at. least. as good for person i as y if and only if 1I.i(:C) 2 u;(y). I 
use the word "utility function") but it is not committed to any particular 
notion of utility in philosophy. It is just a numerical representation. 
As the measurement of people's well-being, I shall assume that the order 
and ratios of differences between the scale values are preserved. That is, 
if u( ) provides an admissible transformation of an individual betterness 
9 
ordering, then v( ) provides another admissible transformation of the same 
individual betterness ordering if and only if there exist coefficients Q, > 0 
and b such that v( ) == Q,u( ) + b. Precisely, a utility function is unique 
up to an increasing affine transformation. A utility function of this kind 
represents an individual betterness ordering cardinally. As an increasing 
affine transformation is defined as v( ) == Q,u( ) + b, where Q, is some 
positive number and b is any number (i.e. b can be positive or negative), 
v( ) is an increasing linear transform of u( ), and 11.( ) is an increasing 
linear transformation of v( ), too. 
There may be many utility functions that represent an individual bet-
terness ordering. Each utility function is an increasing linear transformation 
of the other utility functions. One important point to note is that amongst 
utility functions of the same family, ratios of value differences are deter-
mined uniquely. Consider any two utility functions 11. and v, and any four 
distributions x, y, z and w. As v( ) = Q,u( ) + b, it is easy to verify that 
u(x) - u(y) 
u(z) - u(w) 
v(x) - v(y) 
v(z) - v(w)' 
This means that the ratio of value differences, measured by a utility 
function u( ), is the same as the ratio, measured by another utility function 
v( ). If the utility fUllction represents the individual betterness ordering, 
it preserves not only the individual betterness ordering but also the ratio of 
utility differences. This is the case when utility function is cardinal. 
An example may be helpful. Consider the measurement of hotness. Sup-
pose that it is hotter in a state A than in another state B, and that it is 
hotter in B than C. It follows that it is hotter in A than C. We can make this 
sort of judgment without referring to a quantitative notion of temperature, 
if we are sensitive enough to the hotness. But we often measure hotness by 
temperature, and assign a quantitative notion to hotness. For example, it 
is 20 degrees in the Celsius scale in A, 15 degree in B, and 10 degrees in 
C. The Celsius scale just preserves the ordering of our sense of hotness: we 
do not say that it is twice as hot in A as C. The Celsius scale assigns the 
higher number to the higher temperature. However, the Celsius scale is just 
one scale amongst others. We have, for example, the Fahrenheit scale, too. 
We have different measures to represent hotness. The choice of whether we 
use Celsius scale or Fahrenheit scale is rather arbitrary. But, if we choose 
the Celsius scale, the Fahrenheit scale is an increasing linear transformation 
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of hotness. Our quantitative notion of hotness is determined by the choice 
of scales. The choice of scale is rather arbitrary. In the temperature scale, 
the choice of zero point is also rather arbitrary. In the Celsius scale, zero 
point is the freezing temperature of water, and hundred point is the boiling 
temperature of water. But in the Fahrenheit scale, it is not the case. Vile 
arbitrarily fix the zero point and hundred point. In each scale, the number is 
assigned some meaning arbitrarily. The choice of the scale is also arbitrary. 
Likewise, the quantitative notion of well-being represents the individual 
betterness ordering cardinally. \iVhen I say, for example, that a person's 
well-being in x is zero, I do not mean that zero is the nonexistence of that 
person or anything. Zero well-being only means that it is better than -1, 
or worse than 10. The quantitative notions of well-being just assigns higher 
values to a better well-being than a worse well-being in such a way that 
the order and ratios of value differences are preserved. We do not need to 
assume a quantitative notion of well-being before we pick one utility function 
that represents an individual betterness ordering of distributions. Therefore, 
for example, zero well-being does not have any significance in itself. The 
values represent the order of individual betterness, but it does not stand 
for absolute quantities of well-being. Whenever I represent a person's well-
being by a number, it does not signify how well off he is. It only means how 
good he is. It may be misleading that I use the word "well-being" in this 
dissertation, because my use of well-being does not mean the absolute level 
of a person's state. It is concerned only with his state in comparison with his 
another state in terms of betterness. It could be called "better-being". But 
this is llot a conventional English word. So I will use the word well-being. 
I must assume another important point, namely interpersonal compara-
bility of well-being. I assume that a person \; well-being can be fully com-
pared with another person's well-being. There is a huge literature in eco-
nomics and philosophy on whether we can compare one person's well-being 
with that of another. In traditional welfare economics, it is often assumed 
that a person's well-being is not compared with another's.9 However, as 
Sen (1970) notes, "nothing of much interest can be said on justice without 
bringing in some interpersonal comparability".10 In economics, there are 
many notions of interpersonal comparability of well-being, and economists 
9Por example, soo Arrow (1951) and Samuelson (1947). 
1080n (1970, p. 150). 
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work out what kind of interpersonal comparability is needed to characterize 
distributive principles. 11 In this dissertation, however, I simply assume that 
a person's well-being can be fully compared with another's. 
For convenience, I list the main assumptions I make in this dissertation. 
• the number of people is finite and fixed 
• distributive principles are for outcomes, not for prospects 
• a distribution is a vector of people's well-being 
• the betterness ordering of distributions is analyzed 
• a person's well-being is everything that is good for that person 
• desert is not considered (people are equally deserving) 
• the quantity of well-being represents the individual betterness ordering 
cardinally 
• people's well-beings are fully comparable 
1.3 Outline of dissertation 
These preliminaries over, I shall sketch an outline of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 ("The structure of Prioritarianism") introduces Derek Parfit's 
Prioritarianism., and attempts to elucidate its theoretical structure. Some 
people think that inequality is bad in itself. Call this type of Egalitari-
anism Telic Egalitarianism.. Parfit raises the Levelling Down Objection to 
Telic Egalitarianism, and then proposes Prioritarianism as an alternative 
distributive principle to Telic Egalitarianism. Keeping closely to Parfit, I 
characterize Prioritarianism by three conditions: (a) strong separability (b) 
Pareto, and (c) the Pigou-Dalton condition. According to Parfit, the absur-
dity of Telic Egalitarianism, shown in the Levelling Down Objection, is due 
to its relationality: namely that equality is concerned with the relationship, 
or comparison, between different people's well-beings. Then, his proposed 
Prioritarianislll excludes the relationship, or comparison, between different 
llSee d'Asprelllont. and Cevers (HJ77), Cevers (HJ79), and Roherts (HJ80a, HJ80b). 
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people's well-beings. It judges the goodness of distribution by the abso-
lute level of each person's well-being. In this sense, Prioritarianism is non-
relational. The Objection also implies that the levelling down of the better 
off always makes the distribution, all things considered, strictly worse. This 
claim requires that any sensible distributive principle should satis(y what 
I call Pareto. Parfit claims that we should give priority to those who are 
at a lower absolute level. This is because he maintains that the goodness 
of a person's well-being diminishes as the absolute level of his well-being 
gets higher. The basic claims of Prioritarianism are: (sf) the moral good-
ness of people's well-being is determined independently of relative positions 
of others; and (b/) benefiting a worse off person (in the absolute sense) is 
more important than benefiting a better off person. I argue that strong 
separability best exemplifies (a'), and that the Pigou-Dalton condition best 
exemplifies (b'). I consider distributive principles that give complete prior-
ity to the worse off or worst off person (Maximin and Leximin), and suggest 
that Leximin may be seen as a version of Prioritarianism, if Prioritarians 
agree to replace the Pigou-Dalton condition by what is known as Hammond 
equity. I also discuss the significance of the recent philosophical discussion 
of Prioritarianism. In economics, the distributive principle of giving priority 
to the worse off is not new. There exists a large literature on such principles 
in economics. I show what is new with Parfit's Prioritariauism. 
Chapter 3 ("Priority and Threshold") examines a possible criticism to 
Prioritarianism. Some people might object to Prioritarianism because it 
would give priority to the worse off, even when the worse off person is very 
well off. They would claim that we should not care about priority amongst 
the well off people, and that we should give priority to those below a certain 
low level of well-being over those above. I propose what I call the Threshold 
Principle, which gives priority to those below the threshold level over those 
above. I consider two versions of the Threshold Principle, Lexical and Con-
tinuous Threshold Principles. The former does not allow a trade off between 
well-being above the threshold and the well-being below. On the other hand, 
the latter allows such trade offs. I argue that the Threshold Principle, be 
it Lexical or Continuous, is not inconsistent with Parfit's Prioritarianism. 
The Threshold Principle may be seen as a version of PrioritarianisIIl. The 
discussion in this chapter clarifies the far-reaching scope of Prioritarianislll. 
Chapter 4 ("On Levelling Down") starts my defence of Telic Egalitari-
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anism. According to Par'fit, Telic Egalitarianism is subject to the Levelling 
Down Objection, whereas his proposed Prioritarianism is not. Therefore, 
in Parfit's argument, the Levelling Down Objection demonstrates a relative 
advantage of Prioritarianism over Telic Egalitarianism. However, if it is 
shown that the Levelling Down Objection is not a serious problem to some 
versions of Telic Egalitarianism, the Levelling Down Objection no longer 
demonstrates a relative advantage of Prioritarianism over Telic Egalitarian-
ism. In this chapter, I show that some versions of Telic Egalitarianism avoid 
the Levelling Down Objection. Although the Levelling Down Objection is 
a serious objection to some versions of Telic Egalitarianism, it is not to my 
proposed Weighted Egalitarianism, according to which the bad of inequality 
is reduced to the weight of individual well-being in the overall goodness of a 
distribution. The Objection only applies when the bad of inequality cannot 
be reduced to the weight of people's well-being. A positive message of the 
Levelling Down Objection might be that whenever equality is believed to be 
valuable in itself, one should adopt Weighted Egalitarianism. 
Chapter 5 ("Weighted Egalitarianism or Prioritarianism 7") puts forward 
the general form of Weighted Egalitarianism, and explains its characteris-
tics. It clarifies the exact difference between Weighted Egalitarianism and 
Prioritarianism, and argues that Weighted Egalitarianism is more accept-
able than Prioritarianism. It shows that Weighted Egalitarianism satisfies 
the Pigou-Dalton condition, namely that Weighted Egalitarianism gives pri-
ority to the worse off just like Prioritarianism. It also satisfies Pareto. How-
ever, it violates strong separability'. Then, I suggest an interpretation that 
the difference between Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism is that, 
in Prioritarianism, the weight to each well-being is determined by an inde-
pendent measure, whereas in Weighted Egalitarianism, it is determined by 
the rank-order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. In 
this respect, I shall raise two objections about Prioritarianism. I shall also 
consider two possible objections to 'iVeighted Egalit.arianism, and argue t.hat 
these two objections do not undermine Weighted Egalitarianism. However, I 
point out that if Prioritarians adopt Leximin by replacing the Pigou-Dalton 
condition by Hammond equity, they can avoids my criticisms. Leximin does 
not allow a trade off between the better off and the worse off, and this makes 
Leximin hard to adopt. 
Chapter 6 ("Equality, Priority and Time") considers intertemporal clis-
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tribution of well-being. Some infiuential political philosophers such as John 
Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Ronald Dworkin, maintain the lifetime view of 
distributive judgement, according to which the basic temporal unit of dis-
tributive judgement is people's lifetime well-being. I reject this lifetime view, 
be it Egalitarian or Prioritarian. Some Prioritarians believe (a) that the ba-
sic unit of distributive judgement should not be lifetime well-being, and (b) 
that the rejection of the lifetime view of distributive judgement illuminates 
that Prioritarianism is more acceptable than Telic Egalitarianism. In this 
chapter, I reject this case for Prioritarianism. I claim that both the distri-
bution of lifetime well-being and the distribution at each temporal stage are 
relevant for any distributive principle, be Prioritarianism or Weighted Egal-
itarianism. I further claim that Prioritarianism has philosophical difficulty 
in assigning the moral weight to the lifetime well-being and the well-being 
at each period at the same time, although this is not a knock-out argument 
against Prioritarianism. 
Chapter 7 ("Aggregation and Numbers") considers the scope of distribu-
tive principles, that gives priority to only one person. Leximin avoids my 
criticisms of Prioritarianism, but it has a drawback that it rules out the trade 
off between the better off and the worse off. However, this very feature of 
Leximin may obtain a support from non-Prioritarians: the critics of inter-
personal aggregation in general and the critics of utilitarianism in particular. 
They believe that interpersonal aggregation of well-being violates the sepa-
rateness of persons, and that a plausible distributive principle should give 
priority to only one person, or group, in order to avoid interpersonal ag-
gregation (for example, Rawls's Difference Principle, Nagel's pairwise com-
parison, and Scanlon's contractualism). Recently, non-aggregative principles 
have been criticized because they fail to account for the numbers in a partic-
ular choice situation: faced with a choice between saving five strangers and 
saving another stranger (the rescue case), those principles advocate tossing 
a coin to decide whom we should save. In this chapter, I argue that a non-
aggregative version of Prioritarianism, Leximin, can support the case for 
saving the greater number without appealing to interpersonal aggregation. 
I also discuss Scanlon's contractualism as another non-aggregative theory in 
favour of saving the greater number. Nonetheless, I raise a further question 
as to whether we should always save the greater number. I doubt that we 
should save the greater number when we are faced with a choice between 
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saving 1,000 lives and 1,001 lives. In t.his large scale rescue case I believe 
t.hat. we should t.oss a coin. I propose a t.heoretical framework within which 
we should save the great.er number in some cases, yet should t.oss a coin in 
other cases. Some people defend a principle of giving priority to only one 
person in order to avoid the allegedly implausible feature of interpersonal 
aggregat.ion and t.o respect. each person equally and separately. However, I 
believe that interpersonal aggregation is not the right target of criticism of 
non-ut.ilit.arians. Interpersonal aggregation is useful t.o encompass the equal 
respect to separate person. 
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Chapter 2 
The Structure of 
Prioritarianism 
2.1 Introduction 
Some peoples' lives go well. Others' badly. The unequal state of peoples' 
lives has given rise to a serious concern of moral philosophers, namely that 
the distribution of people's well-being should be taken into consideration 
when we fare how well a society is going. Amongst those who hold this 
concern, the most well-known is Egalitarianism. Egalitarianism maintains 
that equality should playa role in some way when we fare how the society is 
going. There are many types of Egalitarianism. Some Egalitarians believe 
that equality is valuable in itself, and that it is in itself bad if some people are 
worse off than others. Call this type of Egalitarianism Telic Egalitarianism, 
which I shall be examing in this dissertation. Other Egalitarians believe 
that inequality is unfair or unjust: they do not think that inequality is a 
bad. I shall not consider Egalitarianism of this kind. 
In an important paper, Derek Parfit (1995) raises the Levelling Down 
Objection to Telic Egalitarianism, and proposes the Priority View, or Pri-
oritarianism. According to Parfit, equality is not valuable in itself. Instead, 
Parfit claims that priority should be given to those who are at a lower abso-
lute level. He claims that his proposed Prioritarianism is not subject to the 
Levelling Down Objection. Pm'fit's Prioritarianism has received extensive 
attention in recent years, l but the reach of its theoretical structure has not 
IFor discussion in support of Prioritarianism, sec Arneson (H)9:3, H)99) and McKerlic 
17 
yet been made sufficiently clear. 
The main goal of this chapter is to elucidate the structure of Prioritari-
anism. I shall not criticize or defend Prioritarianism in this chapter. I only 
attempt to formulate it in a precise way. Keeping closely to Pm·fit (1995), 
I formulate Prioritarianism by way of three conditions: strong separability, 
Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition. Section 2 introduces the basic idea 
of Telic Egalitarianism and Parfit's objection to Telic Egalitarianism. Sec-
tion 3 explains strong separability. Section 4 explains Pareto. Section 5 
explains the Pigou-Dalton condition. Section 6 considers whether two dis-
tributive principles that give priority to only one persoll, i.e. :Maximin and 
Leximin, can be seen as a version of Prioritarianism. I shall argue that Lex-
imin may be seen as a version of Prioritarianism if Prioritarians are ready 
to replace the Pigou-Dalton condition by what is known as "Hammond eq-
uity". Section 6 discusses what Parfit's Prioritarianism has added to the 
existing economic literature on the distributive principles that gives priority 
to the worse off. 
2.2 Telic Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down 
Objection 
Parfit's Prioritarianism is motivated by the Levelling Down Objection to 
Telic Egalitarianism. I will start by defining Telic Egalitarianism that Parfit 
has in mind, and then turn to his Levelling Down Objection in order to see 
the motivation behind Prioritarianism. 
There are many types of Egalitarianism. Some Egalitarians believe that 
we should reduce inequality because it is bad in itself. Other Egalitarians 
believe that we should reduce inequality because it is unfair or unjust. The 
former type of Egalitarians believes in what Parfit calls the Principle of 
Equality. 
The Principle of Equality: It is in itself bad if some people 
(1994, 1996). For critical di~cl\Ssion, sec Broome (19~)3, ch. 9), Crisp (2002), Klint 
.lensen (1996), Rabinowic:t (2002), and Temkin (H)93, ch. 9). It should be noted that 
there is a separate discussion as to whether Prioritarianism is substantially different from 
Telic Egalitarianism. Marc Fleurbacy (2001) and Daniel Hausman (2001) think that the 
distinction between Prioritarianislll and Telic Egalitarianism is not substantially useful. 
.lohn Broome (2001), on the other hand, claims that it is useful. 
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are worse off than others.2 
I do not discuss whether the Principle of Equality is a necessary or suffi-
cient condition for Telic Egalitarianism. I simply follow Parfit's presentation 
here. 
Consider a distributive principle that is based only on the Principle of 
Equality. Call such principle Pure Egalitarianism. Few people would think 
that Pure Egalitarianism is plausible, because it is too extreme. To il-
lustrate how extreme it is, compare two distributions, x = (200,200) and 
y = (100,100), where the brackets show the well-being of persons 1 and 2. 
In this comparison, Pure Egalitarianism would judge that x is equally as 
good as y, because people's well-beings are perfectly equal in x and y. By 
definition, Pure Egalitarianism cares only about equality. But it is absurd 
to judge that x is equally as good as y. It should be judged that :r is strictly 
better than y. This is because x is strictly better for both persons than y, 
and hence the total well-being is greater in x than y. Any sensible form 
of Telic Egalitarianism should combine the Principe of Equality with what 
Parfit calls the Principle of Utility. 
The Principle of Utility: It is in itself better if people are 
better off. 3 
According to Pal'fit, if we care only about the Principle of Utility, we 
would be Pure Utilitarians.4 On Pal'fit's interpretation, the Principle of 
Utility means the total sum of people's well-being, 
When the Principle of equality is combined with the Principle of Utility, 
:7; = (200,200) is judged to be better than y = (100,100), Telic Egalitarian-
ism means a class of distributive principles that satisfy both the Principle 
of Equalit.y and t.he Principle of Utility. This is what Parfit has in mind. I 
say "a class of distributive principles", because, as I shall discuss in chapter 
4, t.here are many versions of Telic Egalit.arianism, t.hat sat.isfy these two 
principles. 
Parfit then raises the Levelling Down Objection to Telic Egalitarianism.5 
Levelling down means that the well-being of a better off person is lowered 
2Parfit (UJ95, p. 4). 
3Parfit (19~J5, p. 4). 
'IParfit (1995, p. 4). 
5Parfit (1995, p. 17). 
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to the level of a worse off person without benefiting any person. Parfit 
points out that if equality is valuable in itself, levelling down is, at least in 
one respect, better. Telic Egalitarianism, Parfit therefore claims, judges that 
levelling down is, at least in one respect, better. However, he believes that it 
is not better in any respect, and that this implication of Telic Egalitarianism 
is absurd. This is Par·fit's Levelling Down Objection to Telic Egalitarianism. 
Parfit writes: 
If inequality is bad, its disappearance must be in one way a 
change for the better, however this change occurs. Suppose that 
those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so that they 
become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would 
remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome, on the 
Telic View [Telic Egalitarianism], even though they would be 
worse for some people, and better for no one. This implication 
seems to many people to be quite absurd.6 
To illustrate the gist of Parfit's claim, compare x=(100, 100) and y=(200, 
100). For person 1, x is strictly worse than y. For person 2, :1' is equally as 
good as y. Therefore, x is not better than y for either person. However, if 
equality is valuable in itself, it is argued that a; is, at least in one respect, 
better than y. This is because x is a perfectly equal distribution, whereas y 
is not. According to Parfit, Telic Egalitarianism would judge that levelling 
down is, at least in one respect, better. However, it may be claimed that x 
is not better than y in any respect. If this is the case, Telic Egalitarianism 
may turn out to be absurd. 
Let us clarify more precisely what the Levelling Down Objection implies. 
Telic Egalitarians believe in the Principle of Equality and Principle of Utility. 
According to the Telic Egalitarianism Parfit objects to, the goodness of a 
distribution is determined by the bad of inequality and the total sum of 
people's well-being. This is formally expressed as follows. 
G = g(W,I), (2.1) 
where lV is the aggregated well-being across people, I is some inequality 
measure, and g( ) is a function increasing in lV and decreasing in I. 
"Parfit (1995, p. 17). Original cmphaf!if!. 
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In this expression, W represents the Principle of Utility and I represents 
the Principle of Equality. The overall good of a distribution is determined 
by the aggregated well-being, ltV, and some inequality measure, I. Given the 
total sum of people's well-being and some measure of inequality, the function 
g( ) establishes how much lV and I count in the overall good of a distribution. 
There is a trade-off between the goodness of total sum of people's well-being 
and the badness of inequality. The function g( ) determines this trade off 
between the goodness of total sum of people's well-being and the badness of 
inequality. For example, if the overall good of a distribution is represented 
by an additive form, it is the case that G = ltV -aI, where a is some positive 
number. 
By the levelling down of a better off person, ltV is decreased, and I is 
decreased. On balance, the levelling down may be worse, all things consid-
ered. However, it may be better in terms of I, because the value of I is 
decreased by levelling down. According to Telic Egalitarianism understood 
as (2.1), levelling down is, in one respect, better. As Pm'fit claims, Telic 
Egalitarianism may be absurd. 
There may be several responses to the Levelling Down Objection. Firstly, 
some people take the Levelling Down Objection seriously, and give up the 
notion of Telic Egalitarianism. Then, they seek for an alternative distribu-
tive principle. This is Parfit's own response. Pm'fit thinks that the levelling 
down of a better off person to the level of a worse off person is not better 
in any respect. He thinks that there is no respect with regard to which the 
outcome is made better by levelling down. Then, he sets aside the idea that 
inequality is bad in itself, and seeks for an alternative distributive principle, 
i.e. Prioritarianism. 
Secondly, some people simply do not care about the Levelling Down 
Objection, because the idea underlying the Levelling Down Objection is not 
plausible. This is, for example, Larry Temkin's response. Temkin (1993, 
2000) thinks that the Levelling Down Objection appeals to what Temkin 
calls Slogan. According to Temkin, the Slogan claims that one situation 
cannot be worse (or better) than another situation in any respect if there is 
no one for whom it is worse (or better) in any respect.7 He thinks that we 
should distinguish between theories about self-interest and theories about 
outcomes, and that once this distinction is made, there is reason to doubt 
7Tomkin (2000, p. 186). 
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the Slogan and the arguments invoking it. He then rejects the Slogan, and 
does not care about whether or not levelling down is better in some respect. 
He might think that the outcome is made better by levelling down in some 
circumstances. I shall not discuss Temkin's argument against the Slogan 
any further here. 
Thirdly, some people argue that, like Parfit, levelling down is not better 
in any respect. However, they argue that the Levelling Down Objection is 
serious to some versions of Telic Egalitarianism, but not serious to other 
versions of Telic Egalitarianism. The Levelling Down Objection clarifies 
what sort of Telic Egalitarianism is more plausible than other versions of 
Telic Egalitarianism. This is my own response. There are several versions 
of Telic Egalitarianism, and some versions of Telic Egalitarianism do not 
have a respect. with regard to which the outcome is made better by levelling 
down. I shall discuss this response in chapter 4. 
Let us turn to the examination of Parfit's Prioritarianism, along the line 
of the first response. 
2.3 Strong separability 
The Levelling Down Objection against Telic Egalitarianism motivates Parfit 
to propose his Prioritarianism. His proposed Prioritarianism is this. 
Prioritarianism (informal definition): I3enefiting people mat-
ters more the worse off those people are. 8 
This definition needs to be made more precise. I shall argue that Prior-
it arianism consists essentially in three claims: (a) the goodness of people's 
well-being should be determined independently of other people's well-being, 
and (b) levelling down always makes the distribut.ion, all things considered, 
strictly worse, and (c) the well-being at a lower absolute level should be 
assigned more weight than the well-being at a higher absolute level in judg-
ing the goodne8s of a distribution. I then argue that these claims are best 
captured by strong separability, Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
I st.art with explaining the first claim, i.e. strong separability. Parfit 
wants to avoid the Levelling Down Objection. In order to do so, he sets aside 
the claim that equality is valuable. Telic Egalitarianism is concerned with 
8Parfit (1995, p. UJ). 
22 
the goodness of equality, or the badness of inequality. In the Levelling Down 
Objection, the goodness of equality, or the badness of inequality, provides a 
respect with regard to which levelling down is better. Equality is about the 
relationship between different people. Then, Parfit rules out the relational, 
or comparative, element from the relevant consideration in evaluating the 
overall goodness of a distribution. His proposed distributive principle is 
intended to be non-relational, or non-comparative. For this purpose, he sets 
out Prioritarianism such that the goodness of a distribution is determined 
by the absolute level of people's well-being. He writes: 
The chief difference [between Prioritarianism and Telic Egalitar-
ianism] can be introduced like this. I have said that, on the 
Priority View, we do not believe in equality. Vve do not think 
it in itself bad, or unjust, that some people are worse off than 
others. This claim can be misunderstood. We do of course think 
it bad that some people are worse off. But what is bad is not 
that these people are worse off than other'S. It is rather that they 
are worse off than they might have been. () 
He goes on: 
on the Priority View, benefits to the worse off matter more, but 
this is only because these people are at a lower absoZ.ute level. It 
is irrelevant that these people are worse off than others. Benefits 
to them would matter just as much even if there were no others 
who were better off. 
The chief difference is, then, this. Egalitarians are concerned 
with relativities: with how people's level compares with the level 
of other people. On the Priority View, we are concerned only 
with people's absolute levels. 10 
Parfit maintains that how good the benefits to a person are should be 
determined only by the absolute level of his own well-being. It should not be 
concerned with the relationship between different people's well-being. The 
goodness of people's well-being should be determined independently of the 
well-being of other people. According to Prioritarianism, people are worse 
9Parfit. (1995, p. 22). Original emphasis. 
IOParfit (U)9S, p. 2a). Original emphasis. 
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off in the sense that they are worse off than they might have been, rather 
than that they are worse off than others: people are worse off in absolute, 
not relative, terms. 
The idea that the goodness of people's well-being should be determined 
independently of other people's well-being is, I think, best captured by the 
technical notion of strong separability in economics. Strong separability 
claims that, in the case of distributive judgement, the goodness of people's 
well-being is determined independently of other people. 
To capture the gist of strong separability, consider the distributions 
:1: = (10,12, 'W3, 'W4, 'Ws) and y = (11,11, 'W3, 'W4, 'Ws). Strong separability 
claims that the relative goodness of x and y is determined by the relative 
goodness of (10,12) and (11,11). Only when we judge (10,12) is better than 
(11,11), then strong separability claims that x is better than y, regardless 
of the level of ('W3,'W4,'WS). That is to say, x = (10, 12,'W3,'W4,'W5) is better 
than y = (11,11, 'W3, 'W4, 'Ws) only if x' = (10, 12, 'W~, 'W~, 'W&) is better than 
y' = (11, 11, 'W~, 'W~, 'W~), for all 'Wi and 'W:. According to strong separability, 
we can concentrate on the well-beings of affected people, and the relative 
goodness of distributions is determined independently of the well-being of 
the unaffected people. 
Let me define strong separability in a precise way. Let me start with in-
troducing a formal framework concerning the overall good of a distribution. 
First, we shall consider a set of individuals N = {1,2, ... ,n} and a set of 
possible well-being lV. Let us assume that a distribution is a vector of peo-
ple's well-being. A distributive principle determines a betterness ordering 
of distributions, which is assumed to be a reflexive and transitive, binary 
relation on X" = {('Wl,W2, ... ,w,,)lwi E Hl,i = l,2, ... ,n}. If a betterness 
ordering of distribution is continuous, it can be represented by a goodness 
function g( ), where a distribution x is at least as good as another y if and 
only if g(x) 2': g(y). 
We have paved the way to define strong separability precisely. Take some 
subset of people A, and let A = N - A be the set of people other than A. 
Let us call the vector of well-being of people in A, i.e. (Wi)iEA, a subvector. 
Given 10 A constant, the betterness relation defines the betterness relation 
of the subvectors. I shall call the latter conditional betterness ordering. If 
the conditional betterness ordering on the subvectors (Wi)iEA is the same for 
all W A, A is said to be separable. A betterness ordering is weakly separable 
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if and only if every person is separable. A betterness ordering is strongly 
separable if and only if every subset of persons is separable. ll This is the 
formal definition of strong separability. 
Not surprisingly, strong separability may not be accepted by Telic Egali-
tarians. For example, comparing x = (10,12,12,12,12) and y = (11,11,12,12,12), 
some Telic Egalitarians would judge that x is better than y. I3ut, compar-
ing x' = (10,12,11,11,11) and y' = (11,11,11,11,11), they would claim 
that y' is better x'. I3ut strong separability requires that just in case x is 
judged to be better than y, x' is judged to be better than y'. Thus, Telic 
Egalitarians may violate strong separability, and disagree with Parfit's idea 
of "non-relationality". This is not surprising at all. Telic Egalitarianism 
is concerned with equality, and equality is concerned with the relationship 
between people. It is, by definition, relational. Thus, it is not surprising 
even if Telic Egalitarianism violates strong separability. I shall come back 
to this issue ill chapter 5. 
It is easy to show that classical utilitarianism satisfies strong separability. 
Classical utilitarianism claims that x = ('WI, 'W2, ... , 'W1l ) is at least as good 
as y = ('W~, 'W~, ... , 'W:,) if and only if G(x) = 'WI + 'W2 + ... + 'Wn ~ G(y) = 
'W~ + 'W~ + ... + 'W:, . It cares only about the total well-being, and does not 
care about how people's well-beings are distributed. Take some subset of 
persons, A c N. When we keep the well-being of the other people constant, 
the relative goodness of distributions is determined by the relative goodness 
of total amount of well-being of A. Classical utilitarianism satisfies strong 
separability and is thus non-relational. 
According to classical utilitarianism, the goodness of distribution is an 
additive function of people's well-being. It is also strongly separable, and 
thus non-relational. I should introduce the notion of additive separability 
here. If and only if an ordering is additively separable, it is represented by 
an additive function: namely that x = ('WI, 'W2, ... , 'Wn ) is at least as good as 
y = ('WI' 'W~, ... , 'W~) if and only if G(x) = gl (wt) + g2( W2) + ... + gn( 'Wn) ~ 
G(y) = gl ('WJ.) + g2( 'W~) + ... + gil ('W:,),12 Additive separability entails strong 
separability, but not vice versa. If an ordering is strongly separable and 
continuous, then it is additively separable. I3ut if an ordering is strongly 
separable but discontinuous, it cannot be represented by a functional form, 
II For the far-reaching scope of separability in ethics, see Broome (1991, eh. 4). 
12See Debreu (1959). 
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or, therefore, by an additive form. 
2.4 Pareto 
Let's go back to the Levelling Down Objection again. The Levelling Down 
Objection claims that levelling down is not better in any respect. How-
ever, suppose that levelling down is better at least in one respect. If this 
is true, there must be some cases, where the increase in the goodness of 
this respect outweighs the decrease in the goodness of other respects if we 
assign a sufficiently large weight to the bad of inequality.13 In other words, 
there must be some cases, where the increase in the goodness of reducing 
inequality outweighs the decreases in the goodness of total well-being. In 
turn, this implies that levelling down sometimes makes the distribution, all 
things considered, strictly better. Of course, those who are concerned with 
the Levelling Down Objection wish to rule out this possibility. By claiming 
that levelling down is not better in any respect, the Levelling Down Objec-
tion implicitly implies that levelling down always makes the distribution, all 
things considered, strictly worse. Many people would agree that any rea-
sonable distributive principle should be sensitive to levelling down in terms 
of the all-things-considered judgement. The idea behind this claim is what 
I call Pa.reto. 
Pareto: if a distribution is strictly worse (better) for some peo-
ple than another distribution and if it is better (worse) for no 
person, then it is, all things considered, strictly worse (better) 
than the other. 
We should note the following, too. The claim that moving from y to x is, 
all things considered, strictly worse is equivalent to the claim that moving 
from x to y is, all things considered, strictly better. That is, the levelling up 
of a person's well-being, keeping other people's well-beings constant, makes 
the outcome, all things considered, strictly better. Thus, Pareto is seen to 
support the positive responsiveness of the all-things-considered judgement 
to the change of a person's well-being, when other people's well-beings are 
constant. 
13In chaptcr 4 section G, I will discuss that this is not the case if we restrict the scope 
of equality. However, it is true as far as equality is understood to be always valuable. 
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Some egalitarian (not necessarily Telic Egalitarian) principles avoid the 
Levelling Down Objection, yet do not judge that levelling down makes the 
outcome, all things considered, strictly worse. One example is T\/Iaximin, 
according to which the relative goodness of distributions is judged entirely 
by the level of the worst off people across distributions. It judges that a 
distribution x is at least as good as y if and only if the well-being of the 
worst off in x at least as high as that in y: it gives absolute priority to the 
worst off. As it focuses on the worst off, the well-being of the non-worst 
off people does not affect its distributive judgement. The levelling down of 
a better off person does not affect a judgement on the relative goodness of 
distributions so long as the well-being of the worst off remains at the same 
level. Compare:1: = (100,100) and y = (200,100). Maximin judges that x is 
equally as good as y, all things considered. It claims that there is no respect 
with regard to which levelling down is better, namely that x is not better 
in any respect. However, moving from y to x is levelling down. lVlaximin 
implies that levelling down is not better in any respect. 1i£aximin thus avoids 
the Levelling Down Objection. However, M~'{imin does not judge that x is 
strictly worse than y. It violates Pareto. 14 Maximin is insensitive to levelling 
down in terms of the all-things-considered judgement. 
2.5 The Pigou-Dalton condition 
I now turn to the third claim of Prioritarianism, i.e. the Pigou-Dalton 
condition. Parfit does not think that equality is valuable in itself. Instead, 
he claims that the well-being of a worse off person counts more than the 
well-being of a better off person, i.e. "[bJenefiting people matters more the 
worse off those people are". He explains the idea of giving priority to the 
worse off by what he calls the law of diminishing moral goodness. 
We believe that, if benefits go to people who are better off, 
these benefits matter less. Just as resources have diminishing 
marginal utility, so utility has diminishing marginal moral im-
portance. Given the similarity between these claims, there is a 
second similar argument in favour of equality: this time, not of 
resources, but of well-being. On this argument, whenever we 
HParfit himself thinks that Maximin is too extreme, even though he believes that Max-
imin is a version of his proposed Priorit.arianism. Sec Parfit (lD~)5, pp. :l5-:lD). 
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transfer resources to people who are worse off, the resulting ben-
efits will not merely be, in themselves, greater. They will also, 
on the moral scale, matter more. There are thus two ways in 
which the outcome will be better. 15 
In Prioritarianism, giving a benefit to a worse off person has greater 
moral significance than giving the same benefit to a better off person. The 
idea of the law of diminishing moral goodness is depicted in figure 1. 
Place figure 1. (The figure is attached to the end of this dis-
sertation) . 
The figure shows that the goodness of well-being diminishes as the ab-
solute level of well-being gets higher. The curve is strictly increasing, but 
bends downwards. The shape of this curve is known as strict concavity in 
economics. 16 
In order to capture the gist of the law neatly, let us put it formally. 
Parfit claims that "if benefits go to people who are better off, these benefits 
matter less". This means that the increase in the good derived from the 
benefit c is greater for lower well-being than for higher well-being. This can 
be put as follows: g(WI + e) - g(wI) < g(W2 + e) - g(W2) for WI > W2 and 
some benefit e > O. That is to say, the additional good derived from giving 
some benefit, e, to the worse off person is greater than the additional good 
derived from giving e to the better off person. According to PrioritarianislIl, 
giving some benefit to a worse off person yields more good than giving it to 
a better off person. 
Suppose that we can transfer some benefit from one person to another 
person, keeping other peoples' well-being constant. If we transfer some 
15Parfit (1995, p. 24). Original emphasis. 
16There are two different cases of strict. concave curve. The one is that the goodness 
of well-being increases to infinity. That is, the curve is not bounded above, and goes up 
infinitely. In this case, there is no limit in the value of goodncss of well-being. The other 
case is t.hat the goodness of well-being strictly increases but approaches to a certain finite 
limit, which Frank Ramsey (H)28) called the /!li.S8. In this case, the curve approaches 
to bliss indefinitely, but never goes up above bliss. That is, the value in the goodness 
of well-being is bounded above. This is an important distinction in economics, and it 
lllay be a philosophically interesting question whether there i;; a limit level of goodness of 
well-being. However, for the present purpose, I do not need to discuss whether or not the 
goodness of well-being is bounded above. 
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benefit from the better off person to the worse off person, it makes the 
outcome better, all things considered. The outcome gets better and better 
as we make the transfer of benefit, from a better off person to a worse off 
person. Call this transfer of the benefit from a better off person to a worse off 
person the equalizing transfer. The equalizing transfer makes the outcome 
better up to the point where the well-beings of two persons are completely 
equalized. The same process of equalizing transfer applies to any pair of 
well-being. Thus, in Prioritarianism, the series of equalizing transfer makes 
the outcome better up to the point where everyone's well-being is at the 
same absolute level. Thus, although Parfit refrains from the claim that 
equality is valuable in itself, in his proposed Prioritariallism, equality is a 
property that makes the outcome better. Par'fit writes: 
On the definition with which I began, the Priority View is not 
Egalitarian. On this view, though we ought to give priority to the 
worse off, that is not because we shall be reducing inequality. We 
do not believe that inequality is, in itself, either bad or unjust. 
but, since this view has a built-in bias towards equality, it could 
be called Egalitarian in a second, looser sense. \Ve might say 
that, if we take this view, we are Non-Relational Egalitarians.17 
In Prioritarianism, equality increases the goodness of a distribution with-
out increasing the total well-being. To put this the other way round, keeping 
the total well-being constant, a more equal distribution is better than less 
equal one. Formally, if we assume that the betterness ordering can be rep-
resented by an additive function, it is equivalent to: if WI + 102 = w~ + w~ 
and 1101 - tu21 < ltu~ - tu~l, then g( WI) + g( 102) > g( tu~) + g( tu~). This follows 
when the function g( ) is strictly concave. 
The law of diminishing moral goodness thus understood is known as the 
Pigo'u-Dalton condition in economics. The Pigou-Dalton condition claims 
the following. Suppose that we can transfer a fixed amount of benefit from a 
better off person to a worse off person without altering the relative position 
of the two and without decreasing the total well-being. Then, the after-
transfer distribution is better than the before-transfer distribution. Many 
economists believe that the Pigou-Dalton condition is a desirable condition 
17Parfit (1995, p. 25). Original emphasis. 
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for the inequality measure, and that, as I shall discuss in section 6, egalitar-
ian social welfare function should satisfy this condition. 18 This is because 
they believe that, other things being equal, the transfer of income from a 
better off person to a worse off person reduces the overall income inequality 
in the society. Economists usually understand the Pigou-Dalton condition in 
terms of income. However, needless to say, I use the Pigou-Dalton condition 
in terms of well-being. 
One might wonder how Parfit can possibly claim to give priority to the 
worse off, if he is committed to the idea of non-relationality. According 
to Parfit, a person is worse off in the sense that he is worse than what he 
might have been. He is not worse off in the sense that he is worse off than 
others. So, in Prioritarianislll, a person is worse off, because he is at a lower 
absolute level. Pal'fit claims that we should give priority to the people at a 
lower absolute level. This is the difference between Telic Egalitarianism and 
Prioritarianism with regards to the use of "worse off". 
Now, I propose the formula of Prioritarianism. The general form of 
Prioritarianislll is given by (a) strong separability and (b) the Pigou-Dalton 
condition. I\'lore specifically, Prioritarianism is characterized by (a' ) additive 
separability and (b' ) strict concavity. 
Prioritarianism (formal definition): a distributive principle 
is Prioritarianism if it satisfies strong separability, Pareto, and 
the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
A typical formula of Prioritarianism is that x = (Wl,W2, ... ,Wn ) is at 
least as good as y = (w~, w~, ... , w~) if and only if G(x) = g(wd + g(W2) + 
... + g(wn ) ~ G(y) = g(wD + g(w~) + ... + g(w:J, where g( ) is an increas-
ing, strictly concave function. It is easy to verify that this formula above 
satisfies both strong separability, Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
One example of this formula is the sum of the square-root function of in-
dividual well-being: namely that x = (Wl,W2, ... ,W11 ) is at least as good 
as y = (w~,w~, ... ,w:J if and only if G(;1:) = VW1 + JW2+, ... ,+J% ~ 
G(y) = ;;;f + ~+, ... , +~. It is easy to verify (a) that the goodness 
of a subset of people's well-being is determined independently of the other 
people's well-being, (b) that levelling down always makes the distribution, 
all things considered, strictly worse, and (c) that the individual component 
lSSee Cowell (1995, p.55), and Sen and Fo~ter (1997). 
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of overall good diminishes as the well-being gets higher. Another, rather 
unclear, example is what economists call the Nash social welfaTe function. 
The Nash social welfare function judges relative goodness by the product of 
individual well-being: namely that x = (Wl, W2, ... , wn) is at least as good 
as y = (wi,w~, ... ,w:,) if and only if G(x) = Wl X W2 X ... X Wn 2': G(y) = 
w~ x w~ x ... X w;,. On the face of it, it is not an additive function or 
a strictly concave function. However, if we take the logarithm, we have: 
x = (Wl,W2, ... ,Wn) is at least as good as y = (w~,w~,,,,,W;,) if and only if 
log G(x) = log Wl + log W2 + ... + log Wn 2': log G(y) = log wi + logw~ + ... + 
log w~. Since the log function is strictly concave, the formula is an additive 
and strictly concave function. The Nash social welfare function is a version 
of Prioritarianism. 
2.6 Giving complete priority 
One might wonder if my definition of Prioritarianism above could include 
principles that give complete priority to the worse off or the worst off as a 
version of Prioritarianism. I shall consider two distributive principles. The 
first is lvlaximin. Ivlaximin claims that we should give absol'ute priority to 
the WOTst off. The other is Leximin. Leximin claims that we should give 
lexical priority to the WOTse off. These principles give complete priority to 
the worst off or the worse off and, on the face of it, each principle seems 
to be a version of Prioritarianism, because each can be phrased as "giving 
priority to the worst/worse off". Let me examine each principle in the light 
of my formal definition. 
Maximin became well-known after Rawls (1971) used it as an underlying 
idea in his Difference Principle. Here I discuss Maximin itself: it is different 
from Rawls's Difference Principle. This is because in Rawls's argument (a) 
the Difference Principle must be used with other principles of justice, (b) it 
applies to the basic structure of society, (c) it applies to the representative 
member of the worst off group, and (d) the informational basis of distributive 
judgement is the bundle of primary social goods. 
Maximin is defined as follows: a distribution x is at least as good as y 
if and only if the well-being level of the worst ofl' person in ;7: is at least as 
high as that in y. More formally, x = (Wl,W2, ... ,Wn ) is at least as good as 
y = (w~, w~, ... , w;,) if and only if min{ Wl, W2, ... , wn} 2': min{ wi, w~, ... , w:,J 
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On the face of it, Maximin seems to be a version of Prioritarianism, since 
it is usually phrased as "giving absolute priority to the worst off". How-
ever, this is not so obvious. It is not a version of Prioritarianism in the 
light of my formal definition. "Maximin satisfies none of strong separabil-
ity, Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition. To see that l\1aximin violates 
strong separability, consider two comparisons: 
case 1: x = (5,10,20,20,20) y = (7,10,20,20,20) 
case 2: ;1:' = (5,10,5,5,5) y' = (7,10,5,5,5). 
In these comparisons, strong separability claims that the relative good-
ness of ;r and y is determined independently of the well-being of persons 3, 
4, and 5. It claims that x is better than y if and only if x' is better than V', 
or that y is better than x if and only if y' is better than x'. In case 1, l\1ax-
imin judges that y is better than x. In case 2, it judges that :r/ and y' are 
equally good. However, strong separability claims that if y is better than x 
in case 1, then y' is better than x' in case 2. Thus, Maximin violates strong 
separability. It is not non-relational, because we cannot judge the relative 
goodness of distributions unless we consider the well-being of all people. 
As I discussed in section 4, Maximin violates Pareto. To remind, compare 
x = (100,100) and y = (200,100). Maximin judges that x is equally as good 
as y, whereas Pareto claims that y is strictly better than x. Thus, Maximin 
violates Pareto. 
Finally, let me show that Maximin violates the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
Compare x = (50,20, 10) and y = (40,30, 10). Maximin judges that x and y 
are equally good, whereas the Pigou-Dalton condition claims that y is better 
than x. Thus, Maximin violates the Pigou-Dalton condition. As Maximin 
violates strong separability, Pareto, and the Piguo-Dalton condition, it can-
not be seen as a version of Prioritariallislll. 
What about Leximin'? Leximin is the lexicographical extension of Max-
imin. According to Leximin, a distribution x is better than y if and only 
if the well-being level of the worst off in x is higher than that in y, or the 
well-being level of the worst off in x is the same as that in y and the well-
being level of the second worst off in x is higher than that in y, and so on. 
That is, we first compare the well-being level of the worst off across distri-
butions. Only when the worst off is at the same level across distributions 
do we then compare the second worst off. Only when the worst off and the 
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second worst off are at the same level, do we then compare the third worst 
off across distributions. This process proceeds up to the best off person. It 
gives lexicographical priority (for short, lexical priority) to the worse off. It 
is lexicographical, because the distributions are ranked similar to the way 
that words are organized in a dictionary: the order of the first letter of each 
world takes strict priority over the order of its second letter, and so on. 
Leximin satisfies strong separability and Pareto. First, consider strong 
separability. I do not present a proof here. Instead, compare again cases 
1 and 2 above. In case 1, Leximin judges that y is better than x. In 
case 2, it judges y' is better than y. Leximin judges the relative goodness 
of distributions independently of the well-beings of unaffected people. It 
surely satisfies strong separability. Next, consider again :1: = (100,100) and 
y = (200,100). Leximin judges that y is strictly better than :1:, and hence 
satisfies Pareto. 
'What about the Pigou-Dalton condition? Compare again x = (50,20,10) 
and y (40,30,10). Leximin judges that y is better than x. Leximin agrees 
with the Pigou-Dalton condition that an equalizing transfer makes the out-
come better. However, Leximin makes much stronger claim. It claims that , ' 
any transfer of benefit from a better off person to a worse off person makes 
the outcome better, all things considered. That is, it drops "given the total 
well-being constant" condition from the Pigou-Dalton condition. To illu-
minate this point, compare x' = (50,20,1) and y' = (30,21,1), where the 
well-being of the second best off is increased at the cost of the well-being 
of the best off. There is a transfer of benefit from the better off person to 
the worse off person, but it is a very inefficient one. The Pigou-Dalton con-
dition is silent in this comparison, because the total well-being is decreased 
by moving from x' to y'. However, Leximin claims that y' is better than :r', 
Leximin gives priority to the second best off, and the gain in the well-being 
of the second best off outweighs the loss in the well-being of the best off. 
That is, Leximin claims that any gain for a worse off person, however small, 
is more important than any loss for a better off person, however large. Thus, 
Leximin makes the much stronger claim than the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
This stronger claim of Leximin it; captured by Hammond eq'uity in eco-
nomics. 
Hammond equity: x is better than y if the well-being of a 
better off person is made lower in y than x and the well-being of 
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a worse ofl' person is made higher in y than x without altering 
the relative position of the two. 19 
The Pigou-Dalton condition claims that, keeping the total well-being 
constant, the transfer of benefit from a better off person to a worse off 
person makes the outcome better, all things considered. On the other hand, 
Hammond equity claims that any transfer of benefit from a better off person 
to a worse off person makes the outcome better, all things considered. That 
is, it drops "given the total well-being constant" from the Pigou-Dalton 
condition. It does not care about the loss in the total well-being of the 
non-worse off people insofar as the well-being of the worse off is increased. 
Compare again x' = (50,20,1) and y' = (30,21,1). In this comparison, 
Hammond equity claims that y is better than ;1:. Hammond equity gives 
lexical priority to the second best off, and the gain in the well-being of the 
second best off outweighs the loss in the well-being of the best off. That 
is, Hammond equity claims that any transfer of benefits from a better off 
person to a worse off person, however small, outweighs any loss in the total 
well-being of the better off people, however great. Hammond equity rules 
out the trade off between the gains for the worse off and the losses for the 
better off people, however many. 
This seems to be a drawback for Leximin. However, it can be an advan-
tage. The Pigou-Dalton condition presupposes the notion of the total sum 
of people's well-being in a distribution, and requires a cardinal measure of 
well-being. On the other hand, Hammond equity does not require any ag-
gregative notion of people's well-being. This means Hammond equity only 
requires a common ordinal scale of well-being. Given that Leximin does not 
require any aggregative notion, it may be appealing for those who believe 
that interpersonal aggregation of well-being should be ruled out. I will come 
back to this issue in chapter 7. 
Leximin, thus understood, satisfies strong separability and Pareto. Fur-
thermore, it gives priority to the worse off, albeit inefficiently. Admittedly, 
Leximin may be seen as a version of Prioritarianism, if Prioritarians agree to 
replace the Pigou-Dalton condition by Hammond equity. However, if they 
think that Hammond equity is too extreme because it rules out a trade off 
between the gains in the well-being of a worse off person and the loss of a 
19Hammond equity is due to Hammond (1976), which provides an axiomatic analysis 
of Leximin. 
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better off person, they are not to adopt Hammond equity and hence exclude 
Leximin from Prioritarianism, or from a plausible form of Prioritarianism. 
Therefore, if Prioritarians do not want to include Leximin as a version of 
Prioritarianism, the explanation of this is that Hammond equity rules out a 
trade off between the gain in the well-being of the worse off and the loss in 
the well-being of the better off. 
It might be argued that Leximin IS relational, even though it satis-
fies strong separability. Prioritarians claim that Prioritarianism is non-
relational. They claim that the goodness of a person's well-being is de-
termined independently of other people's well-being. Whenever we give ab-
solute priority to the worst off (the second worst off, the third worst off, and 
so on), we must know who is the worst off (the second worst off, the third 
worst off, and so on). This means that we must compare the relationship 
between the different people's well-being in order to find who is the worst 
off. From this, it would be argued that giving lexical priority entails com-
paring different people's well-being, and hence that Leximin is relational. 2o 
I disagree. Suppose that we have one unit of benefit and that we are to give 
it to someone. Then, compare two sets of distributions: 
Case 1: x = (2,4,4) Y = (3,4,4) 
Case 2: z = (2,1,1) w = (3,1,1) 
By moving from x to y, or from z to 10, the well-being of person 1 
is increased by one unit. The increase in the goodness of this benefit is 
non-relational; it should be the same in both cases. But in the first case, 
person 1 is the worst off, whereas in the second case he is better off than the 
others. According t.o Prioritarianism, it is better to give this benefit to the 
person who is at a lower absolute level. Therefore, it is better t.o give the 
benefit to person 1 in :r, but in z it would be better to give the benefit to 
either person 2 or 3. So when we are concerned with how we should judge, 
it is necessary to know how well off a person is relative to other people. 
2°This question is raised by Rabinowicz (2002, p. lan). Rabinowicz writes: "it is incor-
rect to interpret Rawls's difference principle as the extreme, lexical form of the Priority 
View. Rawls's principle givC8 absolut.e priorit.y to those people who are worse off than 
all others. The priority given to the worse off is not., on t.hat. principle, due to t.he fact. 
that t.hese people are 'wor,;e off than t.hey might have boen'. If their welfare level were 
arbitrarily increa,;od but they would still be worse off than others, improving t.heir lot. 
would still have the same (absolute) priority". 
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Prioritarians claim that the goodness of the benefit depends only on how 
well off the recipient of the benefit is. But the weight of this goodness in a 
choice between distributions clearly depends on how well off others are. 
The same is true for Leximin. According to Leximin, the goodness of 
a benefit to a person is not given by a continuous, strictly concave real-
valued function, because it is a discontinuous betterness ordering. Rather, 
benefiting a worse off person creates discontinuously greater goodness. But 
again, the weight of this "goodness" depends on how well off the others are. 
Three things should be clearly distinguished here: (a) the size of a hen-
efit, (b) the goodness of giving the benefit to someone, and (c) what I call 
the weight of this goodness in deciding between distributions. The size of 
the benefit is simply the amount of well-being a person receives by going 
from one distribution to another. If person 1 gets 7111 in distribution x and 
he gets 71I~ in distribution y, the size of the benefit for him by moving from 
x to y is (711 1 - wi). 
The goodness of a benefit to a person (or the moral goodness of the 
benefit) depends solely on how well off he is: it is therefore non-relational. 
In the example, the goodness is given by g( 7111) - g( wD. On Leximin, the 
goodness of a benefit to a person is not given by a continuous, strictly 
concave real-valued function. Rather, it has discontinuously greater value 
to benefit a person if he is worse off. 
The weight of the goodness depends on how well off the others are. 
Consider the above example again. The goodness of giving one unit of well-
being to person 1 is the same in both x and y: it is g(3) - g(2). But the 
weight of the goodness is different in the two cases: g(3) - g(2) is greater 
than g(5) - g( 4), so whenever we have one unit of well-being to add in x, 
we should give this benefit to person 1 rather than to one of the others. On 
the other hand, given that g(3) - g(2) is smaller than g(2) - g(l), so in the 
case of z, we should give the benefit to either person 2 or 3. 
This distinction helps us to understand in which sense Prioritarianism 
is non-relational. The size of a benefit and the goodness of the benefit 
to each person are independent of other people's well-being. However, the 
weight of the goodness of a benefit depends on how well off the other peo-
ple are. Therefore, Prioritarianism actually includes some relationality in 
order to determine the weight of the goodness of a benefit. Prioritarianism 
is non-relational in the sense that the size of benefit and the goodness of 
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benefit to each person are independent of other people's well-being. Lex-
imin satisfies strong separability and Pareto, and hence it is non-relational 
like other versions of Prioritarianism. So if Prioritarians agree to replace the 
Pigou-Daltoncondition by Hammond equity, it may be seen as a version of 
Prioritarianism. 
2.7 Economists' VIews 
Some economists would claim that there is nothing new in Pal'fit's proposal 
of Prioritarianism. They would say that Prioritarianism, defined by strong 
separability and the Pigou-Dalton condition, have been well known amongst 
economists for a long time: it can be traced back at least to Atkinson 
(1970) and maybe to Dalton (1920). Economists would further claim that 
we actually do not need strong separability to give priority to the worse 
off: all we need are two significantly weaker conditions: symmetric and 
strictly S-concave functions of people's well-beings. In this section, I shall 
discuss what Parfit's Prioritarianism adds to the literature of egalitarian 
social welfare function in economics. 
It is Hugh Dalton (1920) who first proposed a kind of Prioritarianism. 
Of course, Dalton did not use the word "Prioritarianism", because such an 
expression did not exist in his time. However, his proposal is exactly the 
same as the formal definition of Prioritarianism on page 29. The difference 
between Dalton's proposal and Pal'fit's is that Dalton was concerned with 
economic welfare and income, whereas Parfit is concerned with the good-
ness of well-being and well-being. 21 Dalton simply assumed that a welfare 
function, which maps the vector of income onto the social welfare ordering, 
is "additive", and that "the relation of income to economic welfare is the 
same for all members of the community" .22 His analysis primarily exam-
ined the shape of welfare function an egalitarian society would have. He puts 
forward what he called "the principle of transfers" , and suggested some func-
tions which satisfy the principle of transfers. Dalton argued that a welfare 
function is additive and strictly concave just like my formal definition. Thus, 
the fomwla of what we call Prioritarianism these days is widely known in 
21Dalton (UJ20, p. :~48) wrote: "the effects of the distribut.ion of income upon the 
distribution and total amount of economic welfare, which may be derived from income". 
22Dalton (1920, p. 34~J). 
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economics, although economists are concerned with economic welfare and 
income. It should be noticed that, as Dalton assumed welfare function to be 
additive, he simply took it for granted additively separable (hence strongly 
separable and, in turn, non-relational): he did not explain why a welfare 
function should be additively separable or non-relational. Likewise, Atkin-
son (1970) assumes that social welfare function is additively separable, but. 
he does not give any support for this view. 
Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973) have argued that additive separability 
is too a strong condition,23 and showed that the welfare function need not be 
strictly concave in order to embody the idea of giving priority to the worse 
off, if additive separability is relaxed to symmetry. If the welfare function 
is symmetric in its arguments, the welfare function only needs to be strictly 
S-concave. 
Let me explain "symmetric" and "strictly S-concave" respectively. A 
symmetric function implies that the goodness of a distribution remains un-
changed even when the personal identities of well-being are permutated. 
More formally, the symmetric goodness function implies that: 
In plain words, symmetry implies that the permutations of personal iden-
tities do not the change the goodness of a distribution. It can be seen 
as a condition of impartiality. Symmetry may be accepted by any person 
without much dispute. Any sensible distributive principle (Prioritarianism, 
Maximin, Leximin, classical utilitarianism and so on) satisfies this condition. 
Strict S-concavity is defined as follows. g( ) is strictly S-concave if for 
all bistochastic matrices Q, it is the case that g(Qx) > g(x), where Qx is 
not x nor a permutation of x. A bistochastic matrix is a square matrix, 
where all of the entries of the matrix are non-negative and each of the rows 
and columns adds up to one.24 Suppose that there is a bistochastic matrix 
Q such that y = Qx, where y is not ;1: or a permutation of ;1:. Then, the 
2:lBut they do not explain why additive Heparability is too ~trong, they Himply ~ay 
"[aJ~ i~ well known, additive ~eparability is a strong condition t.o impose on a general 
welfare function". Of conrse, mat,hematically ~peaking, ~t.rong separability is st.ronger 
than, for example, weak separability. But it is not clear if ~trong separHbility is ct.hicHlly 
too demanding. 
2'IFor example, the matrix 
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goodness function is strict S-concavity if g(y) > g(x).25 
In plain words, if there exists a bistochastic matrix such that y = Qx, 
there exists a vector of well-being such that a vector y can be obtained 
from x by a series of transfers from the better off to the worse off. Strict 
S-concavity claims that y, which is obtained from x by a series of transfers 
from the better off to the worse off, is better than x. This is exactly what the 
Pigou-Dalton condition claims, and actually it is as far as we can go with 
the Pigou-Dalton condition. The goodness function is strictly S-concave 
if, whenever one distribution of well-being can be obtained from another 
distribution by a series of the equalizing transfers, the goodness of the former 
is greater than that of the latter.26 
Economists thus claim the following. If we are concerned only with giving 
priority to the worse off, i.e. the Pigou-Dalton condition, all we need is strict 
S-concavity and symmetry. In other words, strict S-concavity and symmetry 
are jointly sufficient to hold a principle of giving priority to the worse off. 
This position may be called PD-ism after the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
PD-ism: x = (WI, W2, ... , w n ) is at least as good as y = 
(wi, w~, ... , w:,) if and only if G(x) = g(1Ol' W2, ... , 1On ) 2: G(y) = 
g(w~,1O~, ... ,W:,), where g( ) is a symmetric and strictly S-
concave function. 
This PD-ism, however, is too broad. It is so broad because many dis-
tributive principles fall under PD-ism, and because many interesting philo-
sophical distinctions are dismissed. Needless to say, Prioritarianism is a 
version of PD-ism. As I shall show in chapter 5, some versions of Telic 
Egalitarianism satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition and give priority to the 
worse off. Not surprisingly, these versions of Telic Egalitarianism can be 
represented as a strictly S-concave function. PD-ism implies that Prioritar-
ianism and some versions of Telic Egalitarianism fall under the same class 
of distributive principle. 
[
0.5 0.2 0.8] 
0.1 0.6 0.3 
0.4 0.2 0.4 
is bistochastic. 
25Thc proof is found in Dasgupta, Scn and Starrctt (Inn) and Sen (HJn, pp.5G-56). 
26Sce Dasgupat, Sen and Starrett (H17:~), and Sen (Hl7:{, pp. 54-56). 
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As Parfit notes, Prioritarianism has a built-in bias towards equality. 
As the Pigou-Dalton condition claims that, keeping the total well-being 
constant, a more equal distribution is better than less equal one, equal-
ity plays some role in Prioritarianism. As regards practical distributive 
judgements, Prioritarianism and Telic Egalitarianism may end up making 
the same judgement. The practical difference between Prioritarianism and 
some versions of Telic Egalitarianism may be small. But there is a crucial 
theoretical/philosophical difference between the two principles. 
If Prioritarianism is intended to embody only the idea of "gives priority 
to the worse off', economists could reasonably claim that Prioritarianism is 
not new: they could claim that economists have provided a sophisticated 
analysis of Prioritarianism. However, PD-ism, defined by strict S-concavity 
and symmetry, does not distinguish some versions of Telic Egalitarianism 
from Prioritarianism. It is too thin a distributive principle to analyze the 
characteristically different distributive principles. As Dasgupta, Sen and 
Starrett (1973) have showed, strict S-concave function is as far as we can 
go with the Pigou-Dalton condition. This is all economists have showed. 
If they claim that Prioritarianism does not add anything to the strictly 
concave, symmetric goodness function, they are throwing the baby out with 
the bath water. 
Economists certainly showed how far we can go with the idea of "giving 
priority to the worse off' in a precise way. However, we still have to discuss 
why one distributive principle (say, a version of Telic Egalitarianism) is more 
plausible than another (say, Prioritarianism), even though both distributive 
principles entail strict S-concavity. After all, it is the claim of strong sep-
arability that makes Prioritarianism new in the discussion of distributive 
judgement. As I said earlier, strict concavity is, mathematically, a stronger 
condition than strict S-concavity with symmetry. Economists criticize strict 
concavity without moral argument. The reason why Prioritarianism re-
quires strict concavity rather than strict S-concavity is due to the moral 
claim that the goodness of each person's well-being should be determined 
independently of other people's well-being. Strong separability exemplifies 
the idea of non-relationality: Prioritarians believe that the goodness of each 
person's well-being should be determined independently of other people's 
well-being. To materialize this claim, they need strong separability. To ma-
terialize the strongly separable goodness function, they require a condition 
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that is stronger than strict S-concavity, i.e. strict concavity. This is why 
I defined Parfit's Prioritarianism by the Pigou-Dalton condition together 
with strong separability. Prioritarianism is new in the sense that it provides 
the injection of an ethical argument to justify strong separability. Strong 
separability is needed by Prioritarianism because Prioritarians support the 
moral claim that the goodness of a person's well-being is determined in-
dependently of other people's well-being. However, many economists have 
failed to recognize the normative implication of strong separability. 
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Chapter 3 
Priority and Threshold 
3.1 Introduction 
There may be several objections to Prioritarianism. Although in chapter 5 
I raise several objections to Prioritarianism in defence of my version of Telic 
Egalitarianism, in this chapter I take up one objection in order to show the 
far-reaching scope of Prioritarianism. 
The objection starts with the following question: should we give prior-
ity to the worse off even if his well-being is at a very high absolute level? 
Suppose, for example, that we are faced with a choice between two acts (or 
policies), one of which will increase the well-being of the best off, the other of 
which increases the well-being of the second best off. Should we give priority 
to the second best off over the best off? Needless to say, the second best 
oft· is at a lower absolute level. Then, when some benefit becomes available 
(but for some reason, it is not possible to transfer it to people other than 
the first and second best off), is it better to give it to the second best off 
rather than the best off? 
It might be argued that the distribution of well-being amongst well oft· 
people is not morally relevant in evaluating the overall goodness of a dis-
tribution. A plausible distributive principle need not, or should not, be 
concerned with priority amongst well-off people. An objection of this kind 
may give a good reason to search for an alternative distributive principle. 
There may be several directions such a search might take. One possible 
direction is this. We set aside, at least for the moment, the idea of giving 
priority to the worse off. Nonetheless, we adopt a principle that gives priority 
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only to those below a certain absolute level of well-being, and that gives no 
priority to those above that level: that is to say, "giving priority to the 
badly off". Let us call such a principle the Threshold Pr'inciple. Call the 
absolute level of well-being below which our moral concern is warranted the 
threshold. The Threshold Principle claims that we should give priority to 
the well-being of those people below the threshold over the well-being of 
those above the threshold, and that we should give the same weight to those 
people above the threshold. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to propose two formulae of the 
Threshold Principle, and to show the theoretical similarity between Prior-
itarianism and the Threshold Principle. If a distributive principle is said 
to be one version of Prioritarianism whenever it can be phrased as "giving 
priority to ( )", then the Threshold Principle may be seen as a version of 
Prioritarianism, because it can be phrased as "giving priority to the badly 
off". However, such a characterization is not helpful in judging whether or 
not one distributive principle is a version of Prioritarianism. In this chapter, 
I argue that the Threshold Principle can be seen as a version of Prioritari-
anism in its theoretical structure, if Prioritarians readily restricts the scope 
of the Pigou-Dalton condition. I propose two formulae of the Threshold 
Principle, Lexical and Continuous Threshold Principles. Then, I show that 
these two formulae both satisfy strong separability and Pareto fully and the 
Pigou-Dalton condition only below the threshold: the only difference lies in 
the scope of the Pigou-Dalton condition. I point out that there is a good 
reason to give priority to the worse off even above the threshold. If this 
claim of mine is accepted, then the Threshold Principle satisfies all three 
core claims of Prioritarianism. 
In section 2, I first explain a possible objection to Prioritarianism, namely 
t.hat we should not care about priority amongst the well off people. I in-
troduce the intuitive argument for the principle that gives priority to those 
below the threshold over those above it. In section 3, I briefly discuss the lit-
erature of needs and John Skorupski's Threshold Just.ice, which are similar 
to the Threshold Principle. I point out some problems with these arguments, 
and offer an informal formula of the Threshold Principle. In section 4, I dis-
cuss how we should aggregate the well-being below the threshold. It turns 
out t.hat the Threshold Principle should give priority to the worse off below 
the threshold level. In section 5, I propose two formulae of the Threshold 
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Principle. The one is the Lexical Threshold Principle, which rules out a 
trade off between the super-threshold well-being and the sub-threshold well-
being. The other is the Continuous Threshold Principle, which does allow 
such trade offs. In section 6, I clarify the difference and similarity between 
Prioritarianism and the Threshold Principle. The Threshold Principle, be 
it Lexical or Continuous, satisfies strong separability and Pareto fully and 
the Pigou-Dalton condition only below the threshold. In section 7, I discuss 
Roger Crisp's recent claim that his proposed Compassion Principle, which 
is equivalent to my Lexical Threshold Principle, is different from, and lllore 
plausible than, Prioritarianism. 
3.2 A challenge 
The Pigou-Dalton condition claims that, keeping the total well-being con-
stant, the transfer of some benefit from a better off person to a worse off 
person makes the outcome better, all things considered. It maintains that, 
keeping the total well-being being constant, a more equal distribution is 
better than a less equal one, and hence that equality increases the overall 
good of a distribution without increasing the total well-being up to the point 
where the well-being of a better off person and that of a worse off person are 
equalized. Thus, even if Prioritarianism does not hold that equality is valu-
able in itself, it certainly involves some egalitarian element in its theoretical 
structure. Parfit is aware of this, when he states that Prioritarianism has "a 
built-in bias towards equality", and that Prioritarianism is "Non-Relational 
Egalitarian" as opposed to treating equality as valuable in itself. Prioritar-
ianism is "Non-Relational" in the sense that it rules out any relationship 
between different people's well-beings from consideration. 
According to Parfit's Prioritarianism, for any two well-beings, if a per-
son's well-being is at a higher absolute level than another person's well-being, 
we can increase the overall goodness of a distribution by transferring some 
benefit from a better off person to a worse off person. This is the case for 
any pair of a better off person and a worse off person. For example, take 
the best off and second best off person. By the Pigou-Dalton condition, 
Prioritarians claim that we should give priority to the second best off rather 
than the first best off: if we transfer some benefit frOIll the first best off to 
the second best off, the outcome will be better, even if there is no increase 
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in the total well-being. 
This implication of Prioritarianism may be challenged. Is it plausible to 
claim that the outcome is made better by transferring some benefit from the 
best off to the second best off? Should we give priority to the second best 
off over the first best off? Should we be concerned with priority amongst 
the well off people? Even if a challenge of this sort does not provide a 
sufficient reason to reject Prioritarianism, it seems to give a good rea.son to 
motivate the search for a different distributive principle, according to which 
no priority is given amongst those people within the well off group. 
There may be several ways to exclude the very well off people from the 
scope of priority. One possibility is what I call the Threshold Principle. 
Dy "threshold", I mean some absolute level below which one's well-being 
warrants special moral concern in evaluating the overall goodness of a dis-
tribution. Preliminarily speaking, the Threshold Principle maintains that 
we give priority to the people below the threshold, and that we assign no 
priority to the people above the threshold. The Threshold thus works as 
a cut-off point for deciding whether someone's well-being mayor may not 
warrant our special moral concern. 
The Threshold Principle may be appealing for several reasons. The 
plight of people below the threshold would probably arouse our compassion. 
If not harsh, we would readily give priority to those below the threshold over 
the promotion of our own interest. Many of us are drawn to such a concern 
through our basic compassion. Consequently, it is unlikely that many people 
would reject the spirit of the Threshold Principle. The Threshold Princi-
ple may be required from the point of moral agency. A person may not 
be thought to be a fully rational and autonomous agent unless a minimum 
level of well-being is met. It is not radically demanding to claim that main-
taining everyone above such a level is a prerequisite for any sensible moral 
theory. Whatever the reason would be, the Threshold Principle seems to 
have strong force. However, the main purpose of the present chapter is not 
to provide a moral foundation to the Threshold Principle, but to examine 
the theoretical structure of the Threshold Principle in order to clarify the 
scope of Prioritarianism. 
45 
3.3 Similarity arguments 
Before I present my own formulae of the Threshold Principle, it may be 
instructive to look at arguments similar to the Threshold Principle in order 
to motivate my formulae. 
The idea of giving priority to the badly off has been extensively discussed 
in a specific branch of philosophy, i.e. the literature of needs. The literature 
includes David 13raybrooke (1987, 1998), Harry Frankfurt (1984), and David 
Wiggins (1998). Their approach to the issue first establishes an absolute 
conception of needs, and then puts forward a principle that gives absol1de 
priority to the fulfilment of needs over the satisfaction of a mere want or 
the promotion of the individual, or total, well-being. David Wiggins, for 
example, advocates the Limitation Principle, according to which the public 
body should not intervene in a citizen's affairs in such a way that vital needs 
are sacrificed to mere desires, or that stronger vital needs are sacrificed to 
lesser ones. Similarly, 13raybrooke advocates the Principle of Precedence, 
according to which satisfying the :Minimum Standards of Provision for the 
List of :Matters of Needs takes "a lexicographical priority" over other political 
concerns. 
The proposals of these philosophers are undoubtedly important. How-
ever, I shall not start my analysis with their proposals for two reasons. 
Firstly, needs are just one aspect of well-being, and my analysis here is con-
cerned with well-being in general. To specify the notion of a person's needs 
is one thing, and to specify the overall well-being of that person is quite 
another. Some people might claim that all we care about is people's needs, 
and that we should not care about peoples' well-being in general. However, 
the present purpose is to propose a distributive principle that gives priority 
to the well-being below a certain low level over the well-being above that 
level, and to contrast it with Prioritarianism that is defined on peoples' well-
being. Therefore, I shall begin my analysis by considering the distribution 
of peoples' well-being, not. t.heir needs. 
Secondly, those proposals are not accommodated in the theory of better-
Hess: t.hey may resist discussing the fulfilment of needs in terms of betterness. 
For example, for 'Viggins, t.he fulfilment of needs is the prerequisite for any 
workable moral theory. He would claim that failing to fulfil people's needs is 
not bad: i.e. t.hat the fulfilment of needs is not a matter of better or worse. 
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He might claim that peoples' needs ought to be fulfilled, full stop. However, 
the present dissertation is concerned with the betterness of distributions of 
well-being. I admit that there might be some distributive principles that do 
not fall under the theory of betterness, like Nozick's side-constraint theory. 
J3ut this lies outside the scope of thi1:> di1:>1:>ertation. Those propo1:>als about 
need1:> do not fit well into this dissertation. For these rea1:>ons, I shall not 
discuss the literature of needs any further. 
Recently, John Skorupski (1999) ha1:> suggested a version of the Thresh-
old Principle, which he calls Threshold Justice. I think his proposal is a good 
starting point to motivate my formulae of the Threshold Principle. Skorup-
ski discusses both the prudential case (the principle of threshold-constrained 
maximization) and the moral case (Threshold Justice); this chapter focuses 
on the latter. Although Skorupski calls his proposed principle "Threshold 
Justice" , it is not meant to be a general theory of justice but a basi1:> to asseS1:> 
actions, characters, institutions, and so on. It is a theory of betterness of 
distributions with some constraints. 
According to Skorupski, Threshold Justice holds that "one should max-
imize aggregate utility subject to a threshold below which no individual is 
allowed to fall".l Skorupski believes that "our social ideas of social justice 
are much closer to the Threshold conception than to Utilitarianism or the 
Difference Principle [Leximin] and thus more easily rationalized by it than 
by them", because "[u]nlike leximin, Threshold JU1:>tice does not proscribe 
any improvement, however ma1:>sive, to someone's position when it is offset 
by a deterioration, however small, in the well-being of someone less well-off. 
And unlike the principle of aggregate utility, it does not allow indefinite 
worsening of a person's position so long as that is offset by compensating 
gains of well-being to others".2 
Skorupski explains his Threshold Justice as follow1:>: "we shall assume 
that general well-being is maximized subject to a threshold, and simply 
maximized where the threshold cannot be met" .3 He seems to maintain the 
following two-step formulation. 
ISkorupski (1999, p. 90). 
2Skorupski (1999, p. 91). 
3Skorupski (1999, p. 92). To be fair to Skorupski, it should be noted that t.his formula-
tion is a purely provisional one, although he docs not suggest the definitive one. Probably, 
Skorupski would readily revise it. However, I examine his provisional formulation to set 
the framework for our own formulation. 
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First step if there exists an alternative where no well-being is below the 
threshold, then eliminate the sub-threshold alternatives and choose 
the alternative where the total well-being is maximized. 
Second step if there does not exist an alternative where no one well-being 
is below the threshold, then choose the alternative where the total 
well-being is maximized. 
Threshold Justice, thus formulated, conflicts with his own claim that 
Threshold Justice has the relative advantage over classical utilitarianism and 
Leximin. Suppose that the threshold level is set at 10. Then, compare a = 
(9,20,20,20) and b = (10,10,10,10). I3y the first step argument, Skorupski's 
Threshold Justice judges that we should choose b rather than a. I3ut this 
seems to be in conflict with his criticism against Leximin. Like Leximin, 
Threshold Justice justifies any total loss of well-being in order to bring the 
sub-threshold well-being to just above the threshold: it does "proscribe any 
improvement, however massive, to someone's position when it is offset by a 
deterioration, however small, in the well-being of someone less well-off'. 
Skorupski's Threshold Justice is also in conflict with his claim against 
classical utilitarianism. Assuming again that the threshold is set at 10, 
compare c = (5,10,10,10) and d = (1,15,15,15). Following the second step 
argument, we are led to choose d rather than c. Like classical utilitarianism, 
Skorupski's Threshold Justice actually does "allow indefinite worsening of a 
person's position so long as that is offset by compensating gains of well-being 
to others" .4 
I think that the natural way to formulate the Threshold Principle is, 
first, to minimize the badness of the sub-threshold well-being and, then, 
to assign no special weight to those above the threshold. Let us suggest it 
plausible form of the Threshold Principle by two sub-principles . 
• First, minimize the badness of sub-threshold well-being, 
"1 should note that the notion of threshold may be vague, or may change in different 
contexts. For example, in the comparison of a = (9,20,20,20) and b = (10,10,10,10), 
it may be argued that the notion of threshold docs not play any role. The threshold is 
variable and determined as a parameter only in a concrete problem situation, where the 
range of distributions is either defined or at least constrained in some way. We may just 
set the threshold itself, or the level of threshold, by looking at the particular distributions. 
If this is the case, the level of threshold, or the existence of a threshold itself, may be 
determined by the context, or by the concrete choice situation. 
48 
• Then, maximize the goodness of super-threshold well-being. 
I have used the expression "badness of sub-threshold" here. The reason 
is this. If we just say "minimize the sub-threshold well-being" , it will give an 
impression that we should simply minimize the total s'um of each person's 
shortfall from the threshold, But, as I shall argue in the following section, 
it is not plausible to assume the sum total of the gap between the sub-
threshold well-being and the threshold as a target to minimize. Vlfe rather 
need to encompass the amount of sub-threshold well-being in the overall 
goodness of a distribution. To measure how much the sub-threshold well-
being exists in a distribution is one thing. To evaluate the badness of the 
sub-threshold well-being in the overall goodness of a distribution is quite 
another. In the next section, I shall first discuss how we should evaluate the 
badness of sub-threshold well-being. 
3.4 The sub-threshold principle 
How should we evaluate the badness of sub-threshold well-being? It is 
straightforward: the less badness of sub-threshold well-being, the better. 
Then, how do we measure the badness of the sub-threshold well-being, which 
we are to minimize?5 
One way to measure the badness of the sub-threshold well-being is to 
measure the total shortfall from the threshold. Firstly, we add up the indi-
viduals' shortfall from the threshold; then we minimize that total amount. 
The total shortfall seems to be important information when we measure the 
badness of sub-threshold well-being. But it alone can not be the measure 
of the sub-threshold well-being. To illustrate, consider the following exam-
ple. Assuming that the threshold is set at 10, compare a = (3, 10, 10, 10, 10) 
and b = (8,8,8,8,10). The total shortfall judges that the badness of the 
sub-threshold in a (i.e. 7) is smaller than that in b (i.e. 8). Insofar as the 
badness of sub-threshold well-being is concerned, a is better than b. How-
ever, in a, three people's well-beings are kept above the threshold level at 
the cost of person 1. The total shortfall does not register the deterioration 
5In what follows, I capitalize on Amartya Sen's (HJ7Ga) seminal paper, whose far-
reaching scope is not fully discussed here. The literature of poverty measurement is rich, 
and offers many ethical insights. Sec, for example, Foster (HJ84) and Foster and Sen 
(UHJ7). 
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of the well-being of person 1. This example shows that the total shortfall 
can justify any loss for the very badly off people for the gain of others be-
low the threshold. The Threshold Principle is originally motivated to assign 
special concern to the badly off people in absolute terms. Therefore, it is not 
plausible to formulate it in such a way that someone at a very low absolute 
level might be made even worse off. A plausible measure should be sensitive 
to the state of the very badly off. 
Another way to measure the badness of the sub-threshold well-being 
would be to count the number of people below the threshold, which is usu-
ally called the head-count. That is, we first count the number of people 
below the threshold in each distribution, and then choose the distribution 
where the number of people below the threshold is minimized. However, the 
head-count has the same problem as the total shortfall. Just like the total 
shortfall, it is not sensitive to the state of the very badly off people. To 
illustrate the problem, compare c = (2,10,10,10) and d = (9,9,9,9). The 
head-count judges that the badness of sub-threshold in c is smaller than that 
in d. This example suggests that the head-count does not take account of 
the total shortfall of the sub-threshold well-being, and, more importantly, it 
justifies any loss to the very badly off people in order to bring other people 
from just below the threshold to just above the threshold. The head-count 
is not sensitive to the state of the worst off or the badly off. 
Both of the measures considered are therefore limited in scope. The total 
shortfall is insensitive to the state of the very badly off. On the other hand, 
the head-count has two problems: (a) it does not capture the total shortfall 
of the sub-threshold well-being, and (b) it is insensitive to the state of the 
very badly off. It might be easier to reduce the sub-threshold well-being by 
taking some benefit from a person far below the threshold and giving it to 
the least badly off person just below the threshold. This, however, seems 
to be unacceptable, because we may be concerned more with the people far 
below the threshold than the people just below the threshold. 
From these observations, there is a strong reason to suggest that we 
should give priority to those far below the threshold over those just below 
the threshold. If we transfer some benefit from the worst off person to 
another person just below the threshold, then neither the total shortfall nor 
the head-count would record any change in the badness of sub-threshold 
well-being, even if the worst off would have been made even worse off. If 
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this is unacceptable, we should assign more moral weight to the well-being 
of a worse off person over that of a less badly off person below the threshold. 
Thus, a plausible measure of the badness of sub-threshold well-being requires 
us to give priority to the worse off, i.e. to include the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
Now, let us define the distributive principle below the threshold well-
being precisely. Let b = {i\Wi < t} be set of people below the threshold. 
Then, the sub-threshold principle is defined as follows: 
Sub-threshold principle: Gb = LiEb f(Wi), where f( ) is some 
strictly concave function. 
We started our exploration of the Threshold Principle with the objection 
that Prioritarians claim that giving priority to the worse off is counter-
intuitive. nut in formulating the Threshold Principle, we are led to give 
priority to the worse off within the sub-threshold domain, and to require 
that the Threshold Principle includes the Pigou-Dalton condition within 
the sub-threshold domain. 
3.5 Two formulae of the Threshold Principle 
Having characterized the sub-threshold principle, I turn to the super-threshold 
principle and its relation to the sub-threshold principle. My provisional idea 
concerning the Threshold Principle was that we should give priority to those 
below the threshold over those above the threshold, and give the same weight 
to all those above the threshold. The super-threshold principle should give 
the same weight to all those above the threshold when only those above 
the threshold are affected: within the super-threshold domain, the goodness 
derived from the same benefit should be the same for everyone, regardless of 
their absolute level of well-being. So if some benefit is made available, giving 
it to the better off is equaUy good as giving it to the worse off, so long as 
they are above the threshold. This leads us to formulate the super-threshold 
principle so that the goodness of a person's well-being is an increasing, linear 
function of his well-being. Let a = {i\Wi :::: t} (a U b = N, a n b = 0) be the 
set of people above the threshold. Then, the goodness of super-threshold, 
Ga , is defined as follows: 
Super-threshold principle: G a = LiEa Wi· 
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Like classical utilitarianism, well-being of people above the threshold is 
assigned an equal weight. In the case where there is nobody below the 
threshold, the Threshold Principle is equivalent to classical utilitarianism. 
Without much argument, this may be accepted from our original motivation 
of analysis. 
However, upon relating it to the sub-threshold principle, a careful exam-
ination is required. I think there are three possible ways to relate the two 
sub-principles 
(a) absolute priority of the sub-threshold principle over the super-threshold 
principle 
(b) lexical priority of the sub-threshold principle over the super-threshold 
principle 
(c) continuity of the sub-threshold and super-threshold principle 
On (a) and (b), the two sub-principles are discontinuous in the sense that 
the sub-threshold principle dominates the super-threshold principle. That is 
to say, (a) and (b) rule out a trade off between the badness of sub-threshold 
well-being and the goodness of super-threshold well-being. I call this strong 
not.ion of threshold the hard threshold. On the other hand, on (c), the t.wo 
sub-principles are continuous in the sense t.hat it allows a trade-off. That 
is t.o say, (c) allows the trade off between the sub-threshold well-being and 
the super-t.hreshold well-being. I call this weak notion of threshold the soft 
threshold. 
Let me explain each possibility. According t.o (a), the sub-threshold 
principle dominat.es the super-threshold principle absolutely. That is, the 
super-threshold principle does not corne into play at all unless the sub-
threshold well-being is completely eliminated. As long as t.he sub-threshold 
well-being exists, the goodness of distributions is judged entirely by the sub-
threshold principle, however great the well-being above the threshold is. (a) 
claims not only that a small gain for those below the threshold outweighs 
the greater gain of those above the t.hreshold, but also that the state of 
those above t.he threshold is not allowed to be a tie-breaker even if the sub-
threshold well-being is the same across distributions. To illustrate, compare 
x = (9,10.10,10) and y = (9,20,20,20). According to (a), x and yare 
equally good. That is, it claims that the super- and sub-threshold principles 
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are discontinuous. It ignores the super-threshold well-being as far as there 
exists the sub-threshold well-being. That is, the sub-threshold principle 
absolutely dominates the super-threshold principle. 
If (a) is seen to be too extreme, we may adopt (b), which is slightly 
less extreme. (b) claims that the sub-threshold principle lexically dominates 
the super-threshold principle. That is, we first compare the distributions 
according to the sub-threshold principle, and only when the distributions are 
equally good, we compare the distributions according to t.he super-t.hreshold 
principle. The super-threshold principle kicks in only when the distributions 
are equally good in terms of the sub-threshold principle. Thus, the super-
threshold principle works as a tie-breaker when the badness of sub-threshold 
well-being is the same across distributions. The chief difference between (a) 
and (b) is that (b) allows the super-threshold principle to be a tie-breaker 
when the overall badness of sub-threshold well-being is the same across 
distributions, whereas (a) does not allow such a possibility as long as there is 
someone below the threshold. To see this, consider again x = (9,10,10,10) 
and y = (9,20,20,20). (b) first compares the badness of sub-threshold 
well-being and judges that x and yare equally good. Then, (b) claims we 
compare x and y by the super-threshold principle: consequently, it judges 
that y is better than x. In this sense, (b) is less extreme and possibly more 
acceptable than (a), even if both (a) and (b) still give a strict priority to the 
sub-threshold principle over the super-threshold. Now I can state the first 
formula of the Threshold Principle, Lexical Threshold Principle: 
Lexical Threshold Principle: x = (WI, W2, ... , wn ) is better 
than y = (w~, w~, ... , w:,) if and only if either 
• L.1Eb f(Wl) < L.1Eb f(wi), or 
• L.iEbf(Wi) = L.iEbf(wD and L.iEaWi > L.iEaW;, where 
f( ) is a strictly concave function. 
According to the Lexical Threshold Principle, the relative goodness of 
distributions is determined, first, by the badness of sub-t.hreshold well-being, 
which is measured in such a way that. the well-being at a lower absolute level 
counts more than the well-being at a higher level within the sub-threshold 
domain. If the badness of threshold well-being is the same across distribu-
tions (or if nobody is below the threshold), then the relative goodness of 
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distributions is determined by the total well-being above the threshold. So 
strict priority is given to the badness of sub-threshold well-being. 
It may be argued that the Lexical Threshold Principle is still extreme, 
because the sub-threshold principle lexically dominates the super-threshold 
principle. In other words, it is too extreme because the two sub-principles are 
discontinuous, and because a trade off between the badness of sub-threshold 
well-being and the goodness of super-threshold well-being is ruled out. As 
far as one distribution is better than another in terms of the badness of the 
sub-threshold distribution, discontinuity requires us to ignore the goodness 
of well-being above the threshold, however great the total of well-being above 
the threshold would be: any tiny improvement in sub-threshold well-being 
will justify any total loss of well-being above the threshold. To illustrate, 
compare x = (9,10,10,10) and y = (8,20,20,20). The Lexical Threshold 
Principle judges that x is better than y. Discontinuity between the sub-
and super-threshold principles thus has an extreme implication, especially 
for those above the threshold. To support either (a) or (b), we may need 
a strong argument to justify the claim that a very small gain of the sub-
threshold well-being can outweigh any gain for those above the threshold. 
One way to avoid the extreme implication of discontinuity is to adopt 
(c) in order to allow the possibility that a tiny loss for the sub-threshold 
well-being is outweighed by the sufficiently large gains of those above the 
threshold. That is, the two sub-principles should be continuous in order 
to allow the trade off between the badness of sub-threshold well-being and 
the goodness of super-threshold well-being. Adopting continuity requires us 
to abandon a strict priority of the sub-threshold principle over the super-
threshold principle. I3ut it can still give a special weight to the sub-threshold 
well-being. It is the soft threshold that allows the continuity of the two sub-
principles. It is a soft concept of threshold because the cutting power of the 
threshold is less sharp in the sense that it does not give complete priority to 
the sub-threshold principle over super-threshold principle. Now I can state 
the second formula of Threshold Principle, Continuous Threshold Principle. 
Continuous Threshold Principle: x = (WI, W2, ... , wn ) is at 
least as good as y = (w~, w~, ... , W;1) if and only if ~iEN (Wi) ~ 
~iEN (wD, where f ( ) is some concave function, which is strictly 
concave up to T and linear above T. 
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Place figure 2 here. (The figure is appended to the end of this 
dissertation) . 
According to the Continuous Threshold Principle thus formulated, the 
goodness of well-being diminishes below the threshold but is a linear function 
of well-being above the threshold. Figure 2 shows this. Figure also shows 
that giving some benefit to a worse off person below the threshold always 
yields more good than giving the same benefit to a better off person. But 
this is not the case when the worse off person is above the threshold. The 
Continuous Threshold Principle gives more moral weight to the worse off 
only within the sub-threshold domain and gives the same moral weight to 
those above the threshold. 
It should be emphasized that the difference between the Lexical and Con-
tinuous Threshold Principles depends on whether or not we allow a trade off 
between the badness of sub-threshold well-being and the goodness of super-
threshold well-being. If the minimization of the badness of sub-threshold 
well-being is thought to take a strict priority over the maximization of the 
goodness of super-threshold well-being, the Lexical Threshold Principle will 
be adopted. On the other hand, if a small decrease in the badness of sub-
threshold well-being is thought to be compensated for by the sufficiently 
large increase in the goodness of super-threshold well-being, the Continu-
ous Threshold Principle will be adopted. The choice should depend on how 
much priority is believed to be given to the sub-threshold well-being.6 
3.6 Prioritarianism and the Threshold Principle 
I have provided two formulae that characterize the Threshold Principle. 
How the priority to the badly off would be specified depends on the choice 
of the concept of threshold, i.e. the hard or soft threshold. If we choose 
the hard concept of threshold, the trade off between the badness of sub-
threshold well-being and the goodness of super-threshold well-being is ruled 
6However, I should not overemphasi"le that the choice of formula depends on the notion 
of threshold. As footnote [) of this chapter remarks, the notion of threshold may be vague, 
or may change in different contexts. In some contexts, the notion of threshold does not 
come into play at all, even if the Threshold Principle is generally endorsed. The level of 
t.hreshold may be different from one choice sit.uation to another. Also the choice between 
the hard and soft notions of threshold may depend on the particular situation. 
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out: we should adopt the Lexical Threshold Principle. On the other hand, 
if we choose the soft concept of threshold, we should adopt the Continuous 
Threshold Principle so as to allow the trade off between the badness of 
sub-threshold well-being and the goodness of super-threshold well-being. 
The question I should now ask is whether the Threshold Principle is 
consistent with Prioritarianism and whether there is a substantial difference 
between the Threshold Principle and Prioritarianism in their theoretical 
structure. Recollect that, in chapter 2, I argued Maximin is not a version 
of Prioritarianism, even though it is phrased as "giving absolute priority to 
the worst off'. It may be argued that the Threshold Principle is a version of 
Prioritarianism, because it is phrased as "giving priority to the badly off' . 
However, it may not be the case if it does not satisfy the essential claims 
of Prioritarianism. I have characterized Prioritarianisll1 by strong separabil-
ity, Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition I should examine whether the 
Threshold Principle is a version of Prioritarianislll, or a completely different 
distributive principle. 
Let us start with strong separability. It is straightforward that the Con-
tinuous Threshold Principle satisfies strong separability, since it is formu-
lated as additively separable, and additive separability entails strong sepa-
rability (see my argument in chapter 2). On the other hand, it is not clear 
in the case of the Lexical Threshold Principle. But it is also strongly sep-
arable. Lexical combination of strongly separable orderings is also strongly 
separable ordering. The proof is given in the appendix to this chapter. 
Both Lexical and Continuous Threshold Principles are strongly separable: 
the goodness of a person's well-being is determined independently of other 
people's well-being and hence the Threshold Principle is non-relational. 
Next, both the Lexical and Continuous Threshold Principles satisfy 
Pareto, and it is easy to verify this. As for the Lexical Threshold Prin-
ciple, if we increase one unit of well-being someone either below or above 
the threshold, this makes the distribution strictly better. The same is true 
for the Continuous Threshold Principle. 
Finally, what about the Pigou-Dalton condition, it is clear that both 
formulae of the Threshold Principle satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition only 
below the threshold level. The only difference is that Prioritarianism satisfies 
the Pigou-Dalton condition fully and the Threshold Principle satisfies it 
partially. This difference is obvious enough. 
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The two forms of Threshold Principle satisfy strong separability and 
Pareto, but the Pigou-Dalton condition partially. Like Prioritarianism, these 
principles are non-relational, and considers the increase in some person's 
'well-being in terms of the all-things-considered judgement. However, these 
give priority to the worse off only below the threshold level. The difference 
is the scope of the Pigou-Dalton condition. The issue now is whether the 
difference in the scope of the Pigou-Dalton condition is substantial enough 
to separate the Threshold Principle from Prioritarianism. If it is not sub-
stantial enough, we may call the Threshold Principle, be it Lexical or Con-
tinuous, a "Threshold Prioritarianism" in the sense that it gives priority to 
the worse off only in the sub-threshold domain. I shall now discuss whether 
there is a substantial difference between the two principles. 
The difference, however, may be almost nothing if we consider whether 
we should really give no priority to those people above the threshold. It 
may be argued that we should also give priority to the worse off people 
even if they are above the threshold. Suppose that we can transfer some 
benefits from some person above the threshold to another person below the 
threshold. If we give the same moral weight to every person above the 
threshold, it is the case that we are indifferent between taking the benefits 
from some person just above the threshold and taking the same benefits from 
another person far above the threshold insofar as he/she does not cross the 
threshold level and fall below the threshold. But this is counterintuitive. To 
illustrate the point, suppose that the present distribution is (5,15,100) and 
that the threshold is set at 10. Then, compare two possible distributions, 
x = (9,11,100) and y = (9,15,96). Moving to x, we take the benefits 
of 4 units from the person just above the threshold. On the other hand, 
moving to y, we take the same size of benefits from the person far above 
the threshold. The Lexical Threshold Principle holds that x and yare 
indifferent, because the total sum of well-being above the threshold is the 
same. However, it is argued that y is better than x. It may be claimed that 
we should take the benefits from someone far above the threshold rather 
than someone just above the threshold. In other words, we should give 
priority to the worse off above the threshold as well as below the threshold. 
This, in turn, suggests that the goodness of a person's well-being above the 
threshold should be some strictly concave function of the absolute level of his 
well-being. However, it must be the case that the curve above the threshold 
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is less steep than that below the threshold: this implies that the transfer of 
some benefit from any person above the threshold to any person below the 
threshold makes the distribution strictly better. 
This thought makes the Threshold Principle closer to Prioritarianism. I 
discussed that the only structural difference is the scope of the Pigou-Dalton 
condition. Now, I suggested that we should give priority to the worse off 
even above the threshold. If my suggestion is accepted, there is no difference 
between the two principles. 
3.7 Crisp's Compassion Principle 
In a recent paper, Roger Crisp (2002) rejects Parfit's Prioritarianism, claim-
ing that his proposed Compassion Principle is different from, and more 
plausible than, Prioritarianism. As Crisp rightly presents it, Prioritarian-
ism claims that benefiting the worse off people matters more. But he thinks 
that this is not plausible. In order to show the intuitively implausible im-
plication of Prioritarianism, he considers the "Beverley Hills case", where 
we are to offer a fine wine to either two very well off groups, the Super-Rich 
and Rich. According to Crisp, any version of Prioritarianism claims that 
we should offer it to the Rich rather than the Super-Rich. Crisp, however, 
believes this implausible. He thinks that "when people reach a certain level, 
even if they are worse off than others, benefiting them does not, in itself, 
matter more" .7 
Crisp proposes what he calls the "Compassion Principle" as an alterna-
tive distributive principle. He considers the threshold level of well-being, 
below which the truly virtuous impartial spectator warrants his compassion 
and assigns priority. The Compassion Principle is stated as follows. 
Compassion Principle: Absolute priority is to be given to 
benefits to those below the threshold at which compassion enters. 
Below the threshold, benefitting people matters more the worse 
off those people are, the more of those people there are, and the 
greater the size of the benefit in question. Above the threshold, 
or in cases concerning only trivial benefits below the threshold, 
7 CriHp (2002, p. 13). Original emphasis. In what follows, page references are to his 
manuscript forthcoming in Ethics. 
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no priority is to be given.s 
The Compassion Principle, thus defined, gives (1) absolute priority to 
those below the threshold over those above, (2) relative priority to the worse 
off amongst thoi:\e below the threshold, and (3) no priority amongst those 
above the threshold. Crisp's Compassion Principle makes the same claim 
as the Threshold Principle I have proposed. Furthermore, Crisp seems to 
maintain what I called the Lexical Threshold Principle. This is because 
Crisp seems to rule out a trade off between sub-threshold well-being and 
super-threshold well-being if the benefit in question is non-trivial. Crisp 
considers the following example, where the threshold is 25. 
WP Group 1 
Status Quo 22 26 
Below 24 26 
Above 22 100 
In this example, Crisp observes, 
the view [Compassion Principle] will prefer the smallest non-
trivial benefit to any number of individuals below the threshold 
to any benefit, no matter how large, to any number of individuals 
above the threshold. That is, it will view Below as superior to 
Above. This implication of the view, however, may not be as 
implausible as it seems, once we give proper recognition to the 
fact that the threshold is the point at which compassion no longer 
applies. There really is something special to be said for benefiting 
the worst off individual which cannot be said for benefiting those 
above the threshold. 9 
Crisp wants to rule out the trade off between the well-being above the 
threshold and the well-being below the threshold. Thus, Crisp believes the 
threshold to be what I have called the hard threshold. But he might not 
claim that the well-being of those above is irrelevant at all. Consider the 
Beverley Hills case again. If we cannot give a fine wine to someone below 
8Crisp (2002, p. 16). 
9Crisp (2002, pp. 16-17). 
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the threshold for some reason, we should give that wine to at least someone. 
Vie should give it to either the Rich or Super-Rich. By giving no priority 
to any person above the threshold, Crisp does not mean that giving a wine 
to no person (i.e. throwing it away) is equally as good as giving it to either 
the Rich or Super-Rich. He means that giving it to the Rich is equally as 
good as giving it to the Super-Rich. If my interpretation is correct, Crisp is 
claiming that the goodness of a person's well-being above the threshold is 
an increasing, linear function of his well-being. Then, it follows that Crisp's 
Compassion Principle is equivalent to my Lexical Threshold Principle. 
Certainly, if a distributive principle claims that some benefits should be 
given to the Rich rather than to the Super-Rich in Beverley Hills, some 
people would think it to be implausible. It may be claimed that priority 
amongst the very well-off people such as the Rich and Super-Rich is not 
morally relevant in evaluating the goodness of a distribution. Crisp's case 
for the Compassion Principle may be different from, and more plausible than, 
Prioritarianism if every version of Prioritarianism gives priority to the worse 
off above the threshold as well as below the threshold. However, it is not 
clear whether every version of Prioritarianism does give priority to the worse 
off above the threshold. \iVhy must Prioritarians give priority to the worse f 
off above the threshold? Parfit's Prioritarianism suggests that "benefiting 
people matters more the worse off those people are".10 He does not rule 
out the case where no priority is given to the worse off above the threshold. 
Parfit may accept Crisp's Compassion Principle or my Lexical Threshold 
Principle as a version of his Prioritarianism. It is natural to think that there 
are several versions of Prioritarianism. Parfit's Prioritarianism, which Crisp 
criticizes, is just one version of Prioritarianism. It may be the case that his 
Compassion Principle is more plausible than the version of Prioritarianism 
Crisp has in mind. But this does not mean that his Compassion Principle is 
more plausible than all versions of Prioritarianism. This point is obscured in 
Crisp's discussion because he does not define Prioritarianism in a clear way. 
He criticizes a typical version of Prioritarianism. He might be right, but, if 
there are other versions of Prioritarianism, it is not obvious that Crisp has 
successfully rejected Prioritarianism tout court. 
In chapter 2, keeping closely to Parfit, I defined Prioritarianism by 
strong separability, Pareto and the Pigou-Dalton condition. I think that 
lOParfit (1995, p. 19). 
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every version of Prioritarianism is required to satisfy strong separability and 
Pareto fully. The main idea behind Prioritarianism is that the goodness of 
well-being should be determined independently of other people's well-being. 
Strong separability best captures non-relationality. So, for any well-being, 
be it above or below the threshold, the goodness of well-being must be de-
termined non-relationally. At the same time, Prioritarianism is motivated 
by the Levelling Down Objection. This suggests that Prioritarianism should 
satisfy Pareto: otherwise, it is subject to the Levelling Down Objection. In 
order for a distributive principle to be a version of Prioritarianism, strong 
separability and Pareto must be satisfied fully. 
On the other hand, it is not clear if every version of Prioritarianism is 
required to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton fully. See figure 2 in this chapter again. 
The Threshold Principle gives priority to the worse off below the threshold. 
It also claims that a transfer of some benefit from someone above the thresh-
old to another person below the threshold makes the outcome better, even 
though it does not claim that a transfer of benefit from someone above the 
threshold to another person above the threshold makes the outcome better. 
It is not necessarily the case that any version of Prioritarianism satisfies the 
Pigou-Dalton condition fully. If a distributive principle satisfies the Pigou-
Dalton condition below the threshold and if it satisfies strong separability 
fully, it can be seen as a version of Prioritarianism. My proposed Threshold 
Principle, be it Lexical or Continuous, satisfies these requirements. It sat-
isfies strong separability and Pareto fully and the Pigou-Dalton condition 
below the threshold. This is why I think that the Threshold Principle is a 
partial Prioritarianism. The Prioritarianism Crisp has in mind is what might 
be called complete Prioritarianism vis-a-vis Threshold Prioritarianism, since 
it is supposed to satisfy strong separability, Pareto and the Pigou-Dalton 
condition fully. I3ut I doubt that any Prioritarian is required to support 
complete Prioritarianism. Moreover, I pointed out a case for giving priority 
to the worse off above the threshold: in order to benefit a person below the 
threshold, it may be more desirable to take some benefit from someone far 
above the threshold rather than another just above the threshold. If this 
claim is accepted, there is no structural difference between the Threshold 
Principle and Prioritarianism. 
I think that there are different possible versions of Prioritarianism. Some 
would claim that absolute priority should be given to the worse off, whereas 
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others would claim that only relative priority should be given. Given these 
diverse versions of Prioritarianism, one version may be more plausible than 
another, and there are various reasons to support one particular version. I 
agree with Crisp that his Compassion Principle is more plausible than the 
version of Prioritarianism he criticizes (i.e. complete Prioritarianism). But, 
as I have suggested, it is possible that some versions of Prioritarianism give 
no priority is given to the well off people. The form of PrioritarianisIll that 
Crisp criticizes is just one version of it. So is his Compassion Principle. 
Therefore, Crisp's discussion should be seen as an attempt to offer a moral 
argument that one version of Prioritarianism is more plausible than another, 
but not as an attempt to reject Prioritarianism in general. Crisp's paper 
does not successfully reject the general idea of Prioritarianism. Quite the 
contrary, it shows the far-reaching scope of Prioritarianism. 
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Appendix: Lexical Threshold Principle and strong 
separability 
I shall prove that the Lexical Threshold Principle is strongly separable. 
Let a be set of people above the threshold, i.e. a = {ilwi ~ t}, and b be 
set of people below the threshold, i.e. b = {ilwi < t}. 
Let t: be the betterness ordering of the Lexical Threshold Principle, 
which is reflexive, transitive, and complete. Write »- the asymmetrical part 
and "-' the symmetrical part. 
Let us compare (WI, W2, ... , Wk, WJ.,+l, ... , wn ) and (w~, w~, ... , wk, tUJ.,+l, ... , wn ), 
where Wi is some fixed well-being level. Let m be m = {iii = 1,2, ... ,k}, 
and l be l = {iii = k + I, ... , n}. Let Wm be set of well-being of m, and WI 
be set of well-being of l. From the formula of the Lexical Threshold Princi-
ple, (wm, WI) is better than (w:n, WI) if and only either (a) I:iEb J(t - Wi) < 
I:iEb J(t-wD, or (b) I:iEb J(t-Wi) = I:iEb J(t-wD and I:iEa Wi > I:iEa w~. 
I need to show that (Wm,WI) is better than (W:
'
l'WI), regardless the level of 
well-being of l. That is, (wm , WI) t: (w:n, WI) if and only if (Wm , lUI) »-
(W:n, WI), where WI is set of well-being of different level. 
Proof 
I shall first prove that if (Wm,WI) t: (W:n,WI), then (Wm,WI) t: (w:n,wI). 
Since (w m , WI) t: (w:n , WI), I:iEb f(wm, WI) :::; I:iEb f(w:n , WI). As the 
sub-threshold principle is additively separable, I:iEb f( Wm , lUL) :::; I:iEb J( w:n ' lVI). 
So either I:iEb f(wm , WI) < I:iEb f(W~l' WI) or I:iEb J(wm, WI) = I:iEb J(w:n, WI). 
If I:iEb f(w m , 111/) < I:iEb J(w:n, WI)' then (wm' WI) »- (w:n, wI), as re-
quired. 
IfI:iEb J(wm , wI) = I:iEb f(w~" WI)' then I:iEb f(wn" WI) = I:iEb f(w:n, WI)· 
But then, by the definition of the Lexical Threshold Principle, since (wm , WI) t: 
(W:n,WI), I:iEa(w!n,W/) ~ I:iEa(w:n,WI). Therefore, I:iEa(wm,WI) ~ I:iEa(w:n,wt). 
Since I:iEbJ(wm,WI) = I:iEbJ(W:n,W/), by the definition of the Lexical 
Threshold Principle, (Wm,1UI) t: (W:n,WI), as required. 
The "only if' part follows from the same argument. Therefore, (wm , 'WI) t: 
(W~" WI) if and only if (wm, WI) t: (w:n, WI). 
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Chapter 4 
On Levelling Down 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins my defence of some versions of Telic Egalitarianism. 
However, I shall not attempt to directly criticize Par·fit's Prioritarianism 
or support any version of Telic Egalitarianism. The present purpose is to 
show that the version of Telic Egalitarianism I defend, Weighted EgalitaTi-
anism, is not susceptible to the Levelling Down Objection. If my claim is 
right, the Levelling Down Objection does not show the relative advantage 
of Prioritarianism over Weighted Egalitarianism. 
The discussion of levelling down, however, yields a positive messages for 
Telic Egalitarianism. That is, whenever equality is thought to be valuable, 
Weighted Egalitarianism should be adopted. In section 2, I show that some 
versions of Telic Egalitarianism is not subject to the Levelling Down Ob-
jection. In section 3, I distinguish two versions of Telic Egalitarianism, i.e. 
Communal Egalitarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism, the latter of which 
avoids the Levelling Down Objection. In section 4, I clarify what form of 
Telic Egalitarianism avoids the Levelling Down Objection, and what version 
of Telic Egalitarianism Par'fit successfully criticizes in the Levelling Down 
Objection. In section 5, I discuss John Broome's Individualistic Egalitari-
anism, which also avoids the Levelling Down Objection though in a rather 
strange way. In section 6, I examine how Communal Egalitarianism can 
avoid the Levelling Down Objection. 
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4.2 Is the Levelling Down Objection successful? 
Levelling down means that the well-being of a better off person is lowered 
to the level of a worse off person without benefitiug any person. Pm'fit 
points out that if equality is valuable in itself, levelling down is, at least in 
one respect, better. However, he believes it is not better in any respect, 
and that this implication of Telic Egalitarianism is absurd. This is Parfit's 
Levelling Down Objection to Telic Egalitarianism. 
Let us clarify more precisely what the Levelling Down Objection implies. 
Telic Egalitarians believe in the Principle of Equality and Principle of Utility. 
According to the Telic Egalitarianism Parfit objects to, the goodness of a 
distribution is determined by the badness of inequality and the goodness of 
well-being. This is formally expressed as follows. 
G = g(W,I) 
where VI' is the aggregated well-being across people, I is some inequality 
measure, and g( ) is a function that is increasing in 1V and decreasing in I. 
The overall good of a distribution is determined by the aggregated well-
being, 1-11, and some inequality measure, I. Given the aggregated well-being 
and some measure of inequality, the function g( ) fixes the relationship 
between H1 and I in the overall good of the distribution. For example, if the 
overall good of a distribution is represented by an additive form, it follows 
that G = W - aI, where a is some positive number. I think this is the Telic 
Egalitarianism Parfit has in mind. 
What the Levelling Down Objection implies is that, if the well-being 
of a bett.er off person is reduced to the level of a worse off person without 
benefiting any person, it is better in terms of I, even though it is worse 
in terms of lV. It. does not consider whether or not Telic Egalitarianism 
maintains that the overall goodness of a distribution, G, is increased. The 
Levelling Down Objection is not concerned with an all-things-considered 
judgement concerning the goodness of a distribution. It does not object to 
Telic Egalitarianism that x is, all things considered, better than y. It. objects 
only that x is, at least in one respect, better than y. The Levelling Down 
Objection highlights this particular feature of Telic Egalitarianism, not the 
overall goodness of a distribution. 
To see the reach of the Levelling Down Objection, let us com;ider some 
simple examples. Suppose that there are two people, and that inequality 
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is measured by the absolute difference between two well-beings. Then, the 
overall goodness of a distribution is given by 
( 4.1) 
The badness of inequality is normalized by the number of people, i.e. 
1/2 here. 
In equation (4.1), the distributive judgement seems to be subject to the 
Levelling Down Objection. Suppose that person 1 is better off than person 
2, namely that WI > W2. When WI is levelled down to W2, the value of 
1/2(WI - W2) is reduced to nil, and hence the bad of inequality is reduced. 
This means that the levelling down of WI is better in terms of equality. Telic 
Egalitarianism, represented in equation (4.1), seems to claim that levelling 
down is better in one respect: it seems to encounter the Levelling Down 
Objection. But actually it does not. 
However, there is another way to look at equation (4.1).1 By a simple 
rearrangement, equation (4.1) is written as follows: 
G = { 1/2wl + 3/2w2 if WI 2': W2 
3/2wI + 1/2w2 if WI < W2· 
( 4.2) 
Equation (4.1) is mathematically equivalent to equation (4.2). Equation 
(4.2) implies (a) that if Wi is greater than W2 the weight given to WI is 
smaller than W2, and (b) that if W2 is greater than Wi the weight given to 
W2 is smaller than the weight given to Wi. That is to say, the well-being of 
the worse off counts more, and the well-being of the better off counts less. 
That is, equation (4.2) gives priority to the worse off. 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent. However, according to equation 
(4.2), the levelling down of the better off is not better in any respect. Sup-
pose again that WI > W2. According to equation (4.2), the levelling down of 
Wi is not better for person 1. It is not better for person 2, either. It is just 
worse for person 1. So the levelling down of WI is not better in any respect. 
Thus, Telic Egalitarianism represented as (4.2) is not subject to the Lev-
elling Down Objection. Although equations (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent, 
levelling down is better in one respect according to equation (4.1), whereas 
II owe the following point to John Broome. Sec also Blackorby and Donaldson (HJSO, 
p. 115). 
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it is not better in any respect according to equation (4.2).2 
A tentative conclusion may be drawn from this, namely that Telic Egal-
itarianism is not subject to the LDO, whenever it is formulated as equation 
(4.2). What goes on in the rearrangement from (4.1) to (4.2) is this: the 
badness of inequality is reduced to the weight of each person's well-being. 
In equation (4.2), the fact that person 1 is better off than person 2 decreases 
the weight, or importance, of person 1 's well-being in the overall goodness 
of a distribution, and the fact that person 2 is worse off than person 1 in-
creases the weight, or importance, of person 2's well-being in the overall 
goodness of a distribution. That is, the badness of inequality is reduced to 
the weight, or importance, of each person's well-being. One's being better 
off (in the relative sense) decreases the importance of his well-being, and 
one's being worse off increases the importance of his well-being. And the 
reduction removes "one respect" with regard to which levelling down is bet-
tel'. Therefore, if the badness of inequality is attrihuted to the weight of 
each person's well-being, Telic Egalitarianism cancels "one respect", which 
the LDO focuses on. I then conclude that Telic Egalitarianism is not subject 
to the LDO, whenever it is formulated in such a way that the badness of 
inequality is reduced to the weight of each person's well-being. The LDO is 
not a successful objection, if Telic Egalitarianism is understood in this way. 
4.3 Just a mathematical trick? 
Someone may be sceptical about my argument above, since it seems to be 
based on a kind of technical manoeuvre. It might be argued: 
(a) that Telic Egalitarianism as in equation (4.1) is subject to 
2My example can be generalized to cases where there are more than three people. Take 
the three-person case. The simple Telic Egalitarian formula is given by, 
In order to rewrite this formula, we need to consider six possible cases, 
if WI ~ W2 ~ W3 
if W2 ~ WI ~ W3 
if· .. 
Similarly, we consider t.went.y-fom caHes in t.he four-person case, a hundred twent.y calies 
in t.he five-person case, and so on. 
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the LDO, 
(b) that equations (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent, and therefore 
(c) that Telic Egalitarianism as in equation (4.2) is also subject. 
to the LDO. 
My argument, the scept.ic continues, is just. a mathemat.ical trick. But. 
I believe that my argument is more than a mathematical trick, and that it 
casts light upon the nature of Telic Egalitarianism. 
What I wish to say is this: Telic Egalitarianism as in equation (4.1) 
seems to be subject to the LDO, but actually it is not. Whenever the 
badness of inequality can be reduced to the weight of each person's well-
being, Telic Egalitarianism is not subject to the LDO. Telic Egalitarianism 
as in equation (4.1) is not subject to the LDO. Call Weighted Egalitarianism 
for Telic Egalitarianism such that the badness of inequality can be reduced 
to the weight of each person's well-being. 
In equation (4.1), the goodness of a distribution is decomposed into 
two respects: the goodness of aggregated well-being and the badness of 
inequality. Levelling down is better in the latter respect. On the other 
hand, in equation (4.2), the goodness of a distribution is decomposed into the 
individual component.s. There is no respect with regard to which levelling 
down is better. The difference between the two equations lies in the ways 
of decomposition of the goodness of distribution. There are many ways to 
decompose the goodness of distribution into the mutually exclusive respects. 
We may divide the population into mell and women: we first aggregate 
the goodness of men's well-beings and women's well-beings separately, and 
then aggregate them into the overall goodness of distributioll. Or we may 
divide the population by geographical region: we aggregate the goodness of 
distribution in each region separately and then aggregate the goodness of 
individual regions into the overall goodness. Thus, there are many ways to 
aggregate the overall goodness of a distribution, and there are many ways 
to decompose the goodness of a distribution. Telic Egalitarians can choose 
the respects by which the goodness of a distribution is decomposed. 
Telic Egalitarianism holds that inequality is bad in itself, and that a 
more equal distribution is better than a less equal one. But it is an open 
question how the badness of inequality is embedded in the overall goodness 
of a distribution. Equation (4.1) may convey a different sense from equation 
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(4.2). However, equations (4.1) and (4.2) always reach the same distributive 
judgement, and refer the same distributive principle. So there is no difference 
except the sense each equation conveys. nut this difference of senses is 
derived by rather arbitrary decomposition of goodness of a distribution. 
Consider an example. Suppose that you are served a curry-rice at the 
Indian restaurant. if you eat the rice with some curry source together, you 
may enjoy that curry rice. On the other hand, if you first eat curry sauce 
alone and then eat plain rice, you may not enjoy the curry-rice. nut it is 
odd to judge that that curry-rice is bad, if you eat in the latter way. There 
are several different ways to eat the curry-rice, and the richness of the curry-
rice is independent of how you eat that curry-rice. Similarly, the plausibility 
of Telic Egalitarianism is independent of which respects we decompose the 
goodness of a distribution. This is why I believe that Telic Egalitarianism 
as in equation (4.1) is not subject to the LDO, even though it seems to be. 
lt might be claimed, however, that equation (4.1) does not represent the 
form of Telic Egalitarianism that Pm'fit has in mind,3 The Telic Egalitar-
ianism Parfit considers in the LDO is something like this: the goodness of 
a distribution is determined by the total well-being and the badness of in-
equality, the latter of which is not reducible to individual components. More 
precisely, the goodness of a distribution, G, is given by G = 111 - oJ, where 
VV is the total well-being and I is the badness of inequality, the latter of 
which cannot be reduced into individual components. Equation (4.1) does 
not represent Telic Egalitarianism of this kind. Thus, it might be pointed 
out that my argument is not rejecting the LDO that Parfit deploys it. 
This worry is partly correct. Telic Egalitarianism, understood in terms 
of equation (4.1) or (4.2), may not be the one Parfit has in mind. Possibly, 
the one Parfit has in mind is the following: 
( 4.3) 
In equation (4.3), the badness of inequality is given by the square-root of 
the absolute difference between persons 1 and 2. Obviously, Telic Egalitar-
ianism, represented by equation (4.3), is subject to the LDO. Moreover, in 
equation (4.3), the badness of inequality cannot be reduced into the weight 
of each person's well-being. Admittedly, it is this kind of Telic Egalitarian-
ism that Parfit has in mind in the LDO. It might therefore be suggested that 
3This worry was pointed out to me by Thomas Christiano. 
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my argument in defence of W-eighted Egalitarianism does not undermine the 
force of the LDO. 
This, however, does not undermine my argument. Quite the contrary, 
it shows that my argument is correct. It may be right that Telic Egalitar-
ianism, as represented by equation (4.3), is the one Parfit has in mind. If 
this is the case, I agree that my argument is not successful in defending the 
Telic Egalitarianism Parfit has in mind. However, the distributive princi-
ples represented as equations (4.1) and (4.2) are also Telic Egalitarianism, 
and equation (4.2) avoids the LDO. From these, I claim the following. lVly 
argument does not reject the LDO entirely. I admit that Telic Egalitarian-
ism as in equation (4.3) is subject to the LDO. I do not deny this. Telic 
Egalitarianism, as in equation (4.3), may be called Communal Egalitarian-
ism. This is because, in equation (4.3), the badness of inequality cannot be 
reduced to individual components: the badness of inequality is owed by a 
society as a whole. According to Communal Egalitarianism, equality is like 
some ghostly extra entity whose good gets counted in with the well-being of 
actual people. Parfit's LDO focuses on this sort of queer entity. This is why 
equation (4.3) is subject to the LDO. So I agree that my argument does not 
defend Communal Egalitarianism from the LDO. However, the distributive 
principle as in equation (4.2) is also Telic Egalitarianism, and it avoids the 
LDO. Thus, my argument is defending- what I call Weighted Egalitarianism 
from the LDO. My argument is not intended to defend every form of Telic 
Egalitarianism, but to find a version of Telic Egalitarianism that avoids the 
LDO. Therefore, it does not matter whether or not Telic Egalitarianism, as 
in equations (4.1) or (4.2), would be the one Pal'fit attempts to criticize in 
the LDO. 
The reach of the LDO is now clear. The LDO is effective against some 
versions of Telic Egalitarianism, but not others. :More specifically, it is ef-
fective against Communal Egalitarianism, according to which the bad of in-
equality cannot be reduced to the weight of people's well-being. But it is not 
effective against Weighted Egalitarianism. The LDO may give a good rea-
son to support Prioritarianism rather than Communal Egalitarianism. But 
it does not give any reason to support Prioritarianism rather than Weighted 
Egalitarianism. 
Although I argued that the LDO does not undermine my Weighted Egal-
itarianism, it is possible to see the discussion of the LDO in a constructive 
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way. The LDO offers a positive message to Telic Egalitarianism, namely 
that, whenever one believes in the Principle of Equality, one should adopt 
'Weighted Egalitarianism, not other types of Telic Egalitarianism like Com-
munal Egalitarianism. 
4.4 Individualistic Egalitarianism 
John Broome has proposed another version of Telic Egalitarianism, which 
is similar to, but distinct from, Weighted Egalitarianism.4 I shall consider 
Broome's version of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with my proposed 
Weighted Egalitarianism. 
According to Broome, if inequality is a bad, it is bad for the worse off 
person: inequality is an individual harm, and individual harm is a nega-
tive component of his overall well-being. Let us call his version of Telic 
Egalitarianism Individualistic Egalitarianism, since the bad of inequality is 
integrated to a part of individual well-being. He calls the amount a person is 
harmed by inequality his complaint. A person's total well-being is her well-
being, less her complaint. Consider the two-person case, where person 1 is 
better off than person 2. Broome supposes that the better off person has 
no complaint but that the worse off person has a complaint proportional 
to the amount her well-being falls short of the better off person. Then, 
each person's total well-being is determined by her well-being and the re-
lation between her well-being and other person's well-being. That is, the 
better off person's complaint is nil, and the worse off person's complaint 
is 1/2(W1 - W2), where 1/2 is some coefficient. Consequently, person 1's 
total well-being is WI, and person 2's total well-being is W2 -1/2(W1 - W2). 
Likewise, if WI < W2, person 1's total well-being is WI - 1/2(W2 - WI) and 
person 2's total well-being is W2. 
Now, the overall good of a distribution is given by, 
G={ W1+{W2- 1/ 2(W1- W2)} ifw12w2 
{WI - 1/2(W2 - wt}} + W2 if WI < W2· (4.4) 
It should be noted here that equation (4.4) is mathematically equivalent 
to equations (4.1) and (4.2). However, yet again, equation (4.4) suggests a 
different sense than that of equations (4.1) and (4.2). The difference between 
1Broomc (1991, pp. 180-82). 
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Broome's Individualistic Egalitarianism and Communal Egalitarianism is 
obvious. In the former, the bad of inequality is owned by the worse off 
person, whereas in the latter it is owned by a community as a whole. The •.. 
difference lies in the ownership of the bad of inequality. 
However, the difference between my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism 
and Broome's Individualistic Egalitarianism is not so obvious. In both ver-
sions, the goodness of a distribution is decomposed into individual respects. 
In this sense, both are "individualistic". The difference is this. In my ver-
sion, inequality decreases the importance of the better off person's well-being 
in the overall good of a distribution, and increases the importance of the 
worse off person's well-being. On the other hand, in Broome's version, in-
equality decreases the overall well-being of the worse off, but does not affect 
the well-being of the better off. 
Weighted Egalitarianism distinguishes the importance of well-being in 
the overall goodness of a distribution from well-being itself. To measure each 
person's well-being itself is one thing, and to fare how much each person's 
well-being count in the overall goodness of a distribution is quite another. 
Some people would claim that the importance of well-being may diminish 
as the absolute level of well-being gets higher. 5 Others would claim that 
the importance of each person's well-being may augment as the level of 
well-being gets higher. The importance of individual well-being addresses 
how much each person's well-being contribute to the overall goodness of 
a distribution. My Weighted Egalitarianism claims that one's being worse 
off than others makes his well-being more important, and that a person's 
being better off than others makes his well-being less important. Thus, in 
my version, inequality is concerned with the importance of each person's 
well-being in the overall goodness of distribution. 
On the other hand, in Broome's version, inequality is a bad, which de-
creases the well-being of the worse off person. The bad of inequality is a 
negative part of a person's well-being. Inequality directly affects the amount 
of well-being of the worse off person. In Broome's version, inequality is not 
concerned with the importance of well-being in the overall good of distribu-
tion. In my version, it is not the case that inequality decreases the amount 
of well-being of the worse off person. 
It should be asked whether Broome's version avoids the Levelling Down 
5This is exactly what Parfit's Prioritarianism claims. 
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Objection. Like my version, the goodness of a distribution is decomposed 
into individual respects in Broome's version. However, it avoids the Levelling 
Down Objection in a strange way. To see this, suppose that 101 > 102. The 
well-being of person 1 is given by 101, and that of person 2 is given by 
102 - 0:(101 -102). Now, we should ask a question: how can we level down the 
well-being of the better off? According to Individualistic Egalitarianism, 
it is not possible. Lowering WI increases the level of 102 - 0:(101 - 102). 
However, levelling down is defined as lowering the well-being of a better off 
person to the level of a worse off person without benefiting any person. In 
Individualistic Egalitarianism, we can not lower the well-being of a better off 
without benefiting a worse off person, because if we reduce the level of 101, 
the well-being of person 2 is increased. Thus, Individualist.ic Egalit.arianism 
is formulated in such a way that levelling down is not possible. In this strange 
sense, Individualist.ic Egalitarianism avoids t.he Levelling Down Objection. 
Why is Individualist.ic Egalitarianism strange? It. is because Individual-
istic Egalitarianism takes the bad of inequality of well-being t.o be a part of 
well-being. This is a circular way t.o capture the notion of well-being. That 
is, we need the measure of well-being to measure the bad of inequality, and 
we need the measure of inequality of well-being to measure people's well-
being. The only way to avoid this circularity is to distinguish a person's 
overall well-being and his well-being minus the bad of inequality. But. what 
is the latt.er? I shall not intend to answer this question here. 
4.5 Conditional Egalitarianism 
I have argued that. the Levelling Down Objection is effective against Commu-
nal Egalitarianism. However, some Communal Egalitarians may not want 
to give up the idea that inequality is a communal bad. If one thinks that the 
Levelling Down Objection is problematic and if he wishes to see inequality 
as a communal bad, he should reformulate Communal Egalitarianism by 
restricting the scope of equality. More specifically, he should reformulate 
Communal Egalitarianism so that equality is not valuable in the case of lev-
elling down but valuable in other cases. I consider this possible response to 
the Levelling Down Objection in this section. 
Telic Egalitarianism claims that equality is valuable. One natural inter-
pretation of this statement is that equality is always valuable. This implies 
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(a) that equality is valuable even when equality does not benefit anybody. 
From ( a), it follows that (b) levelling down is better in terms of equality, thus 
being subject to the Levelling Down Objection. Obviously, as (b) directly 
follows from (a), (a) should be modified in order to avoid (b). Communal 
Egalitarians may not want to give up the phrase "equality is valuable", be-
cause it would no longer be Telic Egalitarianism if that claim was given up. 
Naturally, the focus is directed on the phrase "even if it does not benefit 
anybody" . 
One possible reformulation is to replace "even if it does not benefit any-
body" by "only when it benefits somebody". This change restricts the do-
main in which equality is valuable. In the original phrase, equality is always 
valuable. On the other hand, equality is valuable only when it benefits some-
body. As levelling down does not benefit anybody, equality is not valuable 
and hence levelling down is not better in any respect. Thus, the Levelling 
Down Objection is avoided. 
Recently, along this line of thought, Andrew 1\11ason has proposed Con-
ditional Egalitarianism, and claims that it avoids the Levelling Down Ob-
jection.6 It is "Conditional" in the sense that equality is valuable only when 
equality benefits at least some people. Mason states, 
Whether some people benefit from equality is to be determined 
by considering other empirically possible states of affairs, in order 
to see whether there is one in which everyone is better off than 
they would be under equality or in which some are better off and 
none worse off. 7 
To put this another way, equality is valuable only when no one can 
be made better off without making someone else worse off. According to 
Mason, if there is a state of affairs such that someone's well-being can be 
OSee Mason (2000, pp. 246-54). He puts forward two versions of Conditional Egali-
tarianiHln, CEI and CE2. CEI Hays that equality is extrinsically but non-instrumentally 
valuable, whereas CE2 says that equality is intrinsically and non-instrumentally valuable. 
The two arc different only in the character of the value of equality. Both agree on the con-
dition under which equality is valuable: equality is valuable only when it. benefits at least 
someone. Since Mason claims this condition allows egalitarianism to avoid the Levelling 
Down Objection, I shall focus on the condition shared by the two versions, and ignore the 
distinction of the character of the value of equality. 
7Masoll (2000, p. 248). 
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made better off without making some other person's well-being worse off, 
equality does not come into play. 
Conditional Egalitarianism: equality is valuable only when 
there is no state of affairs where some people are better off and 
no one is worse off than they would be under equality. 
To capture the gist of Conditional Egalitarianism, it should be clarified 
what Mason means by "under equality". He wants to save equality from the 
Levelling Down Objection and to characterize equality in such a way that it 
avoids the Levelling Down Objection. If "under equality" means equality at 
any level, it does not avoid the Levelling Down Objection. Compare again 
x = (100,100) and y = (200,100). In order for equality to be valuable in 
such a way that the Levelling Down Objection is avoided, "under equality" 
must mean the well-being level that is strictly higher than that of the worst 
off in an unequal state of affairs. If this is the case, there must be at least one 
person who is hetter off in an equal state of affairs. For example, compare 
:r/ = (101,101) and y = (200,100). x' is better for one person, and y is 
better for the other person: there is no state of affairs where some people 
can be better off without making someone worse off. Therefore, equality 
is regarded as valuable in this example. IvIason wants to say that x' is in 
one way better than y. However, so far Mason's Conditional Egalitarianism 
does not tell us which is better, all things considered. All it claims is that 
the equality is valuable in this example. It does not claim hmv valuable it 
is. 
Comparing x' and y, however, it might be argued that the benefit for 
person 2 is almost negligible in comparison with the loss for person 1. Even 
if equality is regarded as valuable given that it benefits person 2, it might be 
argued that the loss for person 1 is too large to outweigh the good of equality. 
Mason's Conditional Egalitarianism may claim that any small improvement 
of a worse off person outweighs any loss in the total well-being of others. This 
is because the definition of Conditional Egalitarianism is not itself intended 
to make an all-things-considered judgement about distributions, and hence 
it does not say that x' is better than y or that y is better than x'. Since 
lVlason's Conditional Egalitarianism is intended only to avoid the Levelling 
Down Objection, it does not matter however much well-being a better off 
perSOll would lose. 
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1/Iason is fully aware of the importance of the all-things-considered judge-
ment. He admits that Conditional Egalitarianism might be regarded as 
"counter-intuitive in some respects", because it regards equality as valuable 
"even when the alternative is an inequality which would make all but one 
individual massively better off and that individual only marginally worse 
off".8 Mason responds to this count.er-intuitive case, 
the organic whole formed by 'equality' and 'some deriving bene-
fit from the state of affairs' is intrinsically valuable, whereas the 
organic whole formed by 'equality' but 'no one deriving benefit 
from that state of affairs' lacks any intrinsic value. In the cir-
cumstances where equality would marginally benefit just one in-
dividual but inequality would make everyone but him massively 
better off, the value of the organic whole involving inequality 
and the benefits many derive from it is greater than the value of 
the organic whole involving equality and the benefit one person 
derives from it.9 
Here, it is not clear what the "organic whole" consists in. One interpreta-
tion in favour of Mason is that the "organic whole" consists of two respects: 
the good of equality and the good of total well-being. If this is correct, 
Mason can say that the relative goodness of distributions is determined by 
aggregating the good of equality and the good of total well-being. 
I should now compare Conditional Egalitarianism with my proposed 
Weighted Egalitarianism. I think that Weighted Egalitarianism is more 
plausible than Conditional Egalitarianism for two reasons. Firstly, Weighted 
Egalitarianism does not impose any restriction on the extent of equality. In 
Weighted Egalitarianism, equality is always valuable. It is, say, 'Uncondi-
tional Egalitarianism. Without any restriction on the extent of equality, 
Weighted Egalitarianism avoids the Levelling Down Objection, and satisfies 
Pareto. It seems to me that such a restriction on equality is unnecessary. 
Secondly, in Conditional Egalitarianism, it is not clear at all how to measure 
the goodness of equality. Mason is aware that the goodness of equality and 
the goodness of total well-being should be balanced. But I have no idea how 
we measure the goodness of equality in the Conditional Egalitarian frame-
8Mason (2000, p. 252). 
9Masoll (2000, pp. 252-3). 
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work. On the other hand, W'eighted Egalitarianism clearly encompasses the 
badness of inequality in terms of the weight given to each person's well-
being. Given these two reasons, I believe that my Weighted Egalitarianism 
is more plausible than Mason's Conditional Egalitarianism. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
Parfit's Levelling Down Objection is successful with regard to COlllmunal 
Egalitarianism but not to my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism. The ab-
surdity of levelling down also arises from the fact that levelling down makes 
the outcome strictly worse, all things considered. Weighted Egalitarianism 
avoids the Levelling Down Objection, and judges that levelling clown makes 
the outcome strictly worse, all things considered. In the discussion of level-
ling down, there are two positive messages for Telic Egalitarians: namely (a) 
that whenever one believes that equality is valuable in itself, the badness of 
inequality should be reduced to the weight of each person's well-being, and 
(b) that any sensible distributive principle should satisfy Pareto. I believe 
that the discussion of levelling down does not make \'Veighted Egalitarianism 
less plausible than Pm'fit's Prioritarianism. Rather, it clarifies the plausible 
form of Telic Egalitarianism. The discussion of levelling down does show 
that Prioritarianism is more plausible than some versions of Telic Egalitar-
ianism. I3ut it does not show that Prioritarianism is more plausible than 
Weighted Egalitarianism, which is a version of Telic Egalitarianism. The 
question of whether Prioritarianism is more plausible than my version of 
Telic Egalitarianism is not answered by considering the levelling down. The 
answer lies somewhere else. Where does the answer lie, then? Answering 
this question is the task of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Weighted Egalitarianism or 
Prioritarianism? 
5.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, I argued that, if equality is valuable, the most plau-
sible form of Telic Egalitarianism is what I call \Veighted Egalitarianism. 
In this chapter, I shall compare \Veighted Egalitarianism with Prioritari-
anisrn, and elucidate the similarity and difference between the two princi-
ples. My discussion in this chapter suggests that the difference between 
t.he two principles resides in whether or not strong separability is satisfied: 
Prioritarianism satisfies strong separability, whereas Weighted Egalitarian-
ism does not. This means that the difference between the two principles 
is that Prioritarianism is non-relational, whereas Weighted Egalitarianism 
is relational. In this chapter, I examine one implication of this point. The 
issue of relationality /non-relationality is understood as the issue of how the 
weight given to each person's well-being is determined. In Prioritarianislll 
the weight to each person's well-being is determined by the absolute measure 
of the goodness of well-being. On the other hand, in Weighted Egalitari-
anism the weight is determined by the rank-order position of the person in 
the ranking by level of well-being. This is my suggested interpretation as 
to the difference between the two principles. As this is the main difference, 
the relative acceptability of the two principles is judged by their relative 
acceptability in this respect. I shall argue that Weighted Egalitarianism is 
more plausible than Prioritarianisrn because of the way it assigns weight to 
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each person's well-being. 
However, I begin by further examining the structure of Weighted Egali-
tarianism. 
5.2 Weighted Egalitarianism: informal analysis 
Consider again the simple two-person case of Weighted Egalitarianism. The 
overall good of a distribution is given by 
G _ { 1/2wI + 3/2w2 if WI ;::: W2 
3/2wI + 1/2w2 if WI < W2 
(5.1) 
The previous chapter showed that Weighted Egalitarianism, represented 
as (5.1), avoids the Levelling Down Objection. In addition to this, equa-
tion (5.1) suggests several important points about the nature of Weighted 
Egalitarianism in gene~al, and about the similarity and difference between 
Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism in particular. There are three 
points we ought to notice here. 
Firstly, like Prioritarianism, Weighted Egalitarianism gives priority to 
the worse off. The fact that person 1 is better off than person 2 decreases 
the importance of person l's well-being, and increases the importance of 
person 2's well-being in the overall good of distribution. The importance 
of the better off person's well-being is less than that of the worse off per-
son's well-being. This implies that, if we increase person 2's well-being by 
one unit, it contributes to an increase in the overall good of a distribution 
more than increasing one unit of person l's well-being. Therefore, Weighted 
Egalitarianism claims that priority should be given to the worse off person, 
and in this respect, Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism make the 
same claim. 
As discussed in chapter 2, if a distributive principle is seen as a version of 
Prioritarianism whenever it is phrased as "giving priority to ( ), Weighted 
Egalitarianism, thus construed, must be seen as a version of Prioritarianism, 
because it certainly gives priority to the worse off. However, as Prioritari-
anism is meant to be an alternative principle to Weighted Egalitarianism, 
Prioritarianism should not entail Weighted Egalitarianism. Thus, my dis-
cussion here verifies that phrasing of "giving priority to ( )" is not useful 
for judging which distributive principle is a version of Prioritarianism and 
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which is not. I 
Secondly, equation (5.1) suggests that, unlike Prioritarianism, the impor-
tance of individual well-being does not diminish or augment as his well-being 
increases. Prioritarianism claims that the marginal importance of each per-
son's well-being decreases as the absolute level of his well-being gets higher. 
Thus, according to Prioritarianism, the importance of well-being diminishes. 
On the other hand, according to Weighted Egalitarianism, the marginal im-
portance of a person's well-being does not decrease or increases, even if the 
absolute level of his well-being gets higher. That is, the importance of well-
being does not diminish or augment as the level of well-being gets higher. 
The goodness of a distribution is an increasing, linear function of people's 
well-being levels. 2 
To see this, consider the weight given to each person's well-being in 
equation (5.1). Suppose that WI > W2. The weight given to WI is 1/2, and 
the weight given to W2 is 3/2. The weight given to each person's well-being 
remains the same unless WI gets lower than W2. Even if the absolute level 
of person 1 's well-being gets higher, namely WI increases to wI (WI < w1), 
the weight given to person 1 's well-being remains unchanged, i.e. 1/2. The 
following is also the case: even if the absolute level of his well-being gets 
lower, the weight given to person 1 's well-being remains unchanged, unless 
his well-being gets lower than person 2's well-being. Similarly, even if the 
well-being level of person 2 gets lower, the weight given to his well-being 
remains 3/2. Thus, according to Weighted Egalitarianism, the weight given 
to each person's well-being does not diminish or augment even when the 
absolute level of his well-being is changed, as far as the relative ordering of 
persons 1 and 2 is not altered. The weight given to each person's well-being 
is altered only when their relative position is changed. 
Thirdly, Weighted Egalitarianism is relational. This is obvious, but it 
is worth emphasizing it here, because equation (5.1) suggests the sense in 
which Weighted Egalitarianism is relational. If WI 2 102, more weight is 
given to WI than W2. Otherwise, a more weight is given to 102 than WI. 
Which person gets more weight depends on who is worse off in comparison 
1 AI'. far aH another ven;ion of Telic Egalit.arianiHm, Communal EgalitarianiHm, iH con-
cerned, it iH not clear whether it gives priority to the worse off. It can be formulated in 
Huch a way that priority is given to the worse off. But I do not discuss this issue here, and 
concentrate on \iVeighted Egalitarianism. 
2See Sen (H)7:~, pp. aa-:{4). 
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with others, i.e. the relative position of the two. The weight given to each 
person's well-being is independent of the absolute level of his well-being, 
so long as the relative position of the two is not changed. It is dependent 
only on the relative position of the two. The weight given to each person's 
wen-being is determined by the relative position of the two, and it remains 
unchanged unless the relative position of the two is swapped. \iVeighted 
Egalitarianism is relational in the sense that the relative position of the two 
determines how much each person's well-being counts in the overall good of 
distribution. 
We should make clear a further implication of the third point. In the 
three-person case, we must consider six possible cases of distribution. Let 
us only consider a case, where WI > W2 > W3. According to Weighted 
Egalitarianism, the overall good of a distribution is given by G = 1/3wI + 
W2 + 5/3w3.3 Once again, we observe that Weighted Egalitarianism gives 
priority to the worse off: the well-being of the best off is assigned less weight 
than that of the second best off, and the well-being of the second best off 
is assigned less weight than that of the worst off. The crucial point in this 
case is that the weight given to the best off person's well-being is always 
1/3, regardless of who will be the best off, or how high the absolute level of 
his well-being will be. Likewise, the weight given to the second best off is 
always 1, regardless of who will be the second best off. To illustrate, consider 
two distributions, x = (10,5,1) and y = (6,3,1). The well-beings of persons 
1 and 2 are higher in x than y. According to Weighted Egalitarianism, 
however, the weight given to the best off is 1/3, the second best off 1, and 
the worst off 5/3 in both distributions. This suggests that the weight given 
to each person's well-being is determined by its ranking: the best off person's 
well-being gets the weight of 1/3; the second best off person's well-being gets 
the weight of 1; and the worst off person's well-being gets the weight of 5/3. 
The weight given to each person's well-being is independent of its absolute 
level. It is fixed by the rank-order position of the person in the ranking by 
well-being level. 
3See footnote 2 on page 6:t 
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5.3 Weighted Egalitarianism: forn1al analysis 
I now consider the general formula of Weighted Egalitarianism. By consid-
ering the general formula, we can understand three points we observed in 
the simple two-person case in a precise way. 
The formula in the n-person case can easily be derived from the formula 
(5.1) in the two-person case. (5.1) is generalized as: 
(5.2) 
Notice that the badness of inequality is normalized by the number of 
people in the society. 
Let us concentrate on the measure of inequality for the moment. The 
overall bad of inequality, GI, is given by: 
(5.3) 
It is possible to rearrange this equation in various ways. First, bearing 
in mind that la - bl = a + b - 2 rnin(a, b), we have 
1 n 
G1 = -(" Wn - min{ Wi, Wj}). 2n D 
" 
This equation can further be rearranged as 
(5.4) 
n 1 n 2 
G1 = L Wi - - L Wi + -[WI + 2W2 + 3W 3 + ... + TWin], (5.5) 
. n. n , , 
'1 As mentioned earlier, the inequality measures, as in equations (5.2)-(5.4), arc known as 
the absolute Gini, in economics. The normalized measure is known as the Gini coefficient, 
which is used extensively in practice. The Gini coefficient is given by: 
1 + lin - 2/(n2,v)[wl + 2W2 + ... + nw"J 
for WI 2: W2 2: ... 2: tUn (tV is average well-being). 
Economists usually usc the normalized version for two reasons, one arising from Scale 
Independence, the other from Population Scale Independence. Suppose that, for some 
reason, the well-beings of all the members of a society arc duplicated, e.g. (10,10,20,20) 
becomes (20,20,40,40). Many economists believe that the value of the inequality measure 
before and after duplieation should be the same: the value of the inequality measure should 
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Substituting equation (5.5) for equation (5.2), the overall good of a dis-
tribution is now expressed as 
G ~ (WI + 3W2 + 5W3 + ... + (271 - l)wn ) 
1 11 
- '2)2i -l)wi 71 . 
t 
for WI :2: W2 :2: ... :2: wn .5 
(5.6) 
From equation (5.6), it is clear that the goodness of a distribution is the 
rank-order-weighted sum of individual well-being. Let us verify three points 
that discussed in the previous section. 
Firstly, Weighted Egalitarianism gives priority to the worse off. As equa-
tion (5.6) suggests, the weight of the best off person's well-being is less than 
that of the second best off person's well-being; the weight of the second 
best off person's well-being is less than that of the third best off person's 
well-being; ... ; and the weight of the (71 - l)-th best off person's well-being 
is less than that of the n-th best off (i.e. the worst off) person's well-being. 
This implies that if we transfer some benefit from a better off person to a 
worse off person, we obtain a better distribution without increasing the to-
tal well-being. That is, Weighted Egalitarianism satisfies the Pigou-Dalton 
condition. Both Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism judge that a 
not be dependent on the seale of well-being. This is why economists normali;le the in-
equality measure by the average well-being in the society. Similarly, suppose that a society 
with n people merges with another identical society with the same number of people and 
the same distribution of well-being, e.g. (10,10,20,20) becomes (10,10,10,10,20,20,20,20). 
NIany eeonomists believe that the value of the inequality measure in the combined soci-
ety with a population of 2n should remain the same: the value of the inequality measure 
should not be dependent on the si;le of population. This is why many economists nonnaliL:e 
the inequality meallure by the number of population. 
"In economics, the social welfare function, based on the Gini coefficient, is called the 
Gini social welfare function. It h; usually formulated as 
G = 1/n2[wl + 3W2 + ... (2n - l)w,,], 
where 1111 2: 1112 2: ... 2: w". Sec, for example, Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, p. 69). In 
this standard formula, the overall goodness of a distribution is normali;led by the number 
of people twice. This is because economists want t.o limit the weight of well-being less 
than one. As we assumed the fixed population si;le in the introduction, the difference in 
the normali;lation does not affect the rest of my argument. Moreover, I do not sec why the 
weight to each well-being should be less than one. This is why I do not normali;le t.wice. 
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transfer of some benefit from a better off person to a worse off person makes 
the outcome better. 
In section 6 of chapter 2, capitalizing on Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett 
(1973), I pointed out that PD-ism is as far as we can go with the Pigou-
Dalton condition. At the same time, I emphasized that PD-ism is not helpful 
in capturing the scope of Prioritarianism because many distributive princi-
ples fall under PD-ism. Now, it turns out that Weighted Egalitarianism sat-
isfies the Pigou-Dalton condition. Weighted Egalitarianism also falls under 
PD-ism.6 Doth Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism are PD-ism. 
This is why I claimed that PD-ism is not helpful in capturing Prioritarian-
ism. 
Secondly, according to equation (5.6), the goodness of a distribution is 
a linear function of people's well-being levels. It should be remembered 
that the Prioritarian betterness ordering of distributions is represented by 
a functional form, G = g(wI) + g(W2) + ... + g(wn ), where g( ) is a strictly 
concave function. This means that the importance of each person's well-
being diminishes as the absolute level of his well-being gets higher. On the 
other hand, according to vVeighted Egalitarianism, as construed in equation 
(5.6), the goodness of a distribution is a linear function of well-being levels, 
not a strictly concave function. The weight given to the well-being of k-
th position is (2k - l)/n. The importance of individual well-being does 
not diminish or augment. The weight is altered only when the rank-order 
position of the person in the ranking of well-being level is altered. 
Thirdly, Weighted Egalitarianism violates strong separability. This is 
not surprising at all, since Telic Egalitarianism in general is not supposed 
to be non-relational. Compare;r = (5,12,4,10,9) and y = (8,11,2,10,9), 
where the total well-being in :r; and yare the same. The well-being of per-
SOIlS 4 and 5 arc the same in ;c and y. Slotting these well-beings into equa-
tion (5.6), 'Weighted Egalitarianism judges that y is better than x. Now, 
compare x' = (5,12,4,2,1) and y' = (8,11,2,2, I), where the well-being 
of persons 4 and 5 are altered. Strong separability claims that y is better 
than x if and only if y' is better than x'. However, Weighted Egalitarian-
ism construed in equation (5.6) claims that ;r' is better than y': hence the 
GFor proof, Ree Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett (HJ7a). Of course, they do not call it 
V/eighted Egalitarianism. .' '. 
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violation of strong separability.7 Prioritarianism is strongly separable, be-
cause Prioritarians want to rule out the comparative or relational element 
from the distributive judgement, and to judge the goodness of each person's 
well-being independently of other peoples' well-beings. On the other hand, 
Weighted Egalitarians (or Telic Egalitarians in general) do not seek to do 
this. Therefore, it is not surprising that 'Weighted Egalitarianism violates 
strong separability. What I wish to call attention to here is the following 
point. I defined Prioritarianism by two conditions, i.e. strong separability 
and the Pigou-Dalton condition. Weighted Egalitarianism satisfies the lat-
ter but not the former. The difference between the two principles is whether 
or not strong separability is satisfied. 
5.4 Relationality and non-relationality 
The analysis of equation (5.6) shows (a) that Weighted Egalitarianism gives 
priority to the worse off and (b) that it is relational. Thus, both Prioritari-
anism and Weighted Egalitarianism give priority to the worse off. However, 
PrioritarianislIl is non-relational, whereas Weighted Egalitarianism is rela-
tional. Therefore, the difference between the two principles is that Prioritar-
ian ism is non-relational and Weighted Egalitarianism is relational. So the 
relative acceptability should be judged by whether the plausible principle 
should be relational or not. If one believes that the relational distributive 
principle is more acceptable than the non-relational one, one should sup-
port Weighted Egalitarianism rather than Prioritarianism. Otherwise, one 
should support Prioritarianism rather than 'Weighted Egalitarianism. 
It is not easy to judge the relative acceptability of either theory when 
we know only that Prioritarianism is non-relational and 'iVeighted Egalitar-
ianism is relational. In order to make such a judgement, we also need to 
consider some of implications of relationality and non-relationality. In this 
section, I provide an interpretation of relationality and non-relationality. I 
attempt to argue that the relational principle is more acceptable than the 
non-relational one, and hence that Weighted Egalitarianism is more accept-
able than Prioritarianism. 
I have shown that Weighted Egalitarianism violates strong separability 
7 A dass of t.he Gini measure of inequalit.y, be it. absolut.e or normali2ed, violat.es strong 
separability. 
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and, therefore, that it is relational. In Weighted Egalitarianism, the weight 
given to each well-being is determined by the rank-order position of the 
person in the ranking by well-being level. That is, the weight given to k-th 
ranked well-being gets the weight of (2k -I)/n. So one's relative position to 
other people determines the weight of his well-being. On the other hand, in 
Prioritarianism, the weight given to each person's well-being is given by the 
strictly concave fUllction, which is independent of distributions of people's 
well-being. 
Here is a suggested interpretation. vVeighted Egalitarianism is relational 
in the sense that the weight given to each person's well-being is determined 
by his relative position to other people. Prioritarianism is non-relational 
in the sense that the weight given to each person's well-being is given by 
the independent strictly concave goodness function. The difference between 
Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism lies in the ways in which we 
determine the weight given to each person's well-being. In other words, we 
have to determine how much each person's well-being contributes to the 
overall goodness of a distribution. If this is correct, the relative accept-
ability of Prioritarianism and Weighted Egalitarianism depends on how we 
determine the weight of each person's well-being. 
I believe that it is more acceptable to determine the weight of each 
person' well-being by the rank-order position than by a strictly concave 
goodness function. The rest of this chapter explains how and why I reach 
this conclusion. 
5.5 Diminishing Moral Goodness revisited 
My main worry about Prioritarianism concerns whether the goodness func-
tion exists independently of the distribution of people's well-being. In this 
section, I will examine the law of diminishing moral goodness more closely. 
Prioritarians claim that the goodness of a person's well-being diminishes 
as the absolute level of his well-being gets higher. I think that many peo-
ple would intuitively agree with this claim. For the sake of argument, let 
us accept this claim. As my well-being gets higher, I may think that the 
marginal increase in the goodness of my well-being decreases, although the 
goodness of well-being itself would never decrease. This may be the case 
for me, regardless of other people's well-being. In Parfit's Prioritarianism, 
86 
.. 
a person is worse off in the sense that he is worse off than he might have 
been. If the goodness of people's well-being is determined independently of 
other people's well-being, the goodness of my well-being diminishes as the 
absolute level of my well-being gets higher. Likewise, the goodness of your 
well-being diminishes as the absolute level of your well-being gets higher. .• 
This is true of everyone. However, we need to ask why the goodness of 
my well-being diminishes in the same way as the goodness of your/his/her 
well-being. If the goodness of my well-being is determined independently 
of other people's well-being, it is quite natural to imagine a case where the 
goodness of my well-being diminishes in a way different to the goodness of 
your well-being. For example, the goodness of my well-being might diminish 
steeply; the goodness of your well-being might diminish slowly; the good-
ness of Simon's well-being might diminish up to a certain level but might 
be a linear function of his well-being a.bove that level (like the case of the 
Threshold Principle), and so on. More precisely, if the goodness of each 
person's well-being does not diminish in the same way, the goodness of an 
alternative x = (WI, W2, ... , wn ) is given by 
(5.7) 
where gi( ) is a strictly concave function. 
Notice that, in the equation above, the goodness function is indexed. 
This means that the goodness of each person's well-being diminishes, but 
that it diminishes in a different way from one person to another. However, 
in chapter 2, I formulated Prioritarianism as follows. 
G(x) = g(WI) + g(W2) + ... + g(wn ), (5.8) 
where g( ) is a strictly concave function. 
This equation means that the goodness of each person's well-being di-
minishes in the same way. There is a gap between the intuition above and 
the formula of Prioritarianism. The issue here is whether the goodness of 
everyone's well-being must diminish in the same way. Should the goodness 
of everyone's well-being diminish in the same way? 
Parfit says "yes": the goodness of everyone's well-being diminishes in the 
'same way. According to Parfit, this is exemplified by the law of diminishing 
moral goodness. Parfit explains the law of diminishing moral goodness, by 
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drawing an analogy with diminishing marginallltility, according to which "if 
the resources go to people who are better off, they will benefit these people 
less".8 Parfit, however, emphasizes the fact that Prioritarianism is concerned 
with the distribution of well-being, not the distribution of resources. He 
writes, 
On the telic version of the Priority View, we appeal to a similar 
claim. We believe that, if benefits go to people who are worse 
off, these benefits matter less. Just as resources have diminish-
ing marginal lltility, so utility has diminishing marginal moral 
importance. Given the similarity between these claims, there is 
a second similar argument in favour of equality: this time, not 
of resources, but of well-being. On this argument, whenever we 
transfer resources to people who are worse off, the resulting ben-
efits will not merely be, in themselves, greater. They will also, 
on the moral scale, matter more. 9 
He continues 
The law of diminishing moral goodness is, in contrast, quite se-
cure. As a moral claim, it always holds. On the Priority View, 
benefits to the worse off always matter more. This argument for 
equality is thus more securely grounded. 10 
The question I raised earlier is concerned with this "moral scale" . 
Since diminishing marginal utility is an empirical generalization, 
the Utilitarian argument for equality is, in a way, coincidental. It 
merely happens to be true that, if people are better off, resources 
give them smaller benefits. 
On the Priority View, there is no coincidence. It does not merely 
happen to be true that, if people are worse off, benefits to them 
matter more. On this view, these benefits matter more because 
these people are worse off. This is a fact, not about the size of 
these benefits, but about their distribution. And, in telling us 
8Parfit (19H5, p. 24). Original emphasis. 
9Parfit (lH95, p. 24). Added emphasis. 
lOParfit (H)95, p. 24). 
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to give priority to such benefits, this view has what Nagel calls 
'a built-in bias towards equality,.l1 
Giving some benefits to the worse off contributes more to the overall 
goodness of a distribution than giving the same benefits to the better off. 
It is not a matter how much of good a person actually derives from these 
benefits. How much goodness one person derives from the benefits depends 
on how people's well-beings are distributed. This is what Pm'fit means by 
saying that it is a fact about distribution, not about the size of these benefits, 
that the benefits matter more to those people who are worse off. How much 
goodness a person derives from the benefits is not the issue. Therefore, the 
goodness function is not indexed. The goodness function is unique to all 
the people. That is, the goodness of each person's well-being diminishes 
in the same way, as his well-being gets higher. According to Pm'fit, this 
"always holds". The goodness function, which maps each person's well-
being onto the individual component of the overall goodness of distribution, 
is independent of each individual person. Intuitively, many people might 
agree that the goodness of a person's well-being diminishes as the absolute 
level of his well-being gets higher. 
5.6 Two criticisms of Prioritarianism 
I should now ask why the unique "moral scale" is "securely grounded". 
According to Pm'fit, there exists the moral scale. It is "a fact". But I 
believe it difficult to assume that there exists such a moral scale. I have two 
criticisms. The first criticism is about the measure of well-being and its effect 
to the distributive judgement. The second criticism is about whether the 
measure of the goodness of well-being exists independently of distributions. 
Prioritarianism requires the independent measure of the goodness of well-
being. Weighted Egalitarianism does not require any such measure. 
My first criticism is concerned with the measure of well-being and its 
effect to the distributive judgement. Prioritarianism claims that the good-
ness of each person's well-being is determined by the absolute level of his 
well-being and the goodness function, which is determined independently of 
distributions. The choice of measure of people's well-being, however, effects 
our distributive judgement. 
llparfit (19~)5, p. 25). Added emphasb. 
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To see this, consider a case, where the level of numerical representa-
tion of people's well-being is altered. We only alter the level of numerical 
representation of well-being here. This does not mean that people's actual 
well-beings are altered. Suppose now that, for some reason (say because of 
inflation), the level of numerical representation of well-being is increased. 
Let us consider a simple two-person case, where the goodness function is 
a quare-root function: a distribution x = (WI, W2) is at least as good as 
y = (wi, w~) if and only if JWl + VW2 ~ Pr + ~. 
Now, compare x = (5,20) and y = (12,12). According to the square-root 
goodness function, y is better than x.12 Next, suppose that the level of each 
person's well-being is numerically increased by 100, namely that the level of 
the well-being is altered by 100. Notice that this alteration does not mean 
that people's actual well-beings are altered. The comparison we consider is 
the one between x' = (105,120) and y' = (112,112). In this new compari-
son, according to Prioritarianism, x' is better than y'.13 I have only changed 
the way to represent the level of well-being. This means that people's actual 
well-being remains the same. However, the distributive judgement of Priori-
tarianism has changed. In this example, I used a square-root function for the 
Prioritarian goodness function. But this sort of change in the distributive 
judgement, due to the choice of level of numerical representation of well-
being, always takes place so long as the goodness function is non-linear. Vife 
should ask why the distributive judgement changes when the level of well-
being is altered, although the actual well-being of people remains the same. 
In Prioritarianism, the choice of level of the measure alters the distributive 
judgement. 
On the other hand, according to 'iVeighted Egalitarianism, this sort of 
change in the distributive judgement, due to the choice of the level of nu-
merical representation of well-being, does not take place. This is because, 
in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is an increasing, 
linear function of people's well-being. Recall that equation (5.6) shows that 
the goodness of a distribution is a linear function of people's well-being. 
This means that the distributive judgement of Weighted Egalitarianism is 
l2The goodness of x is )5(= 2.24) + 50(= 4.47) = 6.71, whereas the goodness of y is 
V12( = ;{.46) + V12( = a.46) = 6.92. Therefore, y is better than ;1'. 
laThe goodness of x' is v'105( = 10.25) + /l2O( = 10.95) = 21.20, whereas the goodness 
of y' is 1fi2(= 10.58) + 1fi2(= 10.58) = 21.16. Therefore, x' is better than y'. 
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not affected by the choice of level of well-being. 
In chapter I, I assumed that the quantity of a person's well-being is de-
rived from the individual betterness ordering. More specifically, I assumed 
that the individual betterness ordering is represented by an increasing, lin-
ear utility function. I did not assume a quantitative notion of well-being 
independently of distributions of people's well-being. Prioritarians assume 
a quantitative notion of well-being independently. They say that x is better 
for a person than y, because the quantity of his well-being is greater in :r 
than in y. On the other hand, in the assumption made in chapter I, the 
quantitative notion of well-being is defined such that Wi(X) ;::: Wi(y) if and 
only if x is at least as good as for i than y. The quantity of well-being 
represents the individual betterness ordering cardinally. 
As the goodness of a distribution is a linear function of people's well-
being, the distributive judgement in Weighted Egalitarianism is not affected 
by the choice of the level of well-being. However, the distributive judgement 
in Prioritarianism is affected by such a choice. This sounds odd. But it is not 
necessarily a knock-down argument against Prioritarianism. Prioritarians 
may claim the following: the goodness of function is given independently of 
distributions of people's well-being, but the shape of the function is altered 
if the level of well-being is altered. 
The second criticism is concerned with whether or not there exists a strict 
concave goodness function, independently of distributions. The goodness 
function determines how much a person's well-being counts in the overall 
goodness of a distribution. In Prioritarianislll, a person's well-being counts 
less as the absolute level of his well-being becomes higher. How much each 
person's well-being counts is given by the strictly concave function, inde-
pendently of distributions. I have a worry about this claim. 
Prioritarians would claim that there is a moral scale of how much a 
person's well-being counts, just like they claim that there is an absolute 
measure of well-being. 
It may help to use this analogy. People at higher altitudes find it 
harder to breath. Is this because they are higher up than other 
people? In one sense, yes. But they would find it just as hard to 
breath even if there were no other people who were lower down. 
In the same way, on the Priority View, benefits to the worse off 
matter more, but that is only because these people are at a lower 
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absolnte level. 14 
According to Parfit, the relationship between the well-being and how 
much each person's well-being counts is like the one between the altitudes 
and how difficult we breath. He thinks that there is an absolute moral scale 
of how much each person's well-being counts. It is given by the fact, as 
we saw in the previous section. But I find it difficult to believe that there 
is no such moral scale, independently of distributions. In my Weighted 
Egalitarianism, how much a person's well-being counts is determined by the 
rank-order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. That is, 
how much a person's well-being counts is given by distributions. We do not 
need to assume anything independent of distributions. Prioritarian's claim 
that the goodness of a person's well-being diminishes may be intnit'ivelll 
plausible. But it is nothing more than intuitive appeal. It requires a moral 
scale that determines how much a person's well-being counts. Arguably, 
scientists may find that the goodness of a person's well-being is, for example, 
a square-root function of his well-being, or another strictly concave function. 
But I doubt that there is any such moral scale. 
To see the implication of such independent goodness function, consider 
the case in which there is only one person in the society. Suppose a situation 
within which there is only one person: call this person Robinson. I should 
ask whether the goodness of his well-being diminishes as the absolute level 
of his well-being gets higher. Parfit's answer is "yes". He writes: 
It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than otheTS. Ben-
efits to them would matter just as much even if there were no 
others who were better off. 15 
According to Parfit, benefits to Robinson matters more if he is at a lower 
absolute level. The goodness of his well-being diminishes as the absolute 
level of his well-being gets higher, But this is hard to believe. 
We should clearly distinguish three elements: a person's well-being, the 
goodness of his well-being, and the goodness of a distribution. It is clear 
what individual well-being means, so I need not explain it. The goodness 
of each person's well-being is one individual component of the goodness 
lIParfit (H)95, p. 23), Original emphasis. 
15Parfit (1995, p. 23), Original emphasis, 
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of a distribution. It is concerned with how much each person's well-being 
contributes to the overall good of that distribution. The overall goodness 
of a distribution is the aggregated value of the goodness of each person's 
well-being. In the case of Prioritarianism, individual well-being is Wi. The 
goodness of individual well-being is g(Wi), where g( ) is a strictly concave 
function. And the goodness of a distribution is given by g( WI) + g( W2) + 
". + g(wn ). 
In the one-person case, Robinson's well-being is WR. The goodness of 
his well-being is 9(WR)' And the goodness of distribution is 9(WR), because 
there is no other person.16 Thus, the goodness of Robinson's well-being 
is equal to the goodness of the distribution. It is more controversial that 
the goodness of Robinson's well-being diminishes as the absolute level of 
his well-being gets higher. That is, the goodness of Robinson's well-being 
diminishes, because Robinson's well-being has less moral importance, as the 
absolute level of his well-being gets higher. I do not see why the goodness 
of Robinson's well-being is not exactly Robinson's well-being, i.e. why it is 
16It is odd to usc the term "distribution" in the one-person case. However, I defined a 
distribution to be a vector of people's well-being. Therefore, according to this definition, 
there is no problem to usc this term for the one-person case. 
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not identical in quantity.17 
According to Weighted Egalitarianism, in the one-person case, the good-
ness of Robinson's well-being is equal to his well-being. According to the 
general form of Weighted Egalitarianism, the k-th best off person in the n-
person society gets weight of (2k l)/n. In the one-person case, no person is 
better off than Robinson, simply because he is the only person. As n = 1 in 
the one-person case, the weight given to Robinson's well-being is 1. There-
fore, in the one-person case, it is always the case that the goodness of his 
well-being is equal to Robinson's well-being. The goodness of his well-being 
does not diminish or augment. This difference is not surprising. Prioritari-
ans believe that there is an absolute measure of the goodness of well-being 
independently of distributions. This is the case even when there is only one 
person in the society. The claim that the goodness of Robinson's well-being 
diminishes in the one-person case is the direct consequence of the claim that 
there exists the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently of 
distributions. I argued that the latter claim is hard to accept. Therefore, 
the former claim, which is the direct consequence of the latter claim, is also 
hard to accept. I think that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable 
17In this dissertation, I do not consider the betterness underlying the choice under 
uncertainty. However, if we consider the betterness defined on prospects, my criticism 
will be made clearer. Along this line, Rabinowicz (2002, pp. 16-17) argued against 
Prioritarianism as follows. 
suppose there arc just two possible equi-probable states, 31 and 32, and let 
i have a choice between a risky prospect y = (0',0") and a safe prospect 
x = (0, 0). Assume that 0' is better for i than 0, which in turn is better for 
i than 0". Suppose, however, that the difference between girO) and g;(o") is 
smaller than the difference between girO') and girO). In other words, as com-
pared with loss in 0" and these two possible outcomes of x, i's gain in 0' is 
larger than his loss in 0" and these two possible outcomes of yare equiprob-
able. Thcn, prudence dictatcs that i should choose the risky prospect y . ... 
Suppo;;c, however, that i';; smaller loss in 0" outweighs hi;; larger gain in 0', 
after the transformation with w: w(g;(o'))-w(g;(o)) < w(g;(o))-w(g;(o")). 
Or, what amounts to the same, 1II(g;(0)) > 1/2w(g;(o'))+ 1/2w(g;(0"). Then 
prioritarian morality favours x, even though prudence dictates y. 
Note that Rabinowicz is concerned with Prioritarianism for prospect, not for outcome. 
Rabinowicz's girO) is taken to be 10;, and his w(g;(O) to be W; in this dissertation. It 
should also be noted that Rabinowicz's treatment of the Robinson example presupposes 
the expectational approach both with respect to the prudential value of prospects and 
their moral value. 
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than Prioritarianism with regard to this point. 
To sum up the two criticisms of Prioritarianism, (a) it is hard to believe 
that our distributive judgment is affected by the choice of the level of peo-
ple't; well-being, and (b) it is hard to believe that there exists an absolute 
moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently of distributions. On 
the other hand, in Weighted Egalitarianism, (a') our distributive judgment 
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being, and (b' ) 
the goodness of a person's well-being is determined by the rank-order po-
sition of the person in the ranking by well-being level, and hence it does 
not assume the absolute moral scale of the goodness of well-being indepen-
dently of distributions. Due to these considerations, I believe that \iVeighted 
Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism. 
5.7 Two possible criticisms of Weighted Egalitar-
. . lanlsm 
I turn to two possible criticisms of Weighted Egalitarianism. According 
to \iVeighted Egalitarianism, the weight given to each person's well-being 
remains the same unless his relative position with others is not altered. 
This implies (a) that the weight remains the same as far as his ranking is 
not altered, even if his well-being is increased or decreased, and (b) that 
the weight is altered when his ranking is altered, even though his absolute 
level is not altered. Prioritarians would criticize these two implications of 
vVeighted Egalitarianism. I shall consider the two criticisms, and defend 
Weighted Egalitarianism against them. 
The first criticism runs as follows. Consider two distributions, x = 
(100,200) and y = (10,200). In both distributions, person 1 is worse off 
than person 2. According to Weighted Egalitarianism, the weight given to 
the well-being of person 1 is 3/2 in both x and Yi the weight given to the 
well-being of person 2 is 1/2 in both x and y. This is because, in Weighted 
Egalitarianism, the weight of well-being is determined by the rank-order 
position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. 
Some Prioritarians would claim that it is not plausible to give the same 
weight to the well-being of person 1 in Y as the well-being of person 1 
in x .18 They would claim that we should give more weight to the well-
18It is not clear that this criticism is raised only by Prioritarians. But I think that 
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being of person 1 in y than the well-being of person 1 in x: we should 
register the change of person 1 's well-being in terms of moral importance. 
Weighted Egalitarianism does not register the deterioration of person 1 in 
terms of moral importance. On the other hand, Prioritarianism gives more 
weight to the well-being at a lower absolute level. Therefore, according 
to some Prioritarians, Prioritarianism is more acceptable than Weighted 
Egalitarianism. 
I disagree. It is not at all clear why we should register the deterioration 
of person 1 in terms of moral importance. Remember that \iVeighted Egal-
itarianism satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition: it gives more weight to the 
well-being of the worse off. I3earing this in mind, the goodness of :r and y 
is given as follows. 
Goodness of x : (1 + 1/2)100 + (1 - 1/2)200 = 150 + 100 = 250 
Goodness of y : (1 + 1/2)10 + (1- 1/2)200 = 15 + 100 = 115 
In moving from x to y, the well-being of person 1 is decreased by 90 
units. In the same move, the goodness of distribution is decreased by 135 
units, and the goodness of person l's well-being is decreased by 135 units, 
too. Weighted Egalitarianism registers the decrease of person l's well-being 
with a special weight in terms of the goodness of person 1 's well-being and 
consequently the goodness of the distribution. I think this is enough. I do 
not see why we need to give more weight to the well-being of person 1 in 
terms of moral importance. My point is that if a distributive principle, be it 
Weighted Egalitarianism or other form of Egalitarianism, satisfies the Pigou-
Dalton condition, it is not seriously undermined by this sort of criticism. If 
we give priority to the worse off, we need not be too sensitive to the change 
in absolute level of each person's well-being. 19 
The second criticism would run as follows. Let us consider the three-
person case. In the three-person case, the weight given to the best off is 1/3, 
the weight given to the second best off is 1, and the weight given to the worst 
off is 5/3. Now, compare x = (100,200,10) and y = (100,200,150), where 
the well-beings of persons 1 and 2 remain the same, but the well-being of 
Prjoritarian~ could appeal to thi~ property of Weighted Egalitarianism, when they criticize 
Weighted Egalitarianism. For this line of criticism, sec Atkinson (1970) and Dasgupta, 
Sen and Starrett (1973). 
j9For a similar argument again~t thb sort of criticism, sec Sen (197a, p. :34). 
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person 3 is altered in moving from x to y. In x, the weight given to person 1 
is 1. In y, it is altered to 5/3. The rate of substitution between persons 1 and 
2 is also altered. These changes of weight take place, although the absolute 
level of persons 1 and 2 remains the same. Then, some Prioritarians would 
claim this to be odd. They might ask how plausibly the weight of person 
1 's well-being could be altered without altering his well-being. They should 
also ask how the rate of substitution between persons 1 and 2 is altered 
without changing the well-being level of persons 1 and 2. 
The weight given to person l's well-being is altered because his rank-
order position is changed. In x, person 1 is the second best off. In y, he is 
the third best off, i.e. the worst off. Weighted Egalitarianism determines 
the weight of each person's well-being, or how much each person's well-
being counts in the goodness of a distribution, by the rank-order position 
of the person in the ranking by well-being level, and hence violates strong 
separability. It is not surprising that the weight given to person 1 's well-
being is altered even if his well-being remains the same. Those Prioritarians 
might imply that the weight given to person l's well-being should not be 
alt.ered if his well-being remains the same. This is because they believe in 
strong separabilit.y. So their criticism is based on the claim that a plausible 
distributive principle should satisfy strong separability. According to them, 
strong separability is a desirable property. 
Parfit would think that strong separability is a desirable property. The 
motivation behind Prioritarianism was the Levelling Down Objection. Pal'fit 
thinks that Telic Egalitarianism is subject to the Levelling Down Objec-
tion. Then, Parfit claims that a plausible distributive principle should be 
non-relational. I claim that non-relationality is best represented by strong 
separability. But, in chapter 3, I showed that Weighted Egalit.arianism is 
not subject to t.he Levelling Down Objection. Moreover, in t.his chapter, I 
showed that Weighted Egalitarianism violates strong separability and is thus 
relational. As it is not subject to the Levelling Down Objection, there is no 
reason to stick to the idea that strong separability is a desirable condition. 
So this line of criticism that Weighted Egalitarianism violates strong sepa-
rability is not well grounded once it is shown that Weighted Egalitarianism 
avoids the Levelling Down Objection. 2o 
2
°1 :;hould note t.hat. some economists and policy makers take strong separability to 
be a desirable property for the inequality measures, because strongly separable inequal-
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I think that these two criticisms of Weighted Egalitarianism are rejected. 
5.8 Leximin: a way out for Prioritarianism? 
I raised two criticisms of Prioritarianism. However, I did not conclude that 
Prioritarianism is totally implausible. I only said that Weighted Egalitar-
ianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism with regard to these two 
respects. This is because Prioritarianism may avoid these two criticisms 
and consequently the third criticism of the one-person case if Prioritarians 
are ready to change one of their main claims. In chapter 2, I argued that 
Leximin may be a version of Prioritarianism if Prioritarians are ready to 
replace the Pigou-Dalton condition by Hammond equity. As I discuss be-
low, Leximin avoids my criticisms of Prioritarianism. Therefore, Leximin 
may be more acceptable than the Prioritarianism, defined by strong sep-
arability, Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition. However, I shall argue 
that Leximin is implausible anyway. Thus, my conclusion is that vVeighted 
Egalitarianism is more acceptable than any possible form of Prioritarianism. 
In chapter 2, I defined Prioritarianism by strong separability, Pareto, and 
the Pigou-Dalton condition. In the same chapter, I argued that Leximin sat-
isfies strong separability and Pareto, but makes a much stronger claim than 
the Pigou-Dalton condition. It satisfies Hanllnond equity. Hammond equity 
claims that if there is a decrease in well-being of a better off person and 
an increase in well-being of a worse off person (without any reversal of the 
relative positions) and everyone else is indifferent, then the new distribution 
ity measures can explain how much of incquality in a variable (typically income in eco-
nomics) can be explained by relevant characteristics (such as age, sex, race, schooling, or 
region). In theory of inequality measures, strong separability became known as decom-
posability. For example, how much of well-being inequality in the United Kingdom can 
be attributed to inequality amongst England and Scotland, and how much to inequality 
within England and amongst Scotland respectively? Decomposability links overall in-
equality to "between-group" inequality and "within-group" inequality. More specifically, 
a class of decomposable inequality measure represents the overall inequality as a function 
of inequality between the constituent subgroups, and inequality between the subgroups. 
Decomposability claims that "inequality ran kings of alternative distributions in the popu-
lation as a whole should match the inequality rankings of the corresponding distributions 
within any the subgroups of which the population is composed" (Cowell 1995, p. 57). 
However, even if we accept the practical usefulness of decomposability, it is not clear its 
acceptability as a general condition for the inequality measure. On this issue, sec Foster 
and Sen (1997). 
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is better. 
Leximin is a discontinuous betterness ordering. It can not be repre-
sented by a functional form. It does not claim that the Prioritarian good-
ness function is a strictly concave function, and this is because it cannot 
be represented by a functional form. It need not care about the form of 
goodness function. My second criticism of Prioritarianism was concerned 
with the claim that the absolute moral scale of the goodness of well-being 
exists independently of distributions of people's well-beings. Since Leximin 
needs no such moral scale, it avoids my second criticism. 
Leximin avoids my first criticism, too. As Leximin compares the level of 
the worse off person across distribution, it only requires ordinal well-being 
comparison. Leximin does not require the cardinal measure of people's well-
being. In Leximin, our distributive judgement is not affected by the choice 
of the level of people's well-being, simply because it does not require such 
choice of the level. Therefore, Leximin avoids my first criticism, t.oo. 
Leximin may avoid my t.wo criticisms. In which case, it may be more 
acceptable than Prioritarianism as such. However, there is a drawback.21 
Recall that the Pigou-Dalton condition claims that, keeping the total well-
being being constant, the transfer of well-being from a better off person to a 
worse off person makes the outcome better. On the other hand, Hammond 
equity claims that any transfer of well-being, however small, makes the out-
come better insofar as the relative position of a better off person and a worse 
off person is reversed. This implies that any loss of well-being for a better 
off person, however massive, is outweighed by any small gain of well-being 
for a worse off person, however small. I think that this is too demanding 
and, therefore, that many Prioritarians would not wish to give up the Pigou-
Dalton condition. Even if Leximin may avoid two of my criticisms, the cost 
incurred from adopting Leximin seems to be too great. 
I think now that my claim that W·eighted Egalitarianism is more accept-
able than Prioritarianism is conclusive. Given the two criticisms I pointed 
out, Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism as 
defined by strong separability, Pareto, and the Pigou-Dalton condition. If 
Prioritarians adopt Leximin, they can avoid two criticisms. But it incurs a 
cost: Leximin rules out the trade off between the well-being of the worse off 
21 As I dbcuss in chapter 7, this is not necessarily a drawback. Those who criticize 
interpersonal aggregation would find this "drawback" to be an advantage. 
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and the well-being of the better off. Although Leximin avoids my two crit-
icisms, it does not make Prioritarianism more acceptable. Leximin may be 
less acceptable than Prioritarianism defined by strong separability, Pareto 
and the Pigou-Dalton condition precisely because of this cost. I consid-
ered two possible criticisms of Weighted Egalitarianism, and argued that 
these criticisms do not undermine Weighted Egalitarianism. I believe that 
\Veighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism. 
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Chapter 6 
Equality, Priority, and Time 
6.1 Introduction 
The shape of people's lives is diverse. Lives go up and down: some people 
have a happy childhood and an unhappy middle age life; other people, the 
other way round. Some people live a blissful life throughout, while others 
suffer hardship throughout. 
Many philosophers think that people's whole life should be the basic unit 
in judging the goodness of distributions. They think that our distributive 
judgement should be based on a person's lifetime well-being, not a temporal 
part of the life. They think that we should first estimate the amount of well-
being within each person's complete life, and that the lifetime well-being 
should then be considered whenever we evaluate the distribution of different. 
people's well-being. They give priorit.y t.o intmpersonal aggregat.ion over 
interpersonal aggregat.ion. Let us call this the lifetime view in distributive 
judgement. Many non-utilitarians take this view. 
For example, in explicating his envy test in t.he hypot.hetical auction, 
Ronald Dworkin writes, 
[iJf we look for envy at particular points in time, then each envies 
Adrian's resources at the end of year, and t.he division is therefore 
not equal. But. if we look at envy differently, as a matter of 
resources over an entire life, and we include a person's occupation 
as part of the bundle of his goods, then no one envies Adrian's 
bundle, and the distribution cannot be said to be unequal on 
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that account. 1 
Similarly, Thomas Nagel believes that the unit of distributive judgement 
should be lifetime well-being. He says that a person's complete life "deter-
mines the size of the units over which a distributive principle operates" 2 • 
John Rawls also seems to maintain the lifetime view, according to whom the 
parties in the original position choose the principles of basic social st.ructure, 
considering the life expectations of represent.ative people. So his difference 
principle is concerned with the comparison of social primary goods over 
complete lives.3 
However, recently, the lifetime view has been challenged by Dennis McK-
erlie and Larry Temkin.4 They claim t.hat the distribution of well-being at. 
each temporal stage should be taken into account, and that the lifetime view 
fails t.o capture the relevance of the distribution at each period. 
In this chapter, I consider the plausible temporal unit. of well-being for 
Prioritarianism and Telic Egalitarianism. I shall argue that both the dis-
tribution of lifetime well-being and the distribution of well-being at a time 
are relevant for Prioritarianism and Telic Egalitarianism. However, when 
we consider the plausible unit of well-being in our distributive judgement, 
some Prioritarians may claim that Prioritarianism is more acceptable than 
Telic Egalitarianism. I shall argue against this claim. I think that the con-
sideration of the plausible temporal unit of well-being does not. provide us 
with a reason to support Prioritarianism over than Telic Egalitarianism. 
Preliminaries. In this chapter I only consider the two-person two-period 
case, where each person lives in the same time and each period is equally 
long. I shall represent the spread of people's well-being at different periods 
as follows. 
Tl T2 
person 1 wf 
person 2 w~ 
I Dworkin (1981, pp. :~O4-:~(5). 
2Nagel (1$)79, p. 12411). In his later work, Nagel (1$)~n, p. 69) writes that "[r]emember 
that the :mbject of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular rewards to 
individuals at some time, but the prospective quality of their lives as a whole, from birth 
to death". 
3RawlH (1971, p. 78, P. 178). 
lMcKerlic (1989, 1994, 1997) and Temkin (H)~)3, ch. 8). 
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The superscript index indicates the time period, and the subscript index 
indicates the perSOll. It is not difficult to extend the argument in this chap-
ter to the n-person case. However, it is too complicated to discuss in one 
chapter. So I shall concentrate all the simplest case. In this chapter, I shall 
consider two different betterness orderings. The one is the betterness order-
ing defined on a vector of well-being at each period, e.g. (wI, wD. I shall 
call a set of well-being at a period distribution. The other is the betterness 
ordering defined on alternatives, which is a matrix of people's well-being at 
each period, e.g. (wr, wi, w~, w~). In this chapter I am primarily concerned 
with the betterness of alternatives. I shall discuss whether Prioritarianism 
is more plausible than Telic Egalitarianism with regard to the betterness 
ordering of alternatives. It might be confusing to use two different types of 
betterness ordering, but I shall clearly indicate which betterness ordering I 
am talking about, whenever I say "( ) is better than ( )" throughout 
this chapter. 
6.2 The lifetime view 
Let us start with defining the lifetime Vlew in general, and then exam-
ine lifetime Egalitarianism and lifetime Prioritarianism respectively. Dennis 
:tvIcKerlie explains the lifetime view as follows. 
[The lifetime view] says that different people's share of resources, 
or welfare, should be equal when we consider the total amounts 
of those things that they receive over the complete course of their 
lives. To apply this view we would begin by estimating the size 
of a person's share of the relevant good things at each temporal 
stage of that person's share in terms of a complete life. Finally 
this share would be compared with the shares of other people 
over their complete lives in order to test for equality. 5 
Let us put this in a general way. First, we aggregate a person's well-
being at each life stage within his life. Call the aggregated value of his 
well-being-at-a-time his lifetime well-being. The process of intrapersonal 
aggregation of temporal well-being need not be additive. But, in his chapter, 
for simplicity, let us assume that a person's lifetime well-being is given by the 
5l\kKcrlie (1989, p. 476). 
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sum of his well-being at each period. Next, a distributive principle considers 
how people's lifetime well-beings should be distributed, and determines the 
overall goodness of an alternative. This establishes the relative goodness, or 
betterness, of alternatives. 
The lifetime view, thus understood, is a general framework for distribu-
tive principles. Many distributive principles can operate within this frame-
work. I shall discuss two types of distributive principle within this frame-
work: lifetime Egalitarianism and lifetime Prioritarianism. 
6.2.1 Lifetime Egalitarianism 
Lifetime Egalitarianism determines the relative goodness of alternatives as 
follows. First, it determines the lifetime well-being of each person by aggre-
gating the well-being of all stages of his life. Then, it compares the lifetime 
well-beings of different people, and determines the overall goodness of each 
alternative by combining the aggregated value of lifetime well-beings of dif-
ferent people and the disvalue of inequality between the lifetime well-beings 
of different people. Let us assume that the disvalue of inequality is given by 
the absolute difference between lifetime well-beings. Call this lifetime in-
equality. Lifetime Egalitarianism claims that an alternative x is better than 
y if and only if the aggregated value of each person's lifetime well-beings 
and divalue of lifetime inequality in x is greater than that in y. 
Suppose that there are two persons, 1 and 2, who live equally long lives 
at the same period. Suppose further that their lives are divided into two 
equally long life stages, Tl and T2. The good of an alternative is given by 
the good of the total lifetime well-beings and the bad of inequality between 
different peoples' lifetime well-beings. That is, the goodness of an alternative 
is given by [(wi + wi) + (w~ + w~)J - 1/2[(WI + w?) - (w~ + w~)J. Then, 
lifetime Egalitarianism is stated as follows. 
Lifetime Egalitarianism: x = (wI, wi, w~, w~) is at least as 
good as y = (wi, wi, w~, w~) if and only if W1 + W2 - 1/21w1 -
w21 ;::: WI + W2 - 1/21w1 - w21, where Wf = w; + w;. 
Consider alternative A, where person 1 's lifetime well-being is equally as 
good as person 2's lifetime well-being, but person 1 is better off than person 
2 at Tl, and person 2 is better off than person 1 at T2. Then, compare it 
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with another alternative TI, where the temporal well-beings of persons 1 and 
2 are the same in T1 and T2. The matrices are given below. 
T1 
1 16 
2 4 
T2 
4 
16 
Alternative A 
T1 
1 10 
2 10 
T2 
10 
10 
Alternative TI 
In alternative A, lifetime Egalitarianism first aggregates the well-being 
of T1 and T2 for each person: person l's lifetime well-being is 20, and person 
2's is 20. Then, it compares person l's lifetime well-being and person 2'8 
well-being: person l's lifetime well-being is equally as good as person 2'6. 
Lifetime Egalitarianism judges that there is no inequality between person 1 's 
and person 2's well-beings. Likewise, in alternative TI, each person's lifetime 
well-being is 20, and there is no inequality between the lifetime well-beings 
of persons 1 and 2. Therefore, lifetime Egalitarianism claims that alternative 
A is equally as good as alternative TI. 
However, many Telic Egalitarians would disagree. They would claim 
that alternative TI is better than alternative A. Why is this? In alternative 
A, there is inequality between persons 1 and 2 at both T1 and T2, whereas, 
in alternative TI, there is no inequality at either T1 or T2. Let us call 
inequality at a period temporal inequality. Those who judge that alternative 
TI is better than alternative A believe that temporal inequality is relevant 
in considering the relative goodness of alternatives. Given that lifetime 
Egalitarianism judges that alternative A is equally as good as alternative TI, 
it implies that the temporal inequality is not relevant as far as the lifetime 
well-beings are at the same level. Lifetime Egalitarianism is defined so as 
to be concerned with inequality between different people's lifetime well-
beings. So, by definition, it does not care about the temporal inequality 
between one person's well-being at a period and another person's well-being 
at the same period, or how one person's well-being is distributed within 
his own life. However, I think that many Telic Egalitarians would find it 
implausible because temporal inequality is relevant in judging the goodness 
of an alternative. 
To be fair, lifetime Egalitarianism may be able to register temporal in-
equality in a certain way. It registers the temporal inequality in such a way 
that temporal inequality does not affect the distributive judgement so long 
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as the lifetime well-beings are at the same level. Consider alternative A 
again. In alternative A, there is a temporal inequality at T1 and another 
temporal inequality at T2. At T1, person 1 is better off than person 2. At 
T2, person 2 is better off than person 1 as much as person 1 is better off 
than person 2 at Tl. In lifetime Egalitarianism, the temporal inequality at 
T1 is seen to be cancelled out by the same amount of temporal inequality 
at T2.6 
However, the cancelling-out of temporal inequality turns out to be im-
plausible. This is because if the inequality at a period is seen to be cancelled 
out by the same amount of inequality at another period, then what McKerlie 
calls "changing places egalitarianism" is justified. He writes, 
[Lifetime Egalitarianism] does not see any disvalue in inequality 
between parts of lives as long as the inequality is compensated 
for at earlier or later times so that there is no inequality between 
complete lives. This enables us to imagine a new kind of egal-
itarian society. It contains great inequality, with happier lives 
attached to certain social positions. But at a fixed time people 
change places and switch from a superior position to an inferior 
one or vice versa. One example would be a feudal society in 
which peasants and nobles exchange roles every ten years. The 
result is that people's lives as wholes are equally happy. Nev-
ertheless during a given time period the society contains great 
inequality, and in one sense this always remains true? 
McKerlie claims that many Telic Egalitarians would find the changing 
places egalitarianism to be implausible. I agree with McKerlie. This is be-
cause we believe that the egalitarian concern is not best captured by lifetime 
Egalitarianism. The egalitarian concern should take the temporal inequality 
seriously. Thus, the lifetime well-being is not the plausible temporal unit 
for Telic Egalitarianism. 
6Nagcl (1979, p. 120) discusses the compensation over time within a life in order 
to support the lifetime view. He writes that "[b]y itself, the possibility of intrapersonal 
compensation neither supports nor undermines egalitarian theories. It implies only that 
if an egalitarian theory is accepted, it should apply only aCTOSS lives rather than within 
them. It is a reason for taking individual human lives, rather than human experiences, as 
the units over which any distributive principle should operate." 
7McKeriie (1989, p. 479). 
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At this stage, what I wish to claim here is that lifetime Egalitarian-
ism is implausible because it does not consider temporal inequality at all. 
I do claim that temporal inequality is relevant, but not that the lifetime 
inequality is irrelevant. 
6.2.2 Lifetime Prioritarianism 
Let us turn to lifetime Prioritarianism. In general, Prioritarianism claims 
that "[b]enefiting people matters more the worse off these people are" 8 , 
where "the worse off" means the well-being at a lower absolute level. That 
is, giving some benefit to the well-being at a lower absolute level yields more 
good than giving it to the well-being at a higher absolute level. Lifetime 
Prioritarianism assigns more weight to the lifetime well-being at a lower 
absolute level than the lifetime well-being at a higher absolute level. Like 
lifetime Egalitarianism, lifetime Prioritarianism first determines the lifetime 
well-being of each person by aggregating the well-being at a time across 
time. Then, it determines the overall goodness of alternatives by assign-
ing more weight to lifetime well-beings at a lower absolute level. Lifetime 
Prioritarianism is stated as follows. 
Lifetime Prioritarianism: x = (wi, wf, w§, w~) is at least as 
good as y = (wi, wt, w§, w~) if and only if g(wt) + g(W2) ?:: 
g(Wl) + g(W2), where Wi = w; + wt and g( ) is a strictly concave 
function. 
Compare alternatives A and B again. As each person's lifetime well-
being is 20 in alternatives A and B, the lifetime well-beings of the two are 
at the same absolute level. No one is worse off in terms of the absolute level 
of lifetime well-being. Then, lifetime Prioritarianism, like lifetime Egalitar-
ianism, claims that alternative A is equally as good as alternative B. 
However, just like the case of lifetime Egalitarianism, many Prioritarians 
would think that alternative B is better than alternative A. According to 
Prioritarianism, the well-being at a lower absolute level should be assigned 
more weight in our distributive judgement. In alternative A, person 2 at T1 
and person 1 at T2 are worse off in absolute terms. They could have been 
better off in alternative B, even though, in alternative B, person 2 could 
8Parfit (1995, p. 19). 
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have been worse off at T2 and person 1 could have been worse off at Tl. 
There seems to be a good reason for Prioritarians to judge that alternative 
B is better than alternative A. However, lifetime Prioritarianism judges that 
alternative A is equally as good as alternative B. Lifetime Prioritarianism 
does not capture the relevance of the lower absolute level of well-being at 
each period. 
Someone might still support lifetime Prioritarianism on the basis that, 
in alternative A, person 1 's being worse off at T2 is compensated for by 
his being better off at Tl. Similarly, he might claim that person 2's being 
worse off at Tl is compensated for by his being better off at T2. Given 
this intrapersonal compensation over time, neither person 1 nor 2 is worse 
off after all. If this is the case, Prioritarians will allow what may be called 
"changing places Prioritarianism". But I think that many Prioritarians will 
still find this implausible, since they might be concerned with the fact that 
person 2 at Tl and person 1 at T2 are at a lower absolute level. 
Many Prioritarians would claim that the lower absolute level of well-
being at a period is relevant. They claim that the lifetime well-being is not 
the only consideration in giving priority. They think that the level of well-
being at each temporal stage should be considered if it is at a lower absolute 
level. Prioritarians would disagree with lifetime PrioritarianisIll. 
6.3 The time slice view 
If the inequality, or the absolute level of well-being, at each period is seen to 
be a relevant consideration, then the lifetime well-being is not the plausible 
temporal unit in our distributive judgment. The lifetime view should be re-
jected. There therefore seems to be a good reason to consider the possibility 
of the time slice view of distributive judgement.9 Let us consider whether 
9This is what McKerlie (1989) calls the simultaneous time slice view. He examines an-
other vemion of time slice view, i.e. the corresponding time slice view. The corresponding 
time slice view "divides all lives into the same series of temporal parts. ... It measures 
equality by comparing the corresponding stages, rather than the simultaneous stages, of 
different lives" (483). Consider the following example, where each person's life is divided 
into three stages an two persons live at different timing. 
T1 
3 
j 0 
T2 T3 T4 
420 
4 4 
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this alternative view is plausible. 
The time slice view holds that the temporal unit of individual well-being 
is the well-being at a period, and hence that the distributive judgement 
should be made by considering how the different people's well-beings at 
each period is distributed. In judging the goodness of an alternative, the 
time slice view takes a two-step process. In the first step, it determines the 
goodness of a distribution at each period respectively. In the second step, it 
aggregates the goodness of the distribution at each temporal period across 
time, and determines the overall goodness of an alternative. 
Consider a simple two-person two-period case. First, the time slice 
view aggregates the goodness of the distribution at each period. Let G 1 = 
g(wt, w~) be the goodness of the distribution at Tl, and G2 = g(wr. w~). 
, 
Then, the overall goodness of an alternative, G, is given by G = h(g( wi, w~), g(wr, w~)), 
where h( ) is an increasing function. 
It should be noticed that, in the two-step process of the time slice view, 
the goodness of a distribution at a period is determined independently of 
distributions at other periods, and, eventually, the goodness of distributions 
at different periods are aggregated into the overall goodness of an alternative. 
The goodness of a distribution at a period is estimated without referring 
to distributions of other periods. The time slice view then proceeds the 
estimation of goodness of a distribution at other periods in the same way. 
Let us state this feature of the time slice view as separability of time. 
Separability of time: the goodness of a distribution at a period 
is determined independently of distributions at other periods. 
To capture the gist of the idea, compare alternatives A and C, and be-
tween alternatives A' and C' , where Wi #- w~ and Wj #- wj at T2 respectively. 
Tl T2 Tl T2 
16 W· 1. 14 Wi 
j 4 Wj j 6 W· J 
Alternative A Alternative C 
In thi~ example, the corresponding time slice view compares i at Tl with j at T2, i at 
T2 with j at T3, and i at T3 with j at T4. On the other hand, the (simultaneou~) time 
sliee view only compares i at T2 with j at T2, and i at T3 with j at T3. However, I ~hall 
not consider this version of the time slice view here. 
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Tl T2 Tl T2 
16 Wi , 14 Wi , 
j 4 Wi 
.1 j 6 w', .1 
Alternative A' Alternative C' 
Separability of time claims that alternative A is better than C if and 
only if alternative A' is better than C' , That is, if the distribution at T2 
is the same, the relative goodness of two alternatives is determined by the 
relative goodness of distribution at Tl, regardless of a distribution at T2, 
According to separability of time, the goodness of distribution-at-a-period 
is independent of the distribution of other periods, 
Separability of time has an interesting implication, namely, that the 
unity of each person's well-being at different periods within his life does not 
matter. In other words, it does not matter who bears how much well-being 
across periods. As the goodness of distribution-at-a-period is determined 
independently of distributions of other periods, how much well-being one 
person has through his lifetime is irrelevant. If the lifetime well-being is 
thought to be relevant, at least to some extent, then who bears how much 
well-being across time should be relevant: the unity of well-being at different 
periods is relevant. However, according to the time slice view, this is not 
relevant in judging the goodness of alternatives, because of the separability 
of time. Although I shall argue against separability of time, and hence 
against the time slice view in a later section, I now apply the time slice view 
to Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism in order to assess the scope of these 
principles. 
For simplicity, I shall assume that the goodness of an alternative is the 
sum of the goodness of the distributions at each period. The goodness of an 
alternative need not be an additive function of the goodness of the distribu-
tions at each period. Given that additive function implies that the goodness 
of distribution at a time is determined independently of distributions at 
other times, this assumption does not affect my argument in the following 
sections. 
6.3.1 Time slice Egalitarianism 
Time slice Egalitarianism was first discussed by McKerlie. According to 
McKerlie's original definition, time slice Egalitarianism seeks to "minimize 
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the sum total of inequality-at-a-time" .10 More specifically, it first measures 
the inequality at each time, and then adds 'up the inequality-at-a-time over 
time. Thus, it claims that we should minimize the total sum of inequality-
at-a-time. 
Consider alternatives A and n. In alternative A, there are 12 units of 
inequality between person 1 's and person 2's well-beings at Tl, and 12 units 
of inequality at T2. According to McKerlie, time slice Egalitarianism adds 
up the inequality at Tl and inequality at T2. If we add up the inequality 
at each stage, the overall inequality is 24 units. On the other hand, in 
alternative B, there is no inequality at either Tl or T2, and hence the 
sum total of temporal inequality is nil. Therefore, :McKerlie's time slice 
Egalitarianism judges that alternative B is better than alternative A. This 
is all that McKerlie's definition claims. 
McKerlie's definition of time slice Egalitarianism needs to be refined, 
however. According to his definition, time slice Egalitarianism is not about 
the overall goodness of an alternatives. It is about betterness in terms of 
equality. McKerlie's definition is plausible only when the total well-being 
of alternative is the same across alternatives. Otherwise, it turns out to 
be implausible. What the definition above literally claims is that, if the 
total well-being across time and people is the same, x is better than y if the 
total sum of inequality-at-a-time in x is smaller than y. If the antecedent 
is not true, McKerlie's definition is not plausible. To see why, compare two 
alternatives below. 
Tl T2 Tl T2 
1 16 4 1 26 14 
2 4 16 2 14 26 
Alternative A Alternative D 
In both alternatives A and D, the temporal inequality at each period is 
12. If we add up the temporal inequality across time, the overall inequality 
is 24 in both alternatives A and D. Thus, according to McKerlie's definition 
of time slice Egalitarianism, alternative A is equally as good as D. But 
this is implausible. In alternative D, the total well-being across time and 
people is much greater than in A. So, if the total well-being is not the same, 
McKerlie's definition turns out to be implausible. This suggests that the 
IOMcKcrlic (1989, p. 481). 
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total well-being at each period and the inequality at each period should be 
combined at each period in some way. 
I now wish to define a plausible form of time slice Egalitarianism. For 
simplicity, the goodness of a distribution at each temporal stage is given 
by the sum of each person's well-being at the same temporal stage and 
the absolute difference between the better off person's well-being and the 
worse off person's well-being. So, the goodness of a distribution at a time is 
determines by the total well-being at a time and the bad of inequality at that 
same time. That is, the goodness of the distribution at Tl, G1 , is given by 
G1 = (wi + w~) -1/2Iwi - w~l· Then, the overall goodness of alternative is 
given by the sum of goodness of the distribution at each period. That is, the 
goodness of alternative, G, is given by G = (wi +w~) -1/2Iwi - w~ 1 + (wr + 
wD -1/2Iwr- wil· This is to say, G = 2:7 2:z w:-l/2(lwi-w~I+lwr-wil). 
Time slice Egalitarianism is stated as follows. 
Time slice Egalitarianism: x = (wi, wr, w~, wi) is better than 
( -1 -2 -1 -2) 'f' d l'f ",2 ",2 t 1/2(1 1 11 Y = wI' wI , w2' W2 1 an on y 1 Ld L.t Wi - wI - w2 + 
Iwr - wi!) > 2:t 2:Z wf - 1/2(lwf - w~1 + Iwi - w~I)· 
Consider alternatives A and D again. The goodness of alternative A is 
40 - 12. The goodness of alternative D is 80 - 12. Therefore, time slice 
Egalitarianism, thus construed, judges that alternative D is better than 
alternative A. 
Unlike lifetime Egalitarianism, according to time slice Egalitarianism, 
the inequality at Tl is not cancelled out by the inequality at T2: it sees 
that the inequality at Tl is bad, and that the inequality at T2 makes the 
alternative even worse. Therefore, time slice Egalitarianism rules out the 
possibility of changing places Egalitarianism. This may be an advantage 
of time slice Egalitarianism over lifetime Egalitarianism. However, not sur-
prisingly, time slice Egalitarianism is insensitive to the inequality between 
lifetime well-beings. Even if there has been a long and extreme inequality in 
the past, time slice egalitarianism will not compensate for past inequality by 
switching the relative position of the worse off and better off: any attempt 
to compensate for past inequality makes the outcome worse. At this stage, 
this feature of time slice Egalitarianism is neither an advantage nor a dis-
advantage, because time slice Egalitarianism is supposed to be unconcerned 
with lifetime inequality. I shall return to this issue in section 4. 
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It is important to note that, in time slice Egalitarianism, the goodness 
of a distribution at each period is determined without referring to distribu-
tions at other periods. The goodness of an alternative is then determined 
by aggregating the goodness of the distribution-at-a-time across time. This 
verifies that time slice egalitarianism implies separability of time. Given that 
Telic Egalitarianism is relational, it violates strong separability in judging 
the goodness of the distribution-at-a-time. However, time slice Egalitarian-
ism satisfies separability of time in judging the goodness of alternatives. 
6.3.2 Time slice Prioritarianism 
Let us turn now to time slice Prioritarianism. Like time slice Egalitarianism, 
time slice Prioritarianism will take the two-step aggregation process. At the 
first step, it determines the goodness of a distribution at each temporal 
stage in such a way that the well-being of a worse off person is given more 
weight than that of a better off person. At the second step, it aggregates 
the goodness of the distribution-at-a-time across time. 
In chapter 2, I defined Prioritarianism by two conditions, i.e. strong 
separability and the Pigou-Dalton condition. These conditions apply to 
the first stage of the aggregation process. The goodness of a distribution-
at-a-time is given by the sum of a strictly concave function of individual 
well-being at each period. The goodness of the distribution at Tl, C 1, is 
given by C1 = f (wi) + f (w~). Likewise, the goodness of the distribution 
at T2, C2, is given by C2 = f(wr) + f(w~). Then, the overall goodness of 
an alternative is given by the sum of goodness of the distribution-at-a-time, 
i.e. C = C 1 + C 2 = f(wf) + f(w~) + f(wr) + f(w~). 
Time slice Prioritarianism: alternative x = (wi, w~, Wf, w~) 
is better than y = (wi, w~, wf, w~) if and only if f( wi) + f( w~) + 
f(wf) + f(w~) > f(u)i) + f(tv~) + f(wr) + f(w~), where f( ) is 
a strictly concave function. 
Let us consider a special case, where the Prioritarian goodness function is 
a square-root function. Compare again alternatives A and B. In alternative 
A, the goodness of a distribution is JI6 + j4 = 6 at Tl, and j4 + JI6 = 6 
at T2. Therefore, the overall goodness of alternative A is 12. In alternative 
13, the goodness of a distribution is v'IO + v'IO = 6.32 at Tl and T2 re-
spectively. The overall goodness of alternative 13 is 12.64. Therefore, time 
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slice Prioritarianism judges that alternative B is better than alternative A, 
(whereas lifetime Prioritarianism judges that alternative A is equally as good 
as alternative B).l1 Thus, time slice Prioritarianism certainly registers the 
fact that the well-beings of person 2 at Tl and person 1 at T2 are at a lower 
absolute level. Given that Prioritarianism is concerned with giving more 
weight to well-being at a lower absolute level, many Prioritarians would 
support time slice Prioritarianism rather than lifetime Prioritarianism. 
It should be noticed that the goodness of a distribution at each period 
is determined independently of distributions at other periods just like time 
slice Egalitarianism. The goodness of a distribution at each period is de-
termined without referring to distributions at other stages, and then the 
overall goodness of alternative is determined by adding up the goodness of 
a distribution-at-a-time. This shows that time slice Prioritarianism satisfies 
separability of time. 
6.3.3 Comparison 
In chapter 2, I argued that the non-relationality of Prioritarianism is best 
captured by the notion of strong separability. In this chapter, the idea of 
strong separability applies to the distribution at-a-time. Strong separability 
claims that the goodness of each person's well-being is determined inde-
pendently of other people's well-beings. In this chapter, I have discussed 
whether or not the time slice Prioritarianism implies separability of time. 
Separability of time claims that the goodness of a distribution-at-a-time 
is determined independently of distributions at other temporal stages. It 
should be noticed that separability and separability of time together reduce 
each person at each time to a mere location of well-being. Look at my for-
mula of time slice Prioritarianism. The goodness of an alternative is given 
by G = G1 + G2 = f(wt) + f(w~) + f(wf) + f(w§). The goodness of person 
1 's well-being at Tl is determined independently of person 1 's well-being 
at T2 or person 2's well-being at Tl and T2. This means that, even if we 
change the location of each well-being at each time to a different location 
in the matrix, the goodness of the alternative remains the same. Even if we 
llFor example, take Leximin, which gives absolute priority to a worse off person. Lex-
imin judges that Alternative B is better than alt.ernative A, because t.he well-being of the 
worst off in alternative A (Le. 4 units for person 2 at Tl and 4 units for person 1 at T2) 
is lower than the well-being of any person at any time in alternative B. 
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permutate one person's well-being at a time and his well-being at another 
time, or even if we permutate one person's well-being at a time and another 
person's well-being at another time, the goodness of the alternative remains 
the same. According to time slice Prioritariauism, if an alternative contains 
two well-beings of 16 units and two well-beings of 4 units, the goodness of 
those alternatives is the same. 
On the other hand, time slice Egalitarianism satisfies separability of time 
but not strong separability of well-beings at each period. The goodness of 
person l's well-being at T1 is affected by the relative level of person 2's 
well-being at Tl. But it is independent of person l's well-being at T2 or 
person 2's well-being at T2. Likewise, the goodness of person l's well-being 
at T2 is affected by the relative level of person 2's well-being at T2, but 
independent of person l's well-being at T1 or person 2's well-being at T2. 
The chief difference between the two principles is that, according to time 
slice Egalitarianism, the goodness of each person's well-being at a period 
is affected by the relative level of other people's well-being at the same pe-
riod, whereas according to time slice Prioritarianism it is not affected. This 
difference emerges because Telic Egalitarianism violates strong separability 
whereas Prioritarianism satisfies it. The gist of the difference is illustrated 
in the following example. 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
1 16 4 1 16 4 1 10 10 
2 4 16 2 16 4 2 10 10 
Alternative A Alternative E Alternative B 
time slice Egalitarianism A --< E '" B. 
time slice Prioritarianism A '" E --< B. 
First, let us consider time slice Egalitarianism. According to time slice 
Egalitarianism, alternative A is worse than alternative E, because there 
are inequalities at both T1 and T2 in alternative A, whereas there is no 
inequality at either T1 or T2 in alternative B. As there is no temporal 
inequality in alternative E, there is no negative factor in determining the 
goodness of the distribution at each period. So the overall goodness of 
alternative E is 40. The overall goodness of alternative B is also 40, because 
there is no temporal inequality at T1 or T2. So, according to time slice 
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Egalitarianism, alternative E is equally as good as alternative B. In sum, 
time slice Egalitarianism judges that A -< E ~ B (-< means that the right 
side is strictly better than the left side, and ~ means that the right side is 
equally as good as the left side). 
Next, consider time slice Prioritarianism. According to time slice Pri-
or it arianism , alternative A is equally as good as alternative B, because two 
well-beings (i.e. person 2 at T1 and person 1 at T2 in alternative A, and 
persons 1 and 2 at T2 in alternative E) are at the level of 4 and the other 
two well-beings are at the level of 16. Comparing alternatives E and B, time 
slice Prioritarianism judges that alternative B is better than alternative E. 
This is because two well-beings are at 4 and the other two are at 16 in al-
ternative E, whereas all well-beings are at 10 in alternative B. Time slice 
Prioritarianism holds that 6 units of gain for the worse off is more impor-
tant than 6 units of loss for the better off. So it judges that alternative B is 
better than alternative E. In sum, time slice Prioritarianism judges that A 
~ E -< B. 
In this comparison, Prioritarians might claim that time slice Prioritari-
anism is more acceptable than time slice Egalitarianism. Why? It may be 
claimed that the difference between alternatives A and E is trivial, and that 
there is no plausible reason to judge alternative A to be better than alter-
native E: because each person has the exactly same low level of well-being 
anyway, it does not matter whether persons 1 and 2 have that low level of 
well-being together at the same time. But time slice Egalitarianism claims 
that it is better for those two people to endure a low level of well-being to-
gether at the same time and to enjoy the high level of well-being together at 
the same time. Time slice Egalitarianism implies that it is better that people 
endure (or enjoy) the low (or high) level of well-being sirnultaneo1Lsly.12 
It may be further argued that there is a good reason to judge alternative 
B to be better than alternative E: even if there is no temporal inequality in 
both E and B, it might be claimed that alternative E is equally as good as 
alternative B. This is because persons 1 and 2 are at a lower absolute level in 
alternative E (even if 4 is above the threshold level of well-being), whereas no 
person is at that low level in alternative B. Time slice Prioritarianism gives 
a satisfying response to this worry: it judges that alternative A is equally 
as good as alternative E and that alternative B is better than alternat.ive 
12 A similar point is made by McKcrlie (2000, pp. 279-80). 
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E. Thus, it may be claimed that time slice Prioritarianism is more plausible 
than time slice Egalitarianism. 
Given (a) from the discussion in section 2 that the complete lives view 
in general is not plausible if temporal inequality is a relevant consideration, 
and (b) that some people might claim that time slice Prioritarianism is 
more acceptable than time slice Egalitarianism, one might be tempted to 
conclude that time slice Prioritarianism is the most acceptable candidate 
amongst intertemporal distributive principles. I disagree. In what follows, 
I argue that the time slice view is, in general, implausible, and, therefore, 
that time slice Prioritarianislll is also implausible. 
6.4 Criticism of the time slice VIew 
In formulating the time slice view, I have emphasized that the goodness of a 
distribution at a period is determined independently of distributions at other 
periods, and that the goodness of each temporal stage is aggregated to the 
overall goodness of an alternative. But I think that this two-step argument 
is implausible. More specifically, I think it is implausible to determine the 
goodness of a distribution at a time independently of distributions at other 
times. That is, separability of time is implausible. Therefore, I think that 
the time slice view, be it Telic Egalitarian or Prioritarian, is implausible. In 
this section I explain why. 
As discussed in the previous section, the time slice view implies separa-
bility of time. Separability of time is a formal condition on the betterness 
ordering defined on alternatives, which includes distributions at different 
periods. In economics, many people accept this condition. For example, 
Mirrlees (1982) and Strotz (1955-6) accept it. But they accept it without 
substantive moral argument. Some economists, for example Deaton and 
I\1uellbauer (1980, pp. 124-5), have reservations about accepting separabil-
ity of time .. John Broome (1991, ch. 11) offers some possible arguments in 
support of separability of time. However, his argument for separability of 
time is inconclusive. I think that separability of time is implausible in the 
context of distributive judgement, and that the goodness of a distribution 
at a period depends on distributions at other periods. 
Consider alternative A again. In time slice Egalitarianism, I first calcu-
lated the goodness of the distribution at Tl, i.e. 16 + 4 - 1/2(16 - 4) = 14, 
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and the goodness of the distribution at T2, i.e. 14. I, then, added the 
goodness of distributions at Tl and T2, i.e. 28. Similarly, in time slice 
Prioritarianism, I calculated the good at Tl, i.e. f(16) + f(4) and the good 
at T2, f(4) + f(16). And then the overall good of alternative A is said to 
be 2f(16) + 2f(4). In this process, I calculated the goodness at Tl inde-
pendently of T2. Similarly, I calculated the goodness of T2 independently 
of Tl. But this is implausible. Compare alternatives A and F. 
Tl 
1 16 
2 4 
T2 
4 
16 
Alternative A 
Tl 
1 16 
2 4 
T2 
16 
4 
Alternative F 
Both time slice Egalitarianism and time slice Prioritarianism judge that 
alternative A is equally as good as alternative F. However, I think that many 
people believe such a judgement to be implausible. They would judge that 
we should choose alternative A rather than alternative F, because person 
2 endures a low level of well-being throughout his life and person 1 enjoys 
a high level of well-being throughout his life. Consequently, person l's life 
is always better ofl:' than person 2. On the other hand, in alternative A, 
both persons 1 and 2 endure the same low level of well-being, and enjoy the 
high level of well-being equally. The time slice view, be it Egalitarian or 
Prioritarian, judges that alternative A is equally as good as alternative F. 
But this is implausible. The source of this implausible judgment of the time 
slice view seems to be that there is some interaction between the distribu-
tions at Tl and T2, whenever we believe that alternative A is better than 
alternative F.13 
There seem to be two arguments against the judgement that alternative 
A is equally as good as alternative F. Firstly, some Egalitarians may say 
that, although the goodness of alternative A is the same as the goodness of 
13 Although this dissertation docs not consider Prioritariani8m for prospects, t.his ex-
ample may be used as a criticism of Rabinowicz's (2002) version of Prioritarianisll1, if 
alternatives A and F arc interpreted as equi-probable uncertain prospects. Suppose that 
Tl and T2 in alternatives A and Fare equi-probable states of nature. Rabinowicz's version 
of Prioritarianism for prospccts first estimat.es the goodness of each st.ate of nature and 
then proceeds to est.imate the overall goodness of a prospect.. On t.his version, prospect. A 
is equally as good ali prolipect. F. But this is counterintuitive. On the other hand, Broome's 
(1991) version of Prioritarianisll1 for prospects judges that prospect. A is strictly bet.t.er 
t.han prospect F, and, in turn, delivers intuitively more plausible result. 
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alternative F in light of the time slice view, there is an inequality between 
the lifetime well-beings of persons 1 and 2, and this lifetime inequality tips 
the balance towards alternative A. They may claim that both temporal 
inequality and lifetime inequality are relevant in judging the goodness of 
alternatives. Let us call Egalitarianism of this kind hybrid Egalitmianism, 
because it may be formulated in such a way that the badness of temporal 
inequality and lifetime inequality are considered to determine the overall 
goodness of alternatives. Hybrid Egalitarianism is briefly mentioned by 
McKerlie, who writes, 
One possibility is that we care about equality between complete 
lives, but we also accept some principle that gives weight to 
inequalities between parts of lives. Faced with a choice about 
whether to compensate for past inequality, we would have to 
balance the gain in equality between complete lives against the 
loss in terms of equality between parts of lives. In some examples 
we might think that one consideration was stronger, in different 
examples the other consideration. 14 
But McKerlie does not develop an Egalitarian position of this kind. I 
shall formulate it in section 6. 
Secondly, many people (even if they are not Egalitarian) may claim that 
alternative F is unfair to person 2, and that we should choose alternative A 
because alternative A is due to this unfairness. In alternative F, persoll 2 is 
deprived of having 16 units of well-being throughout his life. On the other 
hand, in alternative A, each person is not deprived of a high level of well-
being. In this dissertation, I am assuming that people are equally deserving. 
Given this assumption, there is no reason whatsoever to deprive one person 
of having a high level of well-being throughout his life. Thus, alternative 
A is fairer than alternative F. In alternative F, there is unfairness done 
to persoll 2. In alternative A, there is no unfairness done to any person. 
Unfairness done to person 2 tips the balance in favour of alternative A. Let 
us call this thought the unfairness view. 
There may be two interpretations of the unfairness view. 15 The first is 
to think that unfairness cannot be reduced into badness for person 2, and 
HMcKerlie (1989, p. 484). 
15These two interpretations of unfairness will be discussed further in chapt.er 7, though 
in a slightly different. context.. 
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that the unfair alternative ought to be excluded from a set of choosable 
alternatives. According to this interpretation, alternative F is unfair, and 
it ought not to be chosen. Unfairness is not the matter of good or bad. 
Therefore, we cannot say that alternative A is better than alternative F, but 
that alternative F ought not to be chosen. In this interpretation, unfairness 
works as a side-constraint on the set of choosable alternatives. 
The other interpretation claims that alternative A is better than alter-
native F, because unfairness done to person 2 in alternative F is a bad to 
person 2. In this interpretation, unfairness is reduced into the bad of person 
who is affected by unfairness, and the badness of unfairness decreases the 
goodness of that alternative. So, the goodness of alternative A is greater 
than that of E. This interpretation is similar to hybrid Egalitarianism. The 
difference is that the badness, which tips the balance in favour of alternative 
A, is the lifetime inequality in hybrid Egalitarianism and the unfairness in 
this interpretation. Although I shall say nothing about which interpretation 
is more plausible, I shall formulate these two positions with the same for-
mula in section 6. There may be some semantic differences between the two 
positions, but there seems to be no structural difference in their formaliza-
tion. 
Whichever interpretation one maintains, the judgement that alternative 
A is equally as good as alternative F seems implausible. This is because 
we think that there is an interaction between distributions at T1 and T2. 
The absence of interaction between distributions at T1 and T2 is due to 
separability of time. Separability of time is the source of this implausible 
judgement. Therefore, if alternative A is better than alternative F, this 
implies that separability of time is implausible. I think that alternative A 
is better than alternative F. This is why I think separabilit.y of time to be 
implausible. Thus, I think that the time slice view, be it. Egalitarian or 
Prioritarian, is implausible. 
However, some Prioritarians, if not all, may not think that alternative 
A is better than alternative F. They may find nothing implausible in the 
judgement that alternative A is equally as good as alternative F. In the next 
section, I examine this kind of argument for separability of time, but reject 
it. 
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6.5 Does the choice of unit depend on metaphys-
ical theory? 
Prioritarianism is unconcerned with the relationship between different peo-
ple's well-beings. All Prioritarians care about is the absolute level of indi-
vidual well-being. Time slice Prioritarians care about neither who endures 
a low level of well-being nor at which temporal stage someone endures a low 
level of well-being. They claim that it does not matter who endures a low 
level of well-being at T1 or T2. They claim that alternative A is equally as 
good as alternative F, whereas I have claimed that alternative A is better 
than F: they may disagree with me. 
In section 3, I argued that separability of time implies that the unity of 
well-being of different temporal periods, or who bears how much well-being 
across time, does not matter. Those who claim that well-beings at different 
periods are not united within a single person in a significant way may seek 
support from a reductionist account of personal identity in metaphysics. I 
shall argue that the theory of personal identity, be it reductionist or not, 
affects neither the discussion of distributive judgement in general nor the 
judgement of the relative goodness of alternatives A and F more pm'ticu-
larly: distributive judgements are not dependent on any particular theory 
of personal identity. 
Reductionist accounts of personal identity claims roughly the following. 
When we discuss the continuity of person across time, what really matters 
is not personal identity per se, for example bodily continuity. According 
to reductionist accounts of personal identity, what matters rationally and 
morally is the continuity of a person's psychological experiences such as 
pleasure, pain, desire, thought, intention and so on. These psychological 
experiences, however, fade as time goes by. The pain that Jones experienced 
in the past is not as vivid as the one that Jones is experiencing at present. 
Maybe the pain that another person, say Tom, is experiencing at present 
is as vivid as the one that Jones is experiencing at present. Or maybe the 
pain that Tom is experiencing at present is more vivid for Jones than the 
one that Jones himself experienced many years ago. Likewise, the pain that 
Tom is experiencing at present is more vivid for Jones than the one that 
Jones himself will experience in future. Consequently, the pain that Tom, 
or someone else, is experiencing at present is more vivid for Jones than 
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the one that Jones himself experienced in the past or will experience in 
future. Similarly, a person's desires and will change gradually, or sometimes 
suddenly, over time. This suggests that the person's psychological experience 
in the past or future is not more important than the psychological experience 
that other people are experiencing at present. Reductionism then holds that 
the connection between a person's psychological states across time is weakly 
connected, and that it is not more important than the connection between 
his psychological state at a time and other people's psychological state at 
the same time. 
Those reductionists may apply their own metaphysical claim to moral 
t.heory and distributive judgments across time, cir, conversely, the advocates 
of the time slice view may seek support from the reductionist account of 
personal identity. If the reductionist account of personal identity is correct, 
it might follow that alternatives A and F are equally good, and that my case 
against the time slice view in general and separability of time in particular 
might. not be persuasive. In alternat.ive F, person 1 enjoys a higher level 
of well-being throughout, whereas person 2 endures a lower level of well-
being throughout. However, by appealing to the reductionist account of 
personal identity, it may be argued that it is not rationally and morally 
relevant whether the same person enjoys a high level of well-being or endures 
a low level of well-being throughout. That is, it is not relevant that the 
person who endures the lower level of well-being at T1 happens to be the 
same person who endures the lower level of well-being at T2. Person 1 at 
T1 is very weakly connected with person 1 at T2. The relation between 
person 1 at T1 and person 1 at T2 is as strongly connected as the relation 
between person 1 at T1 and person 2 at T1 or T2. For reductiollist.s, all 
that matters in t.he distributive judgement across time is the amount of well-
being experienced by people in each alternative. Consequently, they may 
judge that alternatives A and F are equally good. 
The time slice view, supported by the reductionist account of personal 
identity, may be correct. But this is the case only when the reductionist 
account of personal identity is successfully generalized within the cont.ext 
of t.he dist.ribution of well-being. The t.ime slice view is not successfully 
just.ified by simply appealing to a met.aphysical theory or the reductionist 
theory of personal identity. The move from the reductionist account of 
personal identity to the time slice view must be justified by moral theory. 
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However, I believe that it is not an easy task. The support of the time 
slice Prioritarianism seems to be based on the strong generalization of t.he 
reductionist account of personal identity to a distributive principle. 
I believe that the reductionist theory of person does not determine the 
theory of distributive judgement across time. The choice of distributive 
principle does not depend on the metaphysical theory of personal identity. 
This point was discussed by John Rawls. According to Rawls, a moral 
theory "is the study of how the basic notions of the right, the good, and 
moral worth may be arranged to form different moral structure", and "tries 
to identify the chief similarities and differences between these structures and 
to characterize the way in which they are related to our moral sensibilities 
and natural attitudes, and to determine the conditions they must satisfy if 
they are to play their expected role in human life" .16 He continues, 
the study of substantive moral conceptions and their relation 0 
our moral sensibility has its own distinctive problems and subject 
mat.ter that requires to be investigated for its own sake. At the 
same time, answers to such questions as the analysis of moral 
concepts, the existence of objective moral truth, and the nature 
of persons and personal identity, depend upon an understanding 
of these structures. Thus the problems of moral philosophy that 
tie in with the theory of meaning and epistemology, metaphysics 
and the philosophy of mind, must call upon moral theory.17 
Rawls claims that moral theory is independent of metaphysical theory 
about personal identity, and that whether or not personal identity across 
time is relevant outwith the metaphysical theory should be justified by some 
moral theory. I agree with Rawls. Even if the claim of reductionism is true 
as regards the metaphysics of personal identity, it is not necessarily true 
in the present context, i.e. the distributive theory of well-being. For the 
sake of argument, let us suppose that the claim of reductionist account of 
personal identity is true in the discussion of metaphysics of personal identity. 
If so, there should be a moral argument, that serves as a bridge between the 
thought that personal identity across time does not matter in metaphysical 
argument, on the one hand, and the thought that personal identity does not 
16Rawls (1975, p. 286) Page references are to his Collecte.d Pape.rs. 
I'Rawls (1975, p. 287). 
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matter in distributive judgement, on the other. 
I shall not argue either for or against the truth of the reductionist ac-
count of personal identity here. This dissertation is not about metaphysics. 
However, I shall discuss two issues here: firstly, whether focusing on psy-
chological state yields an appropriate notion of well-being; and secondly, 
whether the well-being across time is morally weakly connected. The reduc-
tionist account of personal identity can be generalized to support time slice 
Prioritarianism only iftwo moral arguments are successfully justified: (a) the 
moral notion of well-being consists in experienced psychological states; and 
(b) the moral importance between well-beings of different temporal stages is 
weakly related. But I think it very difficult to justify these two arguments. 
(a) may not be easily justified. There are many competing accounts of 
well-being. Psychological states such as pleasure, pain, or happiness, form 
the basis of one type of account of well-being. The objective list view also 
provides a credible account of well-being. A somewhat intermediate account 
of well-being is also credible. For example, Amartya Sen tirelessly argues 
that each person's capability to function is the most plausible concept of 
well-being. In order to justify time slice Prioritarianism, it must be showed 
that the experienced psychological state view gives the most plausible ac-
count of well-being. Otherwise, time slice Prioritarians cannot appeal to the 
reductionist account of personal identity, and time slice Prioritarianism and 
the reductionist account of personal identity imply one another. 
Furthermore, it should be considered whether the plausible notion of 
well-being is the experienced psychological state. Suppose that your spouse 
is cheating on you, and that you do not know that fact. The fact that 
your spouse is cheating on you is surely bad for you, even if you do not 
experience any pain or sadness. I think that the experienced psychological 
state view is not the most plausible account of well-being when we consider 
the distributive principles. 
Even if the most plausible account of well-being is the experienced psy-
chological state view, there is a further important question: from the moral 
point of view, is the importance of experienced psychological states across 
time weakly related? Someone might say that, even if the psychological 
states across time are empirically weakly related, they also need to be closely 
morally related. True. We change desires, intentions, tastes, thoughts and 
so on, gradually (sometimes suddenly). However, I believe that it is closely 
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related morally, when we consider the distributive principles. I should ask 
whether there is any reason to justify an alternative in which one person is 
always worse off than the other, when these two persons are equally deserv-
ing. My answer is "no". I provided two reasons in the last section. It may 
be unfair to person 2. It may be worse in terms of inequality of lifetime 
well-being. There are several reasons. However, I believe that there is no 
reason to morally justify an alternative in which one person is always worse 
off than the other, even if a person's experienced psychological states are 
actually weakly connected. I think that the attempt to justify time slice Pri-
oritarianism appealing to the reductionist account of personal identity fails. 
VVe should reject the time slice view, including time slice Prioritarianism. 
6.6 The hybrid view 
"\iVhat do we learn from these discussions? My claim is that any distributive 
principle, be it Egalitarianism or Prioritarianism, should consider both the 
distribution of well-being at each period and the distribution of lifetime well-
being. In section 2, I claimed that the unit of distributive judgement should 
not be limited to the lifetime well-being. This is because many Egalitarians 
would regard inequality at a period as a relevant consideration. Similarly, 
Prioritarians would think that a low level of well-being at a period is also a 
relevant consideration. I did not claim that the distribution of lifetime well-
being is irrelevant. I have also argued that the unit of distributive judgement 
should not be limited to the distribution of well-being at each temporal stage. 
This is because there should be an interaction between each person's well-
being across times. But I did not intend to rule out the relevance of temporal 
inequality from the distributive judgement. My analysis above suggests that 
lifetime well-being should not be ruled out from our distributive judgement. 
This is why we should consider both the distribution at each period and the 
distribution of lifetime well-being. Call this view the hybrid view. 
The hybrid version of Egalitarianism can be easily formulated, if we think 
either (a) that alternative A is better than alternative F because lifetime 
inequality is a bad for person 2, or (b) that alternative A is better than F 
because alternative F is unfair to person 2 and the unfairness is a bad owned 
by person 2. Let IWi - w.i I, where Wi = w; + wt, be the size of badness done 
to person 2. Then, hybrid Egalitarianism. can be stated as follows. 
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Hy brid Egalitarianism: :); = (w~, wI , w~, w~) is at least as 
good as y = (WL1Vr,w1,ul~) if and only if WI +W2 -1!2(lw~­
w11 + IWI - w~1) - ,BIWI -w21 2 WI +W2 -1!2(lwi - w~1 + IWI-
wW ,BIWI -w21, where Wi = wI +wf and,B is some coefficient. 
In hybrid Egalitarianism, the goodness of an alternative is given by 
(total well-being) -(temporal inequality) -(lifetime inequality). 
Hybrid Egalitarianism thus construed encompasses the badness of temporal 
inequality and the badness of lifetime inequality in the overall goodness of an 
alternative. I believe that this is the most plausible version of Egalitarianism 
in the intertemporal distributive judgement. 
On the other hand, the hybrid version of Prioritarianism faces t.he dif-
ficulty. The difficulty is that Prioritarians must derive two different moral 
goodness from a person's well-being: the one from moral goodness of a per-
son's well-being at. each period; and the other from a person's lifetime well-
being, which includes his well-being at each period as a proper component.. 
Consider the first possible formula of hybrid Prioritarianism. 
Hybrid Prioritarianism (formula 1): :); = (wI, wI, w~, w~) is 
at least as good as y = (wI,1VI,w1,lv~) if and only if g[j(wi) + 
f(wn] +g[j(w~) + f(w~)] 2 g[f(wf) + f(wn] +g[j(w~) + f(w~)]' 
where f( ) and g( ) are some increasing, strictly concave func-
tions. 
According to formula 1, we first estimate the moral goodness of each 
person's well-being at each period, independently of other people's well-
being at the same period or of his well-being at other period. We then 
aggregate the moral goodness of his well-being at each period across time, 
and establish the moral goodness of the lifetime moral goodness of well-
being. The question arises: what is meant by the moral goodness of the 
lifetime moral goodness of well-being? It sounds odd to say that the moral 
goodness of the lifetime moral goodness diminishes as the absolute level 
of the moral goodness of well-being gets higher. What morally diminishes 
should be either the lifetime well-being or well-being at each period. I8 
18McKerlie (U)97, p. 295n) presumes that Prioritarianism be based on both the life-
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Another formula of hybrid Prioritarianism faces the similar difficulty. 
Consider the following formula. 
Hybrid Prioritarianism (formula 2): x = (wi, wi, w~, w~) is 
at least as good as y = (wi, wi, w~, w§) if and only if u([g(wf) + 
g(wi) + g(w~) + g(w~)], [h(Wl) + h(W2)]) ;::: u([g(wf) + g(wi) + 
g(iv~) + g(w§)], [h(Wl) + h(W2)]) , where g( ) and h( ) are some 
increasing, strictly concave functions, u( ) is some increasing 
function, and Wi = wi + wI. 
According to formula 2, the different moral weight is given to the life-
time well-being and well-being at each period. This gives rise to the ques-
tion again: given that a person's lifetime well-being includes his well-being 
at each period, why do we give the two moral weights to the same well-
being at a period? It is hard to believe that a person's well-being at each 
period receives two different moral weights at the same time. At least, Pri-
oritarianism, construed in formula 2, does not straightforwardly represent 
the original idea of Prioritarianism, namely that the moral goodness of a 
person's well-being diminishes as the absolute level of his well-being gets 
higher. This is some problem for Prioritarianism, but not a knock-down 
criticism against it. 
I have argued that the temporal unit of distributive judgement should 
be both the lifetime well-being and the well-being at each stage. I examined 
whether the choice of temporal unit would give a positive reason to sup-
port Prioritarianism, be it the time slice view or the hybrid view. Then, I 
discussed it does not provide us with a reason to support Prioritarianism. 
time well-being and well-being at each period, and suggests hybrid Prioritarianism of thiH 
formula. He admits the difficulty I described here, but thinks that Prioritarians would be 
willing to bite the bullet. 
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Chapter 7 
Aggregation and Numbers 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5, I suggested that Prioritarians can avoid my criticisms if they 
replace the Pigou-Dalton condition with Hammond equity, and adopt Lex-
imino This is because Leximin does not require a moral scale of the goodness 
of well-being. At the same time, I also pointed out that many people would 
find Leximin to be too extreme, because Leximin claims that any small gain 
in the well-being of the worse off person outweighs any total loss in the well-
being of the better off people, however many better off people there are. 
In this respect, Leximin is less acceptable than Prioritarianism defined by 
strong separability, Pareto and the Pigou-Dalton condition. However, in this 
very same respect, Leximin will gain some support from a different camp. 
The critics of interpersonal aggregation do not support PrioritarianisIll a:3 
defined by strong separability, Pareto and the Pigou-Dalton condition. But 
they would support Leximin because it rules out interpersonal aggregation 
of well-being. 
There is a bonus, however, for Prioritarians if they adopt Leximin. Lex-
imin only requires the ordinal measure of people's well-being, because Lex-
imin only compares the relative level of people's well-being and does not need 
to estimate the total well-being of people. Prioritarianism and Weighted 
Egalitarianism require the cardinal measure of people's well-being, which is 
stronger than the ordinal measure. I am not sure whether the measure of 
people's well-being tips the balance in favour of either distributive principle. 
However, it might be a good news for non-aggregative Prioritarians. 
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In this chapter, however, I argue against non-aggregative distributive 
principles in general. Recently, it has been argued that non-aggregative 
distributive principles are too extreme because the numbers do not count. I 
shall show that the numbers actually count in Leximin only when the claim 
of each person is of equal moral significance. So, in Leximin, the numbers 
count in some cases but not in other cases. Leximin can respond to the 
criticism against the non-aggregative distributive principles. However, I 
shall argue that the rejection of interpersonal aggregation fails. 
Consider the choice between (a) saving one stranger's life and letting 
five different strangers die, and (b) saving five strangers' lives and letting 
another stranger die (call this Rescue Case). In his controversial paper, John 
Taurek (1977) argues that we should Hip a fair coin in this situation, since 
Hipping a coin gives each person an equal chance of being saved, and this 
best captures the moral claim that we should treat each person with equal 
concern and respect. By endorsing coin-tossing, he rejects the comparison 
between the combined good of five lives saved and the good of one life saved, 
thus ruling out interpersonal aggregation. 
Taurek's argument is not controversial for those who favour interper-
sonal aggregation: there is no controversy but rather a disagreement. It is 
controversial for the critics of interpersonal aggregation who are supposed to 
share the objection to interpersonal aggregation with Taurek, yet may want 
to save five lives directly, not tossing a coin. If the goods/bads of different 
people are not allowed to be aggregated, how could they justify the case for 
saving the five in the Rescue Case? Does the rejection of interpersonal ag-
gregation imply that we should toss a coin in the Rescue Case? Some critics 
of interpersonal aggregation want to give proper respect to each separate 
person but at the same time want to save the greater number in the Rescue 
Case. Let us call this problem the Number Pmblem. 
There seem to be two ways to approach the Number Problem. The first 
approach, that of the critics of interpersonal aggregation, regards the rejec-
tion of interpersonal aggregation as a necessary way to give proper respect 
to each separate person, and they offer an argument for saving the greater 
number without appealing to interpersonal aggregation. Let us call this 
approach the Non-Aggregation Appmach. This approach has recently been 
advocated by Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon. 1 The other approach, 
lKamm (19fJ3, pp. 101, 114-1fJ) and Scanlon (lfJ98, pp. 22fJ-41). 
129 
based on interpersonal aggregation, does not necessarily violate the sepa-
rateness of persons: interpersonal aggregation and the respect given to the 
separateness of persons are not in conflict. According to this approach, we 
can justify the case for the greater number with a proper respect for each 
separate person, but this does not rule out interpersonal aggregation. Let 
us call this approach the Aggregation Approach, which r shall defend in this 
chapter. 
r defend the Aggregation Approach because it seems that we should save 
the greater number in some cases, and that we should toss a coin in other 
cases even if one group is strictly larger than the other: it is not the case that 
we should always save the greater numher. And the Aggregation Approach 
best captures the rationale behind this judgement. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that two non-
aggregative principles, Maximin and the pairwise comparison, do not sup-
port saving the greater number. Section 3 characterizes what is meant ex-
actly by interpersonal aggregation, which many non-utilitarians wish to rule 
out. Section 4 discusses the consequentialist case for saving the greater 
number without appealing to interpersonal aggregation. Section 5 exam-
ines Scanlon's proposal in favour of saving the greater number. Section 6 
raises the question of whether we should always save the greater number 
and discusses what I call the Converse Number Problem. Section 7 puts 
forward the Aggregation Approach, which solves both the Number Prob-
lem and Converse Number Problem by giving proper respect to each person 
concerned. 
7.2 Do they account for the numbers? 
Some philosophers think that we should reject interpersonal aggregation in 
order to give proper respect to each separate person. And they put for-
ward non-aggregative principles. For example, as part of his two principles 
of justice, John Rawls (1971) proposes the Difference Principle, according 
to which social and economic inequality should be arranged so as to benefit 
the least advantaged group in terms of primary social goods. The Difference 
Principle does not aggregate the goods of different groups and, not surpris-
ingly, it does not consider the numbers. To illustrate, suppose that there 
are two million people in the least advantaged group in a possible state ;r; 
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and that there are a million people in the least advantaged group in another 
state y. If both groups are at the same level of primary social goods, the 
Difference Principle judges that x and yare equally good. It also implies 
that any small gain for the worst off group outweighs the greater losses for 
the non-worst off groups, however large the size of the non-worst off groups 
is. Thus, the numbers do not count on the Difference Principle. 
Thomas Nagel also puts forward a non-aggregative distributive principle, 
which he calls the pairwise comparison: it compares one person's gain and 
loss with another's so to identify which alternative would be less unaccept-
able, and chooses the least unacceptable one from individual standpoints. 
Where there is confiict of interests, no result can be completely 
acceptable to everyone. But it is possible to assess each result 
from each point of view to try to find the one that is least un-
acceptable to the person to whom it is most unacceptable. This 
means that any other alternative will be more unacceptable to 
someone than this alternative is to anyone. The preferred alter-
native is in that sense the least unacceptable from each person's 
point of view separately. A radically egalitarian policy of giving 
absolute priority to the worst off, regardless of numbers, would 
result from always choosing the least unacceptable alternative, 
in this sense. 2 
The pairwise comparison compares each person's gain and loss with an-
other's, and, through the series of pairwise comparisons, identifies the alter-
native which is least unacceptable to everyone. Given that the comparison is 
made between the gains and losses of two persons, it rules out the possibility 
that the combined gains of a group of different persons outweigh the com-
bined losses of another group: the pairwise comparison is non-aggregative. 
Even if x is slightly better than y for a million people but if y is considerably 
better than x for one very badly off person, the pairwise comparison claims 
that y should be chosen. Nagel thus rules out interpersonal aggregation of 
gains and losses, and hence thinks the numbers irrelevant. 
However, Nagel is fully aware that it may be problematic that the pair-
wise comparison does not consider the numbers as relevant: 
2Nagel (H)7(), p. 123). Emphasis added. 
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lilt seems to me that no plausible theory can avoid the relevance 
of numbers completely. There may be some disparities of ur-
gency so great that the priorities persist whatever numbers are 
involved. But if the choice between preventing severe hardship 
for some who are very poor and deprived, and preventing less 
severe but still struggling for subsistence, then it is very difficult 
for me to believe that the numbers do not count, and that pri-
ority of urgency goes to the worse off however many more there 
are of the better off." 3 
Yet, he does not propose a principle that can answer this problem. 
Let us see what the non-aggregative principles of Rawls and Nagel would 
claim in the Rescue Case. Given that Rawls's Difference Principle is applied 
only to the basic social structure and to the representative individuals of 
groups, it should not be applied to the Rescue Case. But take 1vIaximin, 
which underlies the Difference Principle. Maximin is concerned with the 
betterness relation of states of affairs. It claims that x is better than y if 
and only if the level of the worst off person in x is higher than that in y. 
Since someone dies whichever group we might save, Maximin judges that 
saving five lives is equally as good as saving one life. Maximin itself does 
not give any reason to support saving five lives. It would not disagree with 
tossing a coin, unless it is combined with some additional conditions. 
Nagel's pairwise comparison does not give a positive reason for saving 
five lives, either. The gain and loss of each person is compared with another, 
and by continuing the pairwise comparisons for all pairs of six individuals 
concerned, it turns out that the gain and loss of each person is equally 
great. Therefore, saving five lives and saving one life are equally accept-
able/unacceptable to each of them. Nagel's pairwise comparison therefore 
implies that saving five lives is equally acceptable as saving one life. Con-
sequently, like Maximin, the pairwise comparison itself does not support 
saving five lives: it would not disagree with tossing a coin.4 
3Nagol (1979, p. 125). Nagel continues "if egalitarian urgency is itself sensitive to 
numbers in this way, it docs not seem that any form of unanimity criterion could explain 
the foundation of the view." But, later, Nagel (1991, p.73) changes his stance. He states 
that. "I am inclined toward a somewhat weaker preference for the worst. off, which can be 
outweighed by sufficiently large benefit to sufficiently large numbers of those better off". 
Sec also Nagel (1981, pp. 197-98). 
1This point was first made by Michael Otsuka (2000, pp. 290-91). 
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Thus, neither Maximin nor the pairwise comparison justifies the case 
for saving five lives. This invites the following question. Does respect for 
each separate person lead us to toss a coin in the Rescue Case? If we 
want to save the five, does this mean that we are appealing to interpersonal 
aggregation? The answer is "no". It is possible to justify the case for saving 
the greater number without interpersonal aggregation. In the later sections, 
I shall examine two proposals that take a Non-Aggregation Approach: the 
consequentialist proposal and Scanlon's argument. But before we begin to 
analyze the Non-Aggregation Approach to the Number Problem, we need 
to pin down what exactly the Non-Aggregation Approach wants to avoid. 
7.3 Aggregation and consequentialism 
I have so far used the term "interpersonal aggregation" without defining 
it precisely. Let me define it in order to clarify what Taurek and non-
utilitarians exactly wish to avoid. Taurek says "[i]t is not my way to think 
of them [five strangers] as each having a certain objective value, determined 
however it is we determine the objective value of things, and then to make 
some estimate of the combined value of the five as against the one".5 Here, 
he does not want to combine the losses of five individuals into an "objective 
value" and to balance the combined value of the five against the one. I shall 
follow Taurek's characterization of interpersonal aggregation. By interper-
sonal aggregation, I mean, roughly, the combination of separate people's 
goods, happiness, losses, well-beings, and so on, into an objective value. In 
what follows, I will provide a precise definition of aggregation in general and 
interpersonal aggregation in particular. 
First, let us define aggregation in general. Aggregation combines the 
values of separate morally relevant features into a single value in order to 
determine a comparative relation bet.ween t.he sequences of t.hese features. 
Suppose t.here are two sets: the one contains i features and the other cont.ains 
j features. The relation between the two sequences is as follows. 
Relation: (aI, a2, ... , ai) is at least as F as (aI' a~, ... , aj), 
where F is some property, e.g. good, great, strong, and so forth. F-relation 
is a strict relation which holds between two sequences, e.g. better, greater, 
5Taurek (1977, p. 307). Emphasis added. 
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stronger, and so forth. For simplicity, let us assume that the F-relation is re-
flexive and transitive, and hence that the F-relation constitutes an (partial) 
F-Ol·dering. The features in each set can be good, well-being, happiness, 
claims, loss, pain, or so on. Aggregation combines these separate features 
into a single value. This is best understood by introducing a real valued 
function, which is a numerical representation of an ordering. The relation 
of the two sequences is represented by an increasing function f ( ), and this 
defines the notion of aggregation. 
Aggregation: (aI,a2, ... ,ai) is at least as F as (a~,a;, ... ,aj), 
if and only if f(aI,a2, .. ·,ai) ~ f(a~,a;, ... ,aj), where f( ) is 
strictly increasing in its arguments. 
When the subscripted indices indicate persons, we have interpersonal 
aggregation. Thus, interpersonal aggregation is the combination of each 
person's morally relevant features (i.e. good, well-being, happiness, claims, 
loss, pain, and so on) into a real value in order to determine the relation of 
two sequences. 
Function f( ) should be increasing in its function because, other things 
being equal, the increase of one feature should make the value of combined 
features strictly greater. 
Take classical utilitarianism as an example. Classical utilitarianism is 
concerned with the betterness relation of states of affairs, i.e. it seeks to 
establish the relative goodness of states of affairs. Classical utilitarianism 
assumes that a state of affairs is a set of persons' happiness and that a state 
of affairs x is better than another y if and only if the sum of happiness in x 
is greater than that in y. So classical utilitarianism combines each separate 
person's happiness into a real value in order to establish the betterness 
relation between states of affairs. T.hat is, 
Classical utilitarianism: x = (WI, W2 • ... , wn ) is at least as 
good as y = (wl, w;, ... , w~J if and only if f (x) = WI + W2 + ... + 
Wn ~ f(y) = wl + w~ + ... + W~t' 
where Wi is a person's happiness. 6 
6It should be noticed that adding-up is not the only way to combine the well-beings 
of different. people. One example of non-addit.ive interpersonal aggregation is what 
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It should be emphasized that, on the definition above, interpersonal ag-
gregation does not entail consequentialism and that consequentialism does 
not entail interpersonal aggregation. Consequentialism determines the right-
ness/worngness of agent's action by the relative goodness, or betterness, of 
states of affairs: a state of affairs x is at least as good as y if and only if 
the good in x is at least as great as that in y. Some principles aggregate 
the goods of different people without appealing to the betterness of states 
of affairs. Some principle may, for example, aggregate the claims of different 
people and claim that we have a duty to respond to the stronger claim as a 
whole. This is not a theory about the betterness of states of affairs, yet it 
combines the claims of different people into an objective value. 
Similarly, consequentialism does not entail interpersonal aggregation. 
Some consequentialist. principles determine the betterness of states of af-
fairs without combining separate goods into an objective value. But the 
good in a state of affairs can be specified without combining the good of 
separate people. For example, according to Maximin, the good of a state of 
affairs is the well-being level of the worst off person. It does not combine the 
good of separate people, yet it is still a principle that refers to the betterness 
of states of affairs. 7 
7.4 Consequentialist proposal 
Given a clear distinction between interpersonal aggregation and consequen-
tialism, there may not be any controversy even if someone wants to accept 
consequentialism without interpersonal aggregation: she might want to say 
economists call the Nash social welfare function, which is a product of individual well-
being: that is, x = (WI,W2, ... ,Wn ) is better than y = (w;,w;, ... ,w;,) if and only if 
f(:7;) = WI X 102 X ... X w" > f(y) = tv; x w; x ... x w: .. This formula certainly combines 
individual well-being into an objective value so to determine the relative goodness of states 
of affairs, but it is not additive. 
7 One might wonder whether Maximin is aggregative according to my characterization, 
since Maximin can be represented by a functional form, i.e. a state:1' = (Wl,W2, ... ,W,,) 
is better than y = (w;, w~, ... , w;.) if and only if min{ WI, W2, ... , Wn} >min{ W;, W~, ... , w;,}. 
Certainly, the good of a distribution is represented by a real value. However, t.he lvlaximin 
function is not increasing in its arguments, and hence it docs not satbfy the characteriza-
tion above. The gbt of my characterization is that interpersonal aggregation dissolves the 
goods of different people into an objective value: Maximin docs not dissolve the goods of 
different people. 
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. .., 
that one state of affairs is better than another state but without combining 
the goods of separate people. I think that consequentialists can justify the 
case for saving the greater number without combining the goods of separate 
people into an objective value. In what follows, I shall consider the con-
sequentialist proposal for saving the greater number without interpersonal 
aggregation.8 
Consequentialism requires only two non-aggregative condit.ions in order 
to show that saving more is better than saving fewer. 
Symmetry : the permutations of personal ident.ities do not change the 
goodness of state of affairs: e.g. x = (10,5) and y = (5,10) are 
equally good. 
Pareto : if one state of affairs is better for some person than another state, 
and if it is worse for no persons, then it is better than the other. 
Equipped only with these two non-aggregative conditions, I shall show 
that saving more is better than fewer. First, consider the choice between (1) 
saving A and letting B&C die and (2) saving B&C and letting A die. Now, 
compare three states of affairs, each of which show the states of A, Band 
C. 
x:=(saved, dead, dead) 
y:=( dead, saved, dead) 
z:=(dead, saved, saved). 
What I need to show is that z is better than x. By Symmetry, x is 
equally as good as y. By Pareto, z is better than y. Consequently, z is 
better than x, as required. Thus, saving the two is better than saving one. 
By continuing the same process for comparisons between saving n persons 
and n - 1 persons, I conclude that saving more is always better than fewer. 
As neit.her Symmetry nor Pareto aggregates the goods of different people, 
consequentialism combined with Symmetry and Pareto supports saving the 
8The following argument is similar to what Frances Kamm calls the Aggregation Argu-
ment Sec Kamm (19~)a, pp. 85-87). However, as I shall show, it docs not aggregate t.he 
good of separate people, and my formulation captures the basic structure of her argument 
neatly. 
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greater number without combining the goods of different people into an 
objective value. 
Symmetry and Pareto are weak conditions, and many principles such 
as utilitarianism, Prioritarianism, Leximin, and so on, satisfy these two 
conditions. As shown, any principle satisfying both conditions judges that 
saving more is always better than saving fewer. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that some non-utilitarians agree with utilitarians that saving more is better 
than fewer. 
Nonetheless, some principles do not satisfy either condition. Those prin-
ciples do not necessarily claim that saving more is better than saving fewer. 
Take Maximin again. It satisfies Symmetry but does not satisfy Pareto. It 
judges that x and yare equally good, but that y is equally as good as z: 
consequently, it judges that x is equally as good as z. According to Max-
imin, there is no ground to support saving the greater number: it might 
agree with tossing a coin. 
It is important, however, to note that the conjunction of Symmetry 
and Pareto fails to provide the definitive answer in a more complicated 
choice problem. Consider the "television studio example" of Thomas Scan-
lon, where we face a choice between (a) interfering with the enjoyment of a 
billion World Cup viewers in order to save Jones who suffers an accident in 
the transmitter room, and (b) letting Jones be in pain and waiting till the 
match is over.9 In this example, the conjunction of Symmetry and Pareto 
does not tell whether we should save Jones or letting him be in pain for the 
sake of the amusement of a billion viewers. To consolidate goods of different 
strength, we need some stronger condition than Symmetry and Pareto. It 
is at this stage that some principles allow interpersonal aggregation, while 
others do not. Some people would adopt an aggregative formula, and would 
say that the combined goods of a million viewers outweigh the goodness 
of saving Jones. Even if the individual good is very small, the combined 
goods of a sufficiently large number of people may outweigh the good of one 
person. Needless to say, utilitarians adopt the aggregative formula at this 
stage. However, some others adopt a non-aggregative formula, like Leximin. 
In the television studio case, Leximin judges that saving Jones is better 
than letting a million viewers watch the match. So Leximin disagrees with 
utilitarianism in this example. 
9Scanlun (1998, p. 235). 
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Symmetry and Pareto are so weak that diverse principles satisfy them. 
Insofar as the good of each person has the same moral importance, Sym-
metry and Pareto tell us to save the greater number without combining the 
goods of different people into an objective value: the numbers count if the 
goods are equally weighty; but the numbers do not necessarily count if the 
goods differ from one another. 
It is of great importance to call attention to the basic idea behind the 
consequentialist proposal, thus construed. Consider Pareto. It says that "if 
one state of affairs is better for some person than another state, and if it 
is worse for no persons, then it is better than the other". We can balance 
the indifferent peoples' states out, and the non-cancelled-out people's state 
tips the balance in favour of bringing about a state of affairs in which the 
greater number of people is saved. To see this, compare again y and z above. 
Pareto implies that we can balance the states of A and B out and focus only 
on the state of C. It is the state of C that tips the balance in favour of the 
judgement that z is better than y. 
It is also important to emphasize that this consequelltialist proposal 
claims that saving more is always better than saving fewer. This is exactly 
what the Non-Aggregation Approach aims at. The Number Problem moti-
vates the search for a case for saving the greater number in such a way that 
the separateness of persons is respected. The Non-Aggregation Approach 
thinks that the rejection of interpersonal aggregation saves the separateness 
of persons. In the Rescue Case where we face a choice between saving five 
lives and saving one life, the Non-Aggregation Approach to the Number 
Problem seeks to justify the case for saving the greater number without 
interpersonal aggregation. The consequentialist proposal is successful in 
achieving this particular purpose. 
7.5 A non-consequentialist proposal: Scanlon's ar-
gument 
Recently, Thomas Scanlon has suggested a different argument for saving 
the greater number. 1O His argument is based on his contractualism, not on 
the betterness of states of affairs: Scanlon does not say that saving more is 
better than saving fewer. 
lOScallloll (1998, pp. 229-41). See also Kamm (1998, p. 101, pp. 114-HJ). 
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His contractualism maintains that an action is wrong if it is ruled out 
by principles that no one can reasonably reject from individual standpoints. 
According to Scanlon's contractualism, whether or not principles can be 
rejected depends only on the reasons from various individual standpoints. 
When there exists even one person who has a plausible reason to reject a 
principle, Scanlon argues, the same principle is not seen as a basis to judge 
the rightness and wrongness of an act, even if many people, however many, 
would have benefited from adopting such a principle. Scanlon's contractual-
ism seems to reject any possibility of aggregating different people's claims. 
However, Scanlon does not want to rule out the possibility that the 
numbers count, saying that "contractualism appears to go too far in the 
opposite direction, disallowing any appeal to aggregative benefits even in 
cases in which the right thing to do does seem to depend on the impact that 
various actions would have on particular individuals but also on the number 
of individuals who would be affected".11 He wishes his contractualism to 
allow the numbers to count at least in some cases so long as it does not open 
the door to an implausible form of aggregation like the utilitarian one. 
Scanlon then puts forward his own case for saving the greater number. 
He first considers a choice between (a) saving A and letting B&C die and (b) 
saving B&C and letting A die. His argument runs as follows. If there is only 
one person on each side, tossing a fair coin might be the principle which no 
one can reasonably reject from individual standpoints. But if the presence 
of C's claim makes no difference to how we are required to go about deciding 
what to do, this implies that C's claim to be saved would have no moral 
significance and hence that C is not shown a positive concern. Therefore, 
C can reasonably reject the principle of tossing a coin. This is all Scanlon 
says. 
It should be noticed that Scanlon's argument is similar to the cOllsequen-
tialist proposal in structure.12 In Scanlon's argument, A's and B's claims 
are balanced out, and C's claim provides the basis to reject the principle of 
tossing a coin, tipping the balance in favour of the principle of saving the 
greater number. The chief difference is (1) that Scanlon's argument is based 
on an individual claim whereas the consequentialist proposal is based on 
the betterness of states of affairs and (2) that Scanlon's argument sees C's 
IlScanion (199S, p. 230). 
12 A more focused discussion on this point is appended t.o the end of this chapt.er. 
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claim as a basis to reject the principle of tossing a coin whereas the con-
sequentialist proposal sees the betterness of C's states as a basis to judge 
the betterness of states of affairs. Even if there are these differences, Scan-
lon's argument is structurally similar to the consequentialist proposal and, 
from this, there is good reason to think that Scanlon's argument, like the 
consequentialist proposal, supports the case for saving the greater number 
without interpersonal aggregation. 
However, someone might argue that Scanlon's argument implicitly relies 
on a type of interpersonal aggregation because C's claim rejects the princi-
ple of coin-tossing only when C's claim is presented together with n's claim. 
This point was recently made by Michael Otsuka, according to whom Scan-
lon's argument "considers C's claim in combination with n's claim so that 
they' tip the balance in favour of saving nand C. So Scanlon's argu-
ment compares the claim of a group of individuals against the claim of one 
person" .13 As Scanlon's argument appeals to the claim of a group of individ-
uals to be saved, Otsuka concludes that it relies on a type of interpersonal 
aggregation. 
Surely, C's claim tips the balance in favour of saving the greater number 
only when C's claim is presented with n's claim against A's claim. So Otsuka 
is right to say that Scanlon's argument "considers C's claim in combination 
with n's claim". However, it is not clear if Scanlon's argument relies on 
interpersonal aggregation. Otsuka seems to imply that whenever someone's 
claim in combination with other people's claims tips the balance in favour 
of them, interpersonal aggregation takes place, even if their claims do not 
dissolve into an objective value. nut I will argue that Scanlon's argument 
does not aggregate n's and C's claims or aggregate the claims of different 
people. 14 
In section 3 of this chapter, I suggested that consequentialism does not 
imply interpersonal aggregation and that. interpersonal aggregation does not. 
imply consequentialism. The same is true in the case of Scanlon's contrac-
tualism. 
130tsuka (2000, p. 291). Original emphasis. 
HOne might. think that the disagreement between Otsuka and me is nothing more 
than a difference in definition, i.e. Otsuka's understanding of interpersonal aggregation is 
broader than mine. Even if this is the case, it can still be said that my argument clarifies 
the implausible form of interpersonal aggregation that Scanlon and other non-utilitarians 
wish to avoid. 
140 
Assume that Scanlon's argument aggregates the claims of different peo-
ple, and let us write Ci. for person i's claim. Assume also that the strength 
of claims of a group can be represented by a real-valued function g( ), where 
the claim of i is stronger than the claim of j if and only if 9 ( Ci ) > 9 (Cj ). 
So the combined claim of Band C is stronger than the claim of A alone if 
and only if 9(CB, Cc) > g(CA)' This is because it is natural to think that 
the function g( ) is increasing in the number of its arguments, and that it is 
not bounded above. 
Now, consider the "television studio example" again. There are two 
cases. If Scanlon's argument aggregates the claims of different people as 
Otsuka claims, then there must be a sufficiently great number n such that 
g(C./ones ) < g(C1,C2,""Cn ), even if g(C./ones ) > g(C1,C2, ... ,Cn-d. That 
is, there must be a sufficiently large number of people such that the com-
bination of weaker claims of those people outweighs the stronger claim of 
Jones. Scanlon, however, does not allow such a combination of claims into 
an objective value. He does not need such combination in order to justify the 
case for saving the greater number. Just as in the case of the consequential-
ist proposal, as far as the claims of people are the same strength, Scanlon's 
argument can justify it by balancing A's and B's claims out and then by 
seeing C's remaining claim as a balance-tipping force. When the claims of 
people are different as in the television studio example, Scanlon's argument 
claims that, like Leximin, we should save Jones. This is because Scanlon's 
argument, like Leximin, does not allow interpersonal aggregation. Otsuka 
is right to say that Scanlon's argument considers C's claim in combination 
with B's claim. But this does not necessarily imply that Scanlon's argument 
relies on some sort of interpersonal aggregation. Scanlon's argument falls 
under the Non-Aggregation Approach to the Number Problem.15 
Finally, it should be noted that, like the consequentialist proposal, Scan-
lon's argument always supports the principle of saving the greater number 
when there is an unbalanced-out claim. Because we give a positive concern 
to each person, the presence of an unbalanced-out claim in the larger group 
15This is just one possible interpretation of Scanlon's argument. It might be argued 
that the claim of .TOlles silences the claims of World Cup viewers. That b, the claims of 
World Cup viewers lose the reason-giving force when it meets with .Tones's claim. But 
my point here is that, even if Scanlon docs not appeal to the notion of silencing a c.ertain 
claim-type, he can still hold that his case for saving the greater number c10es not rcly on 
interpersonal aggregation. 
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provides a legitimate bal3is for rejecting the principle of tossing a coin. This 
is the case whenever the claims of people are equally weighty. Like the con-
sequentialist proposal, Scanlon's argument maintains that we ought always 
to save the greater number. 
7.6 Should the numbers always count?: the Con-
verse Number Problem 
I have examined two successful non-aggregative arguments in the Number 
Problem. Both the consequentialist proposal and Scanlon's argument main-
tain that we should always save the greater number. This is the case when-
ever the goods/claims of people are equally weighty. However, as I briefly 
mentioned in section 1, I believe that we should save the greater number in 
some cases, but that we should toss a coin in other cases even if one group 
is strictly larger than the other. 
Consider the large scale Rescue Case, where we face a choice between (a') 
saving 1000 lives and letting 1001 people die and (b') saving 1001 lives and 
letting 1000 people die. The consequentialist proposal says that saving 1001 
lives is better than saving 1000 lives. Scanlon's argument would say that, if 
we are to adopt the principle of tossing a coin, the additional person on the 
side of 1001 could reasonably reject a principle that favours 1001 lives. So 
both the consequentialist proposal and Scanlon's argument maintain that 
we should save 1001 lives. This is not surprising: the theoretical structure 
of these arguments, i.e. the balancing-out, allows them to support saving 
the greater number regardless of the size of the people concerned. But 
I believe that we should toss a coin in the large scale Rescue Case, even 
if it is the case that we should save the five rather than saving the one. 
If these two judgements are intuitively appealing, we need to provide a 
different argument to explain two seemingly conflicting judgements: that 
(1) we should save the greater number in some cases; and (2) we should toss 
a coin in other cases. On the face of it, the numbers count ill the former 
judgement, whereas the numbers do not count in the latter judgement. I 
have called the Number Problem for the search of arguments for saving the 
greater number. Then, I shall search for an argument which justifies the case 
for tossing a coin. Let us call this problem the Converse Number Problem. 
What is the idea behind the judgement that we should toss a coin in the 
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large scale Rescue Case? Frances Kamm offers a possible answer, though I 
disagree. She considers the large scale Rescue Case. 
Now suppose 1000 people are on one island and 1001 people are 
on another. Here, I believe, it may even be correct to ignore the 
difference of one life. If so, then in this context the one life has 
become an irrelevant utility.I6 
She continues, 
it is not only the (objective) significance of the additional loss 
to the person who will suffer it that counts. ... In addition, 
the size of the chance for life that is at stake for others and the 
number of others whose lives are at stake may make relevant or 
irrelevant an additional utility that is irrelevant or relevant in 
other contextJ7 
Here, Kamm thinks it wrong to deprive 1000 people of their 50 percent 
chance to be saved simply in order to obtain the extra utility of saving 
one more person: an additional life in the group of 1001 is unimportant and 
negligible in the large scale Rescue Case, and it should not count. According 
to Kamm, it is an "irrelevant utility". She believes it right to toss a coin 
and to give each person an equal chance to be saved. IS 
Is an additional life saved in the larger group an irrelevant utility in the 
large scale Rescue Case? I think it a relevant utility. But it is outweighed by 
16Kamm (1993, p. 103). 
17Kamm (1993, p. 103). Originally, her idea of an irrelevant utility is used as a pos-
sible criticism against the substitution of equivalents (which roughly corresponds to my 
Symmetry in the consequentialist proposal) in her Aggregation Argument. 
18To underst.and Kamm's idea of an irrelevant utility, it may be helpful t.o look at. 
anot.her example Kamm discusses (Kalllm 199:{, pp. 101-102). Suppose a choice between 
saving A's life, on the one hand, and saving B's life and curing C's sore t.hroat, on the 
other hand. Call this example the Sore Throat Case. Kamm thinks it wrong to deprive 
A of his 50 percent chance to be saved in order to get the additional utility of curing C's 
sore throat. She thinks that. the additional utility of curing C's sore throat is an irrelevant 
utility. According to Kamm, it is right to toss a coin in the Sore Throat Case. As far 
as this example is concerned, Scanlon might share a similar view. He might claim t.hat, 
faced with a claim to being saved, the claim that the sore throat be t.reated may lose its 
rea80n-giving force, or t.hat the claim that, the sore throat be treated is si.lenced by the 
claim to being saved. However, in the large scale Rescue Case, the claim of an additional 
person may never be silenced by other equally weight claims, 
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some other consideration. The good of an additional life saved is outweighed 
by the bad of something that is caused by saving 1001 lives directly. What 
is this "something" then? It is unfairness: unfairness done to 1000 people 
who are not saved. The next section presents my own argument for tossing a 
coin in the large scale Rescue Case, capitalizing on the notion of unfairness. 
7.7 Taking unfairness seriously 
First of all, let me introduce two accounts of unfairness: a strict account and 
a moderate account. In the Rescue Case, each person, regardless of which 
group he/she might belong to, has an equally strong claim to the good. 
The good is being saved. Each person is equally entitled to this good. So 
their claims should be satisfied equally. When their claims are not satisfied 
equally, it is unfair to those persons whose claim is not satisfied. If the good 
is divisible, we may divide it equally and distribute it to each person equally. 
This is perfectly fair. However, in the Rescue Case, the good is indivisible. 
When some people's claims are satisfied, other people's claims will not be 
satisfied. The only way to satisfy their claims equally is to save nobody. 
This is perfectly fair. 19 
The strict account of unfairness claims that, if an act or policy is unfair 
to someone, it ought to be ruled out, full stop. Unfairness ought to be 
ruled out regardless of how much of good would be obtained by allowing the 
unfairness. Thus, according to the strict account of unfairness, unfairness 
cannot be outweighed by any amount of good, obtained by allowing the 
unfairness. In the Rescue Case, it is unfair to save the people in the larger 
group and let the people in the smaller group die. As each of them has an 
equally strong claim to the good, their claims ought to be satisfied equally. 
As saving nobody is the only way to satisfy the equally strong claim equally, 
it is the only option, which is not ruled out by the strict account of unfairness. 
On the face of it, the coin-tossing seems a fair device. Yet, saving someone 
in the Rescue Case necessarily involves unfairness, because some people are 
left unsaved and this is an unequal satisfaction of equally strong claims. 
Thus, the strict account of fairness would demand that we save nobody. 
On the other hand, the moderate account of unfairness allows a trade 
off between unfairness and other considerations. Like the strict notion of 
19For more detailed treatment of fairnc1lB in thiH line, HCC Broome (UJ90-1, pp. 87-1(2). 
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unfairness, the moderate notion of unfairness claims that it is unfair that 
some people are saved and others are not saved whenever they have an 
equally strong claim. If we save the people in the larger group, it is unfair 
to those in the smaller group. Even if we save the lives of either side by 
tossing a coin, it is still unfair to people who are not saved. However, 
saving no one seems stupid. It may be better to save someone than no one, 
even if doing so involves some unfairness. It is the moderate account of 
unfairness which warrants this move. On the moderate account, unfairness 
is not the only consideration. Other considerations such as the good of 
saving someone are also relevant. Even if saving someone in the Rescue 
Case includes unfairness, that unfairness may be outweighed by the good of 
saving someone. That is, the good of saving someone outweighs the bad of 
unfairness done to those people not saved. This implies that unfairness can 
be outweighed by a sufficient amount of good. What if unfairness is allowed 
to be outweighed by the good of saving someone? The least unfair thing to 
do is to give each person an equal chance to be saved, e.g. by tossing a coin. 
So, the moderate account may claim that we should toss a coin.2o 
The moderate account has a further implication. On this account, it is 
better to save someone than no one. It includes some unfairness. But the 
bad of some unfairness is outweighed by the good of saving someone. This 
implies that, as soon as we judge it better to save someone than no one, we 
are slipping into the domain where unfairness is reduced into a bad, which 
can be outweighed by a good. This opens the door to the possibility that 
the badness of unfairness can be outweighed by a sufficiently large amount 
of good, brought about by saving the greater number of people. We shall 
save someone because saving someone is good enough to outweigh some 
2°It is not my contention that one account of unfairne~s i~ more plau~ible t.han the other 
in general. Whether one account i~ more plausible than the other depends on the context 
of moral judgement. Take racism, for example. If a university docs not admit a student on 
the basis that he is from a certain ethnic group, it is unfair to that student. Many people 
believe that such racism ought to be eliminated however much benefit. t.he university would 
gain by maintaining such a racist admission poliey. In this context, unfairnelis may never 
be thought to be outweighed by any other consideration, and hence we may adopt the 
strict account of unfairness. But, in the Rescue Case, if we adopt the strict account, we 
would end up saving nobody and this seems to be implausible. We should save at least 
some people, even if it includes the unequal satisfaction of equally strong claims, which 
is unfair. Thus, in the particular context of the Rescue Case, it seems t.hat. the moderat.e 
account. is more plausible than the strict account. 
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unfairness. Then, it might be said that saving more lives is even better and 
outweighs more unfairness: and saving the sufficiently large number of lives 
is good enough to outweigh unfairness after all. 
Let us see how this moderate notion of unfairness works in the original 
Rescue Case. In the original Rescue Case, if we choose the least unfair de-
vice, i.e. the coin-tossing, we will save either one life or five lives. Therefore, 
the good of coin-tossing consists in the expected number of lives saved. As 
the probability of each possibility is 50 percent, the expected good of lives 
saved is three lives saved. On the other hand, if we choose to save the greater 
number, we will save five lives for sure. I3ut this is unfair to one person, 
because he is deprived of the chance to be saved. However, if we directly 
saves five lives, unfairness is done to the person on the side of the one, and 
does not do any harm to five persons: it is not unfair to five persons to be 
saved, because their claims are satisfied. Unfairness is a negative factor, or 
one aspect of the bad, which is attributed to the persons whose claims are 
not satisfied. The bad of unfairness is determined by the people who are the 
victims of unfairness. Let us write u. for the bad of unfairness done to one 
person. 
Given that unfairness done to this person should be taken into account 
as a negative factor, we compare the goods of tossing a coin and of saving 
the greater number, i.e. (1) (three lives saved) and (2) (five lives saved) -
(u). Now, the focal point is whether unfairness can be outweighed by the 
good of saving two additional lives. It is hard to determine the relative 
weight of unfairness and of the good of saving two additional lives, but the 
following can be claimed: we toss a coin if u. is more important than the 
good of two lives saved; we directly save five lives if the good of two lives 
saved is more important than u. I think that the good of two lives saved is 
more important than the bad of unfairness done to one perSOll. This is why 
I hold that we should save five lives. 
Next, consider the large scale Rescue Case. If we toss a coin, the expected 
good is 1000 lives and half a life saved. On the other hand, if we save 
the greater number, we will save 1001 lives for sure. What about the bad 
of unfairness? The bad of unfairness, done to each person, is constant 
regardless of the size of people concerned. It is a matter of whether one 
person receives proper respect or not, and this has nothing to do with the 
number of people concerned. The bad of unfairness for each person is the 
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same in both the original Rescue Case and the large scale Rescue Case. 
But the overall bad of unfairness is different in the two respective cases. 
Unfairness done to 1000 people is greater than than the unfairness done to 
one perSOll. For simplicity, suppose that we can represent the overall bad of 
unfairness by the sum of unfairness done to each person. Let us denote u the 
unfairness done to each person. In the original Rescue Case, if we directly 
save five lives, unfairness is done to one person: so the bad of unfairness is 
u. In the large scale Rescue Case, if we directly save 1001 lives, unfairness 
is done to 1000 people: so the overall bad of unfairness is u x 1000. Thus, 
the unfairness done to 1000 people is greater than the unfairness done to 
one person.2l 
After all, we compare (1) (1000 and half lives saved) and (2) (1001 lives 
saved) - (u x 1000). Now, the issue here is whether the good of half a life 
saved is more important than the bad of unfairness done to each of 1000 
people. We should toss a coin if u x 1000 is more important than the good 
of half a life saved. Alternatively, we should save 1001 lives if the good of 
half a life saved is more important than u x 1000. I think that the bad of 
unfairness, done to 1000 people, is more important than the good of half a 
life saved. This is why I believe that we should toss a coin in the large scale 
Rescue Case. 
It should be noted that this argument involves interpersonal aggregation 
in two ways. Firstly, to measure the overall bad of unfairness, it aggregates 
the individual bad of unfairness into the overall bad of unfairness. I proposed 
that unfairness is a bad done to each person. To measure the overall bad 
of unfairness, my argument has aggregated each person's bad as a result 
of unfairness. In my argument, the overall bad of unfairness increases as 
the number of people to whom unfairness is allowed increases. Here, the 
numbers are taken into consideration. 
Secondly, my argument aggregates the good of lives saved. We compare 
the overall bad of unfairness and the difference between the expected number 
of lives saved by tossing a coin and the number of lives saved for sure. In the 
original Rescue Case, for example, we compare the overall bad of unfairness 
21We can make the same argument without using the additive form. Suppose t.hat. t.he 
overall bad of unfairness is represented by a real valued, increasing function h(). If we 
do not. give proper respect to one person, the overall bad of unfairness is h( 1/.). On the 
other hand, if we do not give proper respect to 1000 people, the overall bad of unfairness 
is h((1l)UU=1000). As we assume that the function h( ) is increasing, h((Uju,,=1000) > h(u). 
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and the good of two lives saved. Here, my argument explicitly demands the 
interpersonal aggregation in order to measure the good of two lives saved. 
As the difference increases between the expected number of lives saved by 
tossing a coin and the number of lives saved for sure, it is more likely that 
the good of the extra lives saved outweighs the bad of unfairness. Here, 
again, the numbers are taken into consideration. 
Thus, in my argument, the numbers count in two ways. Firstly, when 
we measure the overall bad of unfairness: if the number of the smaller group 
gets larger, it works in favour of tossing a coin. Secondly, when we measure 
the good of extra lives saved: if the difference between two groups gets 
larger, it works in favor of saving the greater number. 
My argument explicitly includes interpersonal aggregation. This is be-
cause it does not take the view that the rejection of interpersonal aggregation 
does not necessarily imply the proper respect to each person involved in the 
Rescue Case. Thus, my argument falls under the Aggregation Approach to 
the Number Problem. And this approach, I believe, consistently explains 
my case in the Rescue Case and large scale Rescue Case. 
7.8 Concluding remarks 
I have discussed several arguments that have been provoked by Taurek's 
seminal paper. Although there is a substantial difference, these arguments 
attempt to show how we should give a proper respect to each person in Tau-
rek's example. Taurek believes that we should respect each person equally 
and separately, thus flipping a fair coin. Consequentialists maintain that the 
good of the addit.ional life saved in the larger group should be given a pos-
itive respect, thus claiming that saving more is better than fewer. Scanlon 
argues that if we adopt the coin-tossing-procedure, the claim of the addi-
tional person in the larger group would not be respected: as the additional 
person in the larger group can reasonably reject that procedure, the princi-
ple of saving the greater number is one that nobody can reasonably reject. 
Finally, I have argued that unfairness is a failure to give equal respect to 
equally important claims, and that whether we should save the greater num-
ber or toss a coin depends on the balance between the badness of unfairness 
done to people not saved and the goodness of additional lives saved. All 
these arguments respect each person in one way or another. Given that the 
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difference between these arguments rests on the different interpretations of 
what counts as giving respect to each person, it is not easy to determine 
which is the most plausible. However, my proposal sharply contrasts with 
other arguments at least in one respect. It does not claim that interpersonal 
aggregation entails a lack of respect for each person. Rather, interpersonal 
aggregation is useful for encompassing equal respect (or the lack of respect) 
to each person in the overall goodness of alternatives. Interpersonal aggre-
gation is not problematic itself: the problem is how we use interpersonal 
aggregation for the sake of respecting separate people. 
As I have shown, Leximin considers the relevance of the numbers in some 
cases. Therefore, Leximin is not subject to the criticism that it claims to 
toss a coin in the Rescue Case. However, its llon-aggregative nature seems 
to be implausible, because it does not give a good answer to the large scale 
Rescue Case. 
Prioritarians may adopt Leximin in order to avoid my criticisms. Lex-
imin seems implausible in the sense that it rules out interpersonal aggrega-
tion. However, in the same sense, some critics of interpersonal aggregation 
would support Leximin. But, in this chapter, I argued that the rejection of 
interpersonal aggregation is not plausible, especially when we consider the 
large scale Rescue Case. Therefore, I think that Leximin is an implausible 
distributive principle after all. The following is now clear. Priorita.rian-
ism encounters my criticisms in chapter 5. In order to avoid my criticisms, 
Prioritarianism may adopt Leximin. But Leximin turns out to be implau-
sible, too. This shows that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is more 
acceptable than Prioritarianism. 
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Appendix: Lexical dominance in reasons and values 
I discussed the consequentialist proposal and Scanlon's argument separately. 
In this appendix, I shall point out the theoretical similarity between the two 
proposals. 
According to Scanlon's contractualism: 
an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would 
be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation 
of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement. 22 
Scanlon claims that the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on 
various individuals reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives 
to it. Suppose that we are faced with a choice between 
(a) saving A and letting Band C die 
(b) saving Band C and letting A die 
According to Scanlon, it is right to choose (b). On the other hand, if we 
are faced with a choice between 
(a*) saving Jones from serious injury and inconveniencing a mil-
lion World Cup viewers 
(b*) letting a million World Cup viewers enjoy and letting Jones 
be in pain 
According to Scanlon, it is right to choose (a*). I am neither for nor 
against Scanlon's contractualism. But I think we can reach the same con-
clusions without proceeding via contractualist argument. I think we can 
reach the same conclusions by appealing directly to the reasons why the 
relevant principles could or could not be rejected, thereby explaining in a 
more direct way why we should do what Scanlon tells us to do. The main 
idea here is that some reason types (or value types) lexically dominate other 
reason types (or value types) in terms of normative force. 
A plausible explanation of why a million World Cup viewers could not 
reasonably reject a principle which requires us to save Jones would be that 
22Scanlon (1997, p. 153). 
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the reason we have for saving Jones is of a significantly different type than 
the type of reason we have for not inconveniencing a single person in the 
group of a million people. Here is my proposed analysis of this structure: 
(Let m and p be reason tokens of type M and P, respectively.) 
Lexical Dominance: if Al reasons lexically dominate P rea-
sons in terms of normative force, then for any two incompatible 
options supported by either Iv! reasons or P reasons (and no 
other type of reason) 
(1) if there is at least one m supporting an option, then we 
ought to choose the option that is supported by the greater 
number of m's; and 
(2) if the number of m's supporting each option is the same, 
then we ought to choose the option that is supported by 
the greater total number of p's. 
By appealing to the idea that some reason types lexically dominate other 
reason types we can explain why the numbers count only sometimes. Let • 
us suppose that considerations of serious harm provide us with reasons of a 
type which is such that it (the type of reason) lexically dominates reasons 
of the type provided by considerations of inconveniencing people. If this is 
the case then, in the first example, the fact that A would be saved by our 
doing (a) gives us a reason to do (a). The fact that B would be saved by our 
doing (b) gives us a reason to do (b), and the fact that C would be saved 
by our doing (b) gives us another reason to do (b). Since these reasons are 
all of the same type, what we ought to do is to choose the option which is 
supported by the greater number of reason tokens, i.e. (b). This is because, 
according to lexical dominance, if the relevant reason tokens are all of the 
same type, then we ought to choose the option that is supported by the 
largest number of reason tokens, i.e. (b). So the first example is a situation 
in which the numbers count. 
In the second example, the reason we have for saving a person from 
serious injury is of a different type than the reasons we have for allowing a 
million people to enjoy. Again, if we suppose that the reason we have for 
saving a person from serious injury is of a type that lexically dominates the 
type of reason we have for allowing a million people to enjoy, then the fact 
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that Jones would be relieved of his pain by our doing (a*) gives us a reason 
to do (a*). The fact that World Cup viewer one would be able to enjoy the 
match by our doing (b*) is a reason to do (b*); the fact that World Cup 
viewer two would be able to enjoy the match by our doing (b*) is another 
reason for doing (b*) and so on. Viewed this way, if there are a million World 
Cup viewers, we have a million reasons for doing (b*). However, according 
to lexical dominance, we ought to do (a*). If reasons of the former type 
lexically dominate reasons of the latter type, then we should indeed save the 
single person from serious injury, regardless of how many World Cup viewers 
will be inconvenienced. So the second example is a situation in which the 
numbers do not count with regards to determining what we ought to do. 
Again, Scanlon could appeal to lexical dominance as the explanation for 
why Jones could reasonably reject a principle which required us to not to 
inconvenience a very large number of World Cup viewers. 
Whether or not the lexical dominance of some reason types over other 
reason types captures Scanlon's thinking in the examples above, it picks out 
not only a possible explanation of the theoretical structure underlying his 
contractualism, but it also provides, in its own right, an intuitively attrac-
tive way of understanding how considerations of the numbers are relevant in 
different cases. I take this to be an attractive feature of the proposal. Fur-
thermore, since the proposal can explain why we ought to choose the options 
Scanlon says we ought to choose without appealing to the more complicated 
argument he puts forward, my proposal has the virtue of being relatively 
simple. 
Another advantage of my proposal is that it can be accepted by both 
those who take reasons to be the most basic normative concepts and those 
who take a similar view about value(s) (or the good). Scanlon takes the 
idea of a reason as primitive. For him, the notion of a reason is the most 
basic normative entity. However, he does not deny that there is a correlation 
between reasons and values. He says: 
being valuable is not a property that provides us with reasons. 
Rather, to call something valuable is to say that it has other 
properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with 
regard to it.23 
23Scanlon (1997, p.96). 
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This view has become known as the buck-passing account of value. Some 
philosophers disagree with this. According to those who do, it is the positive 
value of an object, action, or state of affairs that provides us with reasons 
to behave in certain ways with regard to it. I have no argument for or 
against either view here. However, regardless of whether we endorse a value-
based or a reason-based theory of ethics (or practical reason), the idea of 
lexical dominance is compatible with either view. The basic idea of lexical 
dominance can be applied to a value-based theory as well. Scanlon says he 
wants to avoid the counterintuitive implications of various implausible forms 
of aggregation such as utilitarianism. By introducing the idea of a lexical 
ordering of reason types, we can certainly avoid these implications. However, 
it is certainly possible to retain the idea that values are the fundamental 
normative element of ethics and/or practical reason, while endorsing the 
view that some value types lexically dominate other value types.24 
A slightly modified, value-based version of our proposal would run as 
follows: 
Lexical Dominance (V): if Jv! values are discontinuously more 
valuable than P values, then for any two incompatible options 
to which either 111 values or P values attach (and to which no 
other type of value attaches) 
(1) if there is at least one m value attached to an option, then 
we ought to choose the option that has the greater number 
of m values attached to it; and 
(2) if the number of m values attached to each option is the 
same, then we ought to choose the option that has the 
greater total number of p values attached to it. 
So my proposal here is, at least on the face of it, neutral between value-
based and reason-based theories of ethics. However, if it can be shown that 
the structure of reasons differs from the structure of value(s) (or the good) 
- e.g. if some reason types are discontinuous with other reason types but 
all values (or value types) are continuous with each other (or vice versa),-
then there may be reasons for preferring one model over the other. If, on the 
2-1J. S. Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures would be an example of 
this. 
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other hand, reasons and values have the same structure, then for all practical 
purposes it will not matter which model we appeal to in order to justify our 
actions. There may of course be deeper metaphysical, epistemological, or 
semantic reasons for saying that either reasons or value are more basic. But 
I have nothing to say about these issues. 
By appealing to the idea that some reason types lexically dominate other 
reason types, we can explain why the numbers only count sometimes. The 
numbers count when and only when the relevant reason types allow it to. I 
have also said that this idea can be accepted by both reason-based and value-
based theories of ethics and practical reason, provided that these theories 
allow not only for the existence of different reason types and value types 
but also for the existence of lexical orderings between these types. For these 
reasons, I think that the model I have presented here should be attractive 
to a wide variety of ethical theorists. 
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Conclusion 
In the Introduction, I suggested that Egalitarianism has not been properly 
defined or understood. In this dissertation, I offered a proper definition 
and defence of a version of Egalitarianism. I argued that we should en-
dorse Weighted Egalitarianism whenever equality is thought to be valuable 
amongst equally deserving people. 
Par fit and his followers believe that the Levelling Down Objection illu-
minates the relative advantage of Prioritariallism over any versions of Telic 
Egalitarianism. However, as I showed, this is not the case. Weighted Egal-
itarianism meets the Levelling Down Objection. It also gives priority to 
the worse off, like Prioritarianism. The difference lies in what is meant 
by "the worse off". In Weighted Egalitarianism, a person is worse off in 
the sense that he is worse off than others. In Prioritarianism, a person is 
worse off in the sense that he is at a lower absolute level. Accordingly, 
Weighted Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism differ with regards to how to 
determine how much each person's well-being counts in the overall good-
ness of a distribution. In 'Weighted Egalitarianism, the weight is determined 
by the rank-order position of the person. In Prioritarianism, it is given by 
the absolute moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently of the 
distribution of people's well-being. This crucial difference is not properly 
captured in the literature. It is left obscure mainly because Par'fit's paper 
was entitled "Equality or Priority?". This title gave us an impression that 
Telic Egalitarianism does not give priority to the worse off, whereas many 
people intuitively believe that we should give priority to the worse off. As the 
real difference between the two principles is left obscure, Prioritarians may 
not know exactly what kind of bullet they are supposed to bite. They must 
presuppose, or at least justify, the existence of the independent measure of 
the goodness of well-being. I believe it is hard to bite such bullet. 
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I have also suggested that Prioritarianism has a further bullet to bite, 
i.e. that they must accept Leximin. Leximin surely avoids my criticisms 
of Prioritarianism defined by strong separability and the Pigou-Dalton con-
dition. However, it is extreme in the sense that it rules out the trade off 
between the well-being of a worse off person and the well-being of the better 
off people. Although Leximin would gain some support from the critics of 
interpersonal aggregation, I argued that the rejection of interpersonal aggre-
gation is not acceptable. Although I did not claim that Prioritarianism is 
a hopeless distributive principle, my exposition, I hope, successfully showed 
that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism or 
Leximin. 
Some claims of Prioritarianism are intuitively appealing. It seems to me 
that many people are supporting Prioritarianism on the intuitive basis. I 
pointed out that Prioritarians must have an argument for the independent 
moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of distributions of 
people's well-being. I believe that this is not the easy task. Probably, Pri-
oritarians may have a cake and eat it. They may claim that sociologist will 
find such absolute measure and moral scale for Prioritarians, or claim that 
we practically have the absolute measure, saying "Look at these homeless 
people! Do you still claim that there is no absolute measure of well-being?" . 
In response to this, I can only say that I agree with such an intuition, but 
that I cannot see the plausible theoretical foundation for such a judgement. 
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